South-South cooperation and new agricultural development aid actors in western and southern Africa

China and Brazil - Case studies

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The analyses and conclusions in this working paper are the authors’ own. They do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the Agence Française de Développement or its partner institutions.

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Findings

Differences in intensity between the two donors

Brazil’s presence remains that of a newcomer, characterised by exploratory missions and initiatives most often than not left to the wayside. China, meanwhile, has the benefit of fifty years’ experience in agricultural investments and a highly visible presence in the field. Paradoxically, while agriculture is a key area of intervention for Brazil, it occupies a relatively marginal position in relation to China’s interests. In both cases, the donors suggest that their legitimacy in intervening in Africa is derived from their respective successes as regards their own agricultural development. Many projects are planned and far fewer are carried out, hence the need to monitor the different countries closely.

Contrasting interventions in the agricultural sector

Brazil places an emphasis on technical cooperation and technology transfer, while China continues its aid projects, which have remained fairly unchanged in form over the last fifty years, in addition to developing its presence through government-assisted investments from large state-owned companies.

Brazil contributes its expertise in relation to farming, support to food-producing cooperatives and farmers’ organisations as well as to the sector of food crops. While it actively supports family farming, the country is also, much like Argentina, involved in supporting and encouraged to support initiatives with links to international markets. This applies particularly to soya cultivation in southern Africa, with Brazil and Argentina recognised as authorities on the subject (genetics, farming techniques and agricultural technology). Brazil is also heavily involved in supporting the development of agrofuels. China, meanwhile, develops large farms and irrigation projects and invests mainly in rice, cotton and sugar production and in processing industries. Contrary to popular belief, neither Brazil nor China is involved in large-scale land grabbing. The majority of China’s agro-industrial ventures produce products for African markets rather than for exports to China.

Both donors are increasingly focused on triangular cooperation projects, and do not seek to ‘oppose’ traditional DAC/OECD donors. However, triangular cooperation projects are today predominantly from Brazil; in Mozambique, for instance, the three major projects that Brazil is involved in are being carried out in partnership with USAID and JICA. China has only recently become involved in triangular cooperation initiatives, most frequently with international institutions (FAO), or, less commonly, bilaterally with industrialised countries (DFID). In any case, the involvement of these donating countries with African countries as part of the process initiated as a result of the Paris Declaration is non-existent or even hostile as they consider that their aid must be tied.

Multiple Chinese stakeholders intervene in the agricultural industry, without any real coordination. Their interventions are increasingly managed by major public and private Chinese companies as well as by development banks. These private actors are seeking opportunities in Africa. Brazilian stakeholders are still, in the main, public organisations (EMBRAPA International, on behalf of the ABC), with few active private companies.

Agriculture: a springboard for moving into other areas

For Brazil and China alike, agriculture represents a showcase in the international arena and a springboard from which to move into other domains. For China, moreover, financing agricultural and rural developments is increasingly tied to other infrastructure projects through concessional loans.
Differing views

States tend to view the presence of these actors in the field differently. States that attract the fewest investors tend to welcome emerging donors all the more easily (and China in particular) that they are lacking in technical and financial partners (cf. Benin). However, Brazilian cooperation has the benefit of historical and cultural closeness (particularly with Portuguese-speaking countries), which is not the case for Chinese cooperation, which is fairly systematically a cause for concern.

For both donors, this remains a learning process, one that is characterised by trial and error and by the very gradual emergence of research into African economies and societies. However, assessments are still very rare and much criticism has been directed towards China’s technical cooperation, where dialogue remains difficult and where extension services are becoming fee-based, for example. African partners seem to view Brazil’s technical cooperation slightly more positively, despite the fact that its involvement is sometimes considered too limited when compared with diplomatic promises. At times, Brazil’s contributions have triggered fears regarding its real intentions, particularly as concerns land access.
The aim of this study is to better understand, from the information collected on missions undertaken in Senegal, Benin, Ghana, Mozambique, and Brazil, the scope and methods of Chinese and Brazilian cooperation interventions in western and southern Africa’s agricultural sector.

In the scope of this study, attention has also been paid to the cooperations leaded by Argentina in the agricultural sector of different African countries, but we will only detail here results about China and Brazil.

Firstly, it is necessary to identify cooperation initiatives in the sector: what projects have in fact effectively been implemented? A database, detailing over 120 agricultural projects implemented by Chinese and Brazilian operators, has been built on data collected from articles in the written press, from missions in the field and from publications by cooperation agencies. Also needed is an overview of the different Chinese and Brazilian stakeholders working in Africa, both public and private. The overview should detail their aims, operating procedures and constraints and emphasise the ‘problematic boundaries’ that lie between public and private sectors. In the context of programmes carried out in Africa and Brazil, relevant elements of appreciation have been determined (although these cannot be considered as a form of evaluation). How are such projects developed, initiated and by whom? Which forms of logic apply and what aims do they fulfill? How do the different stakeholders in the field perceive them? Lastly, two other questions are addressed. The first deals with the fact that the knowledge of Africa acquired by China and Brazil is essentially derived from academic research. What is the nature of this scientific output? The second deals with the intersecting perceptions and often persistent – and even unfounded – rumours about both these financial donors. Why is there a general distrust of and particular anxiety about Chinese stakeholders and, conversely, a degree of solidarity with and closeness to Brazilian stakeholders?

As a means of understanding the reasons why both these emerging countries intervene in sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to bear in mind various fundamental considerations. Firstly, China and Brazil’s cooperation policies can only be understood by taking into account their lengthy implementation. They are often dated and have been configured as a function of each State’s domestic policy orientations. This historical element explains why they seem permanent, even inert, as well as it explains the onset of major transformations. Furthermore, for both countries, cooperation is largely influenced by diplomatic considerations and an unabashed determination to affirm their status as emerging powers within the multilateral system, as well as their intention to defend their economic interests (foreign trade, especially foreign direct investment). In this context, the agricultural sector has its own specificities; it is not an area that China seeks to focus on when intervening in Africa, but rather a springboard for other, more profitable, activities, particularly mining and infrastructure construction. However, both these powers consider that Africa could benefit from their rural development expertise. The concept of transferring a development model is not made explicit in official reports, but is the focus of what both Chinese and Brazilian experts say in the field, while depicting the difficulties they encounter. Finally, China and Brazil’s many stakeholders are radically reshaping frames of reference and norms of cooperation, as well as altering financing procedures for the economies in which they are active; they are not neutral actors in the current context of the relative pooling of funds in favour of agriculture on the part of traditional DAC/OECD donors. However, the very content of their frames of reference is so complex that it is difficult to untangle.
Map 1. Context of study
As with all development funding, contributions are both public and private. Public contributions are hard to measure as Brazil’s and China’s definition of Official development assistance (ODA) differs from that of the DAC/OECD. For an ODA loan, only the ‘state cost’ is considered aid – the boundaries between public and private interventions are hard to delineate and the intended projects are frequently accounted for as firm commitments although many will not come to fruition. There is often a political motivation behind establishing a local presence, leading to media hype about aid projects that have, in fact, not yet been implemented. An example of this is the report by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), where the majority of projects listed as being ‘underway’ are in fact projects that have been the subject of a delegation visit or site study but which have not yet become reality. As regards private contributions, small companies in the agricultural sector relatively frequently escape review and, in China’s case, are relatively numerous.

It is important to take all of these parameters into account so that data is used rationally, putting a stop to the vicious circle of repeatedly reusing unverified information that gives rise to rumours and preconceived ideas. However, the database proves to be a relevant tool in assessing the sectors where China and Brazil’s activities are focused, as well as the types of financing and the partnerships.

The initial results from the database provide information on the number of projects studied, broken down by region and financial donor as detailed below:

Table 1. Breakdown of China/Brazil projects by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Western Africa</th>
<th>Southern Africa</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AFD-CIRAD database, 2012
Projects, whether public or private, seem to be concentrated in some countries more than others. For China, four countries in western Africa – Benin, Ghana, Mali and Senegal – are the sites of two-thirds of all projects, 43 out of a total 61. In southern Africa, out of the 32 projects identified, 17 are in Mozambique, 5 in Zimbabwe and 4 in Tanzania. One might have expected Portuguese-speaking Africa to be favoured by Brazil. This is not the case: only a third of the projects are in Portuguese-speaking African countries. For China, meanwhile, 67 projects are underway in non-Portuguese-speaking countries.

While the majority of projects are considered as ODA, private contributions come mainly from China.

Table 2. Breakdown of China/Brazil public-private projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public Development Aid</th>
<th>Private contributions</th>
<th>Other public contributions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AFD-CIRAD database, 2012

According to the information in the AFD-CIRAD database, China has acquired relatively little land (of the land currently covered in the study) for agricultural purposes alone. Brazil’s land acquisition in this regard is almost non-existent. For China, circa 20,000 ha of land in western Africa have been acquired, of which over 10,000 ha are in Benin (the Complant group) and less than 6,000 ha in Mali (this does not take into account the planned extension of the Sukala sugar plant). In southern Africa, land transactions are estimated to account for less than 9,000 ha, over half of these in Zimbabwe. Given that land grabbing has affected some two million hectares of land across the entire continent, the role of these two countries remains very marginal.

When broken down by sector, Brazil’s and China’s interventions are fairly different. Brazil’s activities seem to be mainly focused on training, research and support to producers’ cooperatives as well as on the funding of studies and consultations. Few productive initiatives are currently identified; the ProSavana project in northern Mozambique to produce soya for exports, which is still in the launch phase, falls within this category. China is active in two main areas: supporting research and extension initiatives, with agricultural demonstration centres playing a key role, and working with productive projects that involve operating farms, supplying agricultural inputs as well as irrigation projects and, more generally, rural engineering plans. Agricultural projects are, in the main, food-based (mainly rice growing and vegetable farms) and, to a lesser extent, industrial projects (essentially sugar, cassava). The largest share of the produce is destined for national and regional markets in Africa, with little emphasis on exports, with the exception of agrofuels (Sierra Leone, Benin), for which there is a potential European market.
1. Current mapping of Brazilian and Chinese interventions in the agricultural sector

Map 2. Types of Chinese intervention in African agriculture

Chinese agriculture and diplomacy

Sectors that Chinese cooperation projects focus on
- Rice growing
- Market gardening
- Cotton
- Sugar
- Irrigation projects

Agroindustrial investments

Figure from Land Matrix, Anseeuw, W., Boche, M., Breu, T., Giger, M., Lay, J., Messerli, P. and Nolte, K. 2012

*these figures reflect land transactions that have already taken place and those that are currently being negotiated, but which may not be completed.

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2. Chinese and Brazilian international stakeholders

2.1. Chinese stakeholders – public and private

Multiple Chinese stakeholders intervene in Africa, although there is no clear leadership, i.e. no real coordinating function. FOCAC is a forum that brings together Chinese authorities and African heads of state every four years, providing the opportunity to make major general policy announcements. At the Egyptian summit, four agricultural sector targets were set out: the creation of 20 agricultural demonstration centres and technical cooperation programmes, supporting CAADP/NEPAD and conducting triangular cooperation actions. This policy was reaffirmed in Beijing in July 2012.

MOFCOM acts as a development agency. Exim Bank grants public loans, under the authority of MOFCOM, the main aim of which is to support Chinese businesses abroad through exclusively tied aid. The China Development Bank gives loans in exchange for raw materials and its agricultural projects are marginal. The China Africa Development Fund (CADF) is a branch of the FOCAC that was created in 2006 with the aim of supporting Chinese businesses in establishing joint ventures (with Benin PC, for example).

Public agro-industrial firms initially created to meet China’s domestic needs have become internationalised as part of the ‘going global’ policy. The largest of these is the China State Farms Agribusiness Corporation (CSFAC), to which we owe the Koba rice farm in Guinea, the Sino-Zambian Friendship Farm and investments in Tanzania. China’s ZTE Agribusiness Company Ltd has a significant presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan, especially as regards the production of agrofuels produced from rubber. The China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation (COFCO), a key figure in Chinese trade, specialises in selling foodstuffs, cereals and oils and is China’s leading importer and exporter in these sectors. The Complant group invests mainly in three sugar plants in Madagascar, Sierra Leone and Benin. China Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries is active in Sierra Leone. Other firms are involved in developing processing infrastructures, such as the China National Overseas Engineering Corporation for the Ségou sugar plant in Mali. Lastly, certain firms like Geocapital are beginning to invest in the agrofuel industry. Contrary to popular belief, Chinese agro-industrial companies are far from finding easily exploitable inroads into Africa: there are many failures and the majority of successes are the result of several years of experience on site.

The presence of regional public firms is increasing. These include the Shanxi Province Agribusiness Group (with a particular presence in Cameroon), the Hubei Agribusiness Group (in Mozambique) and Chongqing Seed, specialised in commercial operations in the field of seeds and owners of agricultural sites, notably in Tanzania. The latter is based in Chongqing and has a significant presence in Africa, aided by the Chinese government’s support to businesses seeking to establish an overseas presence, by means of an equity share, by providing support to production and distribution through tax exemptions and advice for establishing a presence in African countries. While there does not appear to be a huge influx of Chinese businessmen in Africa’s agribusiness industry at present, the state offers incentives to allow some businesses to establish their presence on the international market. Africa is by no means seen as an economic eldorado by Chinese agro-industrial companies, but is rather considered as a solution to the difficult situations in China, where competition is growing.

Small and medium-sized private companies largely act independently of governmental policies, unlike large public...
and semi-public corporations. Such SMEs are in fact hard to identify and are often unknown to Chinese embassies in Africa. For example, data from the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC), part of the Ghanaian Ministry of Finance, attests to the presence in this sector of seven Chinese investors, unknown to the Chinese embassy.

2. Chinese and Brazilian international stakeholders

2.2. Brazilian stakeholders

The international role of Brazilian stakeholders has been strengthened since Lula became President in 2002 and continues to grow under Dilma Rousseff’s presidency. The representation of the private sector remains marginal. Beyond bilateral relations, Brazil intervenes through inter-regional agreements (customs, scientific cooperation, etc.) and through the IBSA forum that it established.

The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), under the authority of the Ministry of External Relations (MRE), develops Brazil’s cooperation policies. Although the ABC was originally an agency designed to manage the aid received by Brazil rather than the other way around, the organisation now finds itself facing an identity crisis and a significant organisational challenge, itself indicative of the change in Brazil’s international status. UNDP Brazil has played an active role in strengthening the ABC at a national level and now at the international level. This heritage manifests itself in the current workings of the ABC, which is not financially or administratively independent and can therefore only invest abroad through the implementation of agencies such as EMBRAPA. EMBRAPA has only operated internationally since 1997 and, since 2006, has opened offices in Ghana, as well as in Mozambique and Senegal. With the increase in South-South cooperation initiatives, EMBRAPA is now also facing institutional and organisational challenges: while its main area of work is still academic research, for which it enjoys financial and long-term strategic autonomy, the agency is increasingly consulted by the ABC for short-term technical expertise assignments which are relatively isolated. The Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA), meanwhile, intervenes to support family-farming programmes.

EMATER provides rural technical assistance and SENAI specialises in professional training as in Mozambique.

The National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) provides support to Brazilian exports. The Banco do Brasil, which finances the ‘Mais Alimentos África’ project, seeks to make it easier for African countries to buy Brazilian agricultural products.

In comparison with China, the engagement in Africa of Brazil’s private sector remains relatively limited, particularly in the agricultural sector. Private Brazilian investment in Africa lies principally in construction (Odebrecht, Camargo Corrêa), mining (Vale do Rio Doce) and oil (Petrobras). The first African country to receive Brazilian investment is Angola. Brazilian investment in agribusiness is limited, although there are some exceptions. For example, Asperbras in Angola is responsible for implementing irrigation systems and managing maize, soya and bean farms. Asperbras is also developing processing plants for cashew nuts and vegetable oil production in Guinea-Bissau. Bioenergy agreements were signed with Senegal in 2006 and public-private partnership agreements with Congo and Nigeria in 2007. In 2009, Angola launched a 30,000 ha sugar cane project for the production of ethanol as part of a joint venture, known as Biom (The Bioenergy Company of Angola), between Angola’s state-owned company Sonangol, the Angolan private player Damer and the Brazilian firm Odebrecht. Mozambique signed two contracts for Brazilian bioenergy investment, as reported by the Brazilian Confederation of Biofuel Companies (APLA).
3. Approaches to cooperation

China: from technical cooperation... to trade relations

The provision of technical assistance remains China’s longest-standing strategy for intervention. While reports of the high numbers of experts sent abroad are frequent, more qualitative assessments are still sorely lacking. As a result, there have been no major changes in the project implementation process, giving rise to the same criticisms from stakeholders in the field: Chinese teams lack adaptability on the ground, communication is difficult (many Chinese experts present locally only speak Mandarin) and post-project follow-ups are only rarely considered. These projects appear to be vestiges of an approach to cooperation that was adopted by China in the 1960s, largely to fulfill a ‘diplomatic’ function. In Sangalkam in Senegal, where five or six Chinese engineers are present, training farmers in market gardening techniques has been limited (with very few participants), and demonstration plots have become commercial farming plots due to the business prospects available in Dakar. The centre in Guia, too far from any urban markets to become profitable, has fallen into ruin. In Podor, where there are five active Chinese engineers, the few local farmers who receive training seem generally satisfied, but the efficiency of the one-day training course is questionable as less than one hundred farmers have been trained since 2006. The Senegalese government does not report these shortcomings, as the local presence of China is key to finding the funding for other investments.

Rather than technical assistance projects that are of a seemingly unpredictable duration, China now favours investment projects combining aid and profitability through the intervention of agro-industrial firms. This change in approach, although not generalised, is apparent in Ghana, where China enjoys the role of main commercial partner since 2010. Indeed, although Ghana is one of China’s strategic partners, it is also one of the only western African countries where China sends no agricultural cooperation missions. An advisor from the Chinese embassy in Accra states: ‘With Ghana, we have entered into the partnership stage’. Thus China has gradually replaced agricultural development aid projects with offers of loans for agricultural infrastructure, such as the irrigation project for the Accra Plains.

The shift towards providing support through parapublic Chinese firms is borne out across a range of industries and countries. For example, the Complant group, active in Benin, produces sugar and agrofuels for domestic and European markets. This project is considered as a pilot initiative that will be replicated in Sierra Leone (Magbass) and Madagascar. The rice-growing project in Mozambique operated by the Hubei Liangfeng consortium covers 300 ha cultivated by 15 Chinese technicians and is set to be extended to cover 10,000 ha and involve 500 Chinese technicians and local staff; the main goal here is to enhance the profitability of rice production and to invoice training programs at rates considered as prohibitively expensive. The Benin Textile group, where the China Textile Industrial Corporation holds a 51% stake, faces significant difficulties in attempting to extend its operations over a 6,000 ha area.

A new generation of private Chinese businessmen has appeared over the last decade. These individuals arrive in a country, often through a family contact, contributing to increasing the number of Chinese communities whose members originally come from the same province. Thus we see concentrations of Chinese businessmen from Hebei in Mozambique and from Fujian and Henan in Senegal. In the case of agricultural sites, these businessmen negotiate land access directly with rural communities. Most often, the Chinese emigrants to Africa who come for agricultural investment purposes do so for want of other options, with income in China proving too low to face the stiff market competition. However, they often intend to return to China
once they have built up wealth. In the agricultural industry, they invest in aviculture, processing industries (distilleries, for example), market gardening or in the supply of farming inputs and tools. The products are destined to be sold locally, to Chinese expatriates or African markets. Most of these businesses receive only ‘theoretical’ support from the Chinese government and are in practice relatively scattered. There seems to be no deliberate governmental policy in such cases. Many of these newly internationalised firms are very isolated and encounter many difficulties in Africa. In particular, they come up against land access difficulties (as with the Nongken Gongs group from Guangdong, which produces cassava in Benin) due to their limited knowledge of national laws. In order to circumvent some of these difficulties, independent businessmen create informal organisations such as the Accra-based Sino-Ghanaian Chamber of Commerce, and also negotiate directly with farmers’ organisations, such as in Benin, to find institutional compromises favourable to the establishment of their local presence.

Demonstration centres

Created as a means of showcasing Chinese expertise, these centres are, for the first three years after their establishment, operated and managed by state-owned Chinese firms. Of the 20 promised by China in 2006, 14 are currently in place and operational. The high degree of autonomy of the groups managing these centres is not propitious to their training and technology transfer missions: they are, in fact, in no way accountable for the content of their training programmes, as though their mere existence was in itself the justification of China’s efforts to contribute to the development of African agriculture. The study conducted with centres in Mozambique and Benin has brought to light many issues. First, the research and training programmes offered by the centres meet none of the needs of the beneficiary countries, instead fulfilling the strategic aims of the centre-managing firms. In addition, there is no system for assessing the programmes that these centres run and over which beneficiary country governments have little control. Communication is non-existent, making it highly difficult to gather more information on the nature of these centres’ activities, barring on-site visits that require authorisation from the Chinese firm. Finally, the centres do not collaborate with the national agronomic research organisations of the relevant countries: in Benin, an agreement signed with the Ministry of Agriculture triggered disputes soon after the opening of the Cotonou centre, set up on land owned by INRAB (the Benin Agronomic Research Institute). In fact, INRAB had not been consulted regarding the creation of the centre on land intended for agricultural testing purposes, and was not even invited to partake in the activities of the Chinese centre. As a result of these disputes, the centre was closed and could not be visited during the study.

The role of triangular cooperation within Chinese cooperation

China partakes in two types of ‘triangular’ cooperation: one with the FAO, the other with the DFID (UK) and has sent more experts than any other country since the creation of the special programme for food security, launched by the FAO in 1994 and ratified in 1996. It has signed agreements with Ethiopia (1998), Mauritania (1999), Mali (2000), Nigeria (2003), Sierra Leone (2006), Gabon (2007) and Senegal (2011). In total, more than 700 Chinese experts were sent to Africa between 1994 and 2006, with an additional 3,000 experts promised in the announcements made at the FOCAC meeting in Beijing in 2006. However, beyond these cumulated figures, it is impossible to gather precise information on the duration of these programmes or on the actual nature of this cooperation. Similarly, the assessments of these programmes are very rare. For China, then, agricultural cooperation with the FAO is derived from a process of international inclusion and recognition for its role in developing African agriculture.

Furthermore, a triangular cooperation initiative was launched in July 2012, between the DFID, China and selected African countries. Four areas of strategic alliance were defined: mechanising small-scale producers, processing agricultural products, developing small-scale farms (poultry, market garden produce and fish-farming) and rehabilitating agricultural land. It is nevertheless to be noted that this coope-
Technical cooperation remains Brazil’s preferred form of intervention in African agriculture. This cooperation is inspired by the concept of united diplomacy, with Brazil sharing its experience with other developing countries. The political discourse that accompanies this technical cooperation is based on the concept of horizontalism, on the respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic issues of countries. In practice, the ensuing cooperation is strongly inspired by a technology transfer vision, where Brazil would share with its partners its progress and success in such matters. The activities and presence of Brazil are in sharp contrast with China’s approach. While short-term expert missions remain the key levers for action, one EMBRAPA representative has been assigned to Senegal, Mozambique and Ghana. These representatives collaborate closely with the Brazilian embassy and their institutional positions facilitate their local inclusion: they are members of the local agronomic research institutions (similar to cooperative organisations in industrialised countries), and consequently work directly with their local peers. This practice is thus radically different from the one preferred by China, where no extensive contact with local executives or populations is established.

There are three technical cooperation projects in Mozambique: the Agricultural Innovation Platform, the Programme for Improving Food Security in Mozambique (ProAlimentar) and the Mozambique Programme for the Development of Africa’s Tropical Savannah (ProSavana). These programmes are based on triangular cooperation with an industrialised country; the first two are being developed with USAID and the third with JICA (Japan). Since November 2011, other triangular cooperation projects are conducted with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and a partnership with the Brazilian government to develop African and Asian agriculture has been announced. The Memorandum of Cooperation between the ABC and the Foundation thus aims at furthering cooperation in various agricultural projects. In addition, the Gates Foundation announced a 2.5 million USD donation to support the Africa-Brazil Agricultural Innovation Marketplace established by EMBRAPA. According to the ABC’s Executive Director: ‘Triangular partnerships such as this one offer a model to scale up our resources and strengthen cooperation to the benefit of the world’s poorest countries … Together, the ABC and the Gates Foundation can do more for African development than they could through independent initiatives.’

In Senegal, technical cooperation is based on four key pillars: developing agrofuels, supporting rice growing, supporting horticulture and livestock farming. The results obtained in this country will determine the continuation of cooperation activities in other countries in the region – Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, where a cotton project is already in place. The rice-growing project in Senegal, both because of its limited scope and repetitive adjustments, acts as a pilot project for the region. Despite the relatively successful outcome of this project, the results of the horticultural and livestock farming projects, which have since been stopped, were less convincing, triggering doubts as to whether cooperation in the field of agrofuels will be maintained (at the preliminary study stage).
The Cotton 4 project, launched in Benin, Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad in 2009, aims to strengthen the national research and technical skills and to build and equip research sites. It also seeks to demonstrate, mainly through ‘showcases’, Brazil’s expertise in cotton, before taking an interest in other areas (fruit and vegetables, etc.) and topics (biotechnologies, etc.). The project in Benin, however, is currently only at its initial stage of development, and it is still too early to discuss results or possible applications.

Brazil is the UEMOA’s main cooperating partner in the field of biofuels. The Memorandum of Understanding (framework agreement for scientific cooperation) was signed during Brazilian President Lula Da Silva’s visit to Ouagadougou on October 15, 2007, and was ratified by the Brazilian Parliament in 2009. The study’s terms of reference for promoting sustainable green energy in UEMOA areas (with financing from the BNDES) were announced in July 2011, a Brazilian Design Office was selected in September 2011 and the official launch of the study scheduled for March 1, 2012. After validation in 2012 of this multidisciplinary study on the agro-ecological, economic and social potential and feasibility of the bioenergy industry, a business forum is planned in Senegal with both private investors from western Africa and Brazilian investors. The UEMOA is considered as the project backer for biofuel projects in the sub-region; Brazil is seeking to establish a coordinating leadership role for itself in this area of work. Cooperation between the UEMOA and Brazil currently involves funding of studies and technical assistance; there are no projects promoting biofuels.

The case of Zimbabwe is interesting in that it differs from the projects described above by combining financial cooperation and technology transfer. The goal is the adaptation of the Brazilian ‘Mais Alimentos’ programme in Africa, after its resounding success in Brazil. The aim of this programme, developed in Brazil by the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) since 2008, is to provide technical support to family farmers. Following the success of the programme in Brazil and the demonstrations of interest from African countries, the Brazilian authorities have presented it as an offer of cooperation. Specifically, the idea of developing ‘Mais Alimentos África’ came about during the Brazil-Africa Dialogue for Food Security and the Fight against Starvation organised in Brasilia in 2010. Ghana, Cameroon, Mozambique, Senegal and Namibia showed an interest in the programme. With the resources made available by Brazil, African countries can only buy Brazilian products. While industrialised countries have stressed the need for untied aid, Brazil develops its cooperation and development aid programmes on a different basis. Senior Brazilian management officials meanwhile offer confident assessments of this commercial arrangement, convinced of the superior value of Brazilian technology versus that of ‘competing’ countries, claiming that this commercial approach will greatly benefit the countries receiving this ‘aid’. Pride in the success of Brazilian agriculture is thus a key driver for the country’s cooperation offer.

Brazil: the learning curve of cooperation

Overall assessments of Brazil’s technical cooperation remain rare. On the one hand, this cooperation is aligned with national research initiatives, which is positive. However, many projects that are announced are not carried out due to a lack of means. Brazilian cooperation does not deploy many permanent agents and projects are essentially conducted through short-term support missions. A number of factors may explain this, including Brazil’s budgetary and legislative constraints and the country’s lack of experience in concrete operations in Africa. As a result, initial criticisms underscore the concept of the learning curve of cooperation. According to the EMBRAPA agent in Senegal: ‘They do not want to learn as much as they want to collect as much money as possible. I wasn’t expecting this when I arrived’. EMBRAPA agents also draw attention to the discrepancies that they feel are apparent in countries like Ghana and Kenya, where the technical support system has been fully privatised, and where farmers are clearly identified as ‘clients’ by local support services. Finally, the cultural differences are also emphasised as regards the types of agricultural practices the Brazilians are accustomed to using and which are not viewed in the same way by African partners. This is the case with family farming, a key notion in Brazil and for the MDA, but for which African partners do not apply the same frame of reference, sometimes compli-
Beyond these practical considerations and projects, Brazilian and Chinese cooperation in the field is also based on intellectual exchanges. A number of training programmes for African partners in Brazil and China have thus been developed, especially in agriculture. Technicians are the first to be invited to Brazil to participate in training programmes organized by EMBRAPA in its training facility. Partners are also invited by China to attend courses at agronomy universities. Brazil has gone further by creating a federal university dedicated exclusively to students from Portuguese-speaking countries, essentially from Africa. These students are taught alongside Brazilian students in the northeast region of the country, where agro-ecological conditions create a dry savannah climate, similar to that of many African countries. Brazil has also heavily invested in facilitating exchanges at doctorate and post-doctorate levels. Finally, the Brazil-Africa Agricultural Innovation Marketplace programme (established jointly with the FAO) enables many young African researchers to train in Brazil, strengthening scientific cooperation relations between the groups. In total, 10% of the total funds allocated by Brazil to South-South cooperation are thus dedicated to training.

It is difficult to put together a unified overview of the way in which China and Brazil’s presence in Africa is perceived. Their activities take many forms, operating through a range of firms and in different countries. From our foray in the field, differing views of Chinese activities are apparent. The demonstration centres were fairly unanimously viewed negatively, due to shortcomings in the centres’ management, sliding markets resulting from these management practices and the limited integration of Chinese technicians in local societies. However, the activities of private companies were in some cases perceived positively, as in the case of the Complant factory in Benin, where it appears that despite what could be qualified as frequent disagreements between employers and employees, the firm is viewed positively due to the many jobs that it has helped to create in the region. In the main, perceptions of Brazilian cooperation are also widely different: while EMBRAPA’s activities are certainly viewed positively, particularly as a result of its representatives being well integrated locally, their African partners do not hesitate to maintain their distance. With only three EMBRAPA representatives in Africa, the small scale of the initiative is a target for criticism. It is compared against the grand political speeches made by the Brazilian government. In addition, Brazil, like China, cannot escape accusations that it has colonial ambitions: in Mozambique, where the ProSavana project is underway, the local populations are highly concerned by the fact that Brazilian soya producers buy or rent large surfaces of land. Finally, it is necessary to assess the way in which Chinese and Brazilian cooperation efforts are perceived by more traditional African cooperation organisations, particularly those involved in triangular cooperation with two emerging countries. China’s activities are seen as especially unclear and very difficult to grasp in view of the country’s low level of interaction with its counterparts from other countries. Brazil’s activities, meanwhile, are valued on the basis of the country’s expertise in terms of tropical agronomy and because of its knowledge of Portuguese that facilitates its local integration. However, Brazil is felt to be lagging behind in terms of triangular activities, and seen more as a follower of JICA and USAID rather than a leader, due to the limited number of local representatives. Brazil’s complex management style in triangular activities is also questioned, the result of EMBRAPA having sought to establish a two-tier project management system, composed of one technical committee and one administrative committee.

Beyond these practical considerations and projects, Brazilian and Chinese cooperation in the field is also based on intellectual exchanges. A number of training programmes for African partners in Brazil and China have thus been developed, especially in agriculture. Technicians are the first to be invited to Brazil to participate in training programmes organized by EMBRAPA in its training facility. Partners are also invited by China to attend courses at agronomy universities. Brazil has gone further by creating a federal university dedicated exclusively to students from Portuguese-speaking countries, essentially from Africa. These students are taught alongside Brazilian students in the northeast region of the country, where agro-ecological conditions create a dry savannah climate, similar to that of many African countries. Brazil has also heavily invested in facilitating exchanges at doctorate and post-doctorate levels. Finally, the Brazil-Africa Agricultural Innovation Marketplace programme (established jointly with the FAO) enables many young African researchers to train in Brazil, strengthening scientific cooperation relations between the groups. In total, 10% of the total funds allocated by Brazil to South-South cooperation are thus dedicated to training.
In addition to this educational element within the South-South cooperation developed by China and Brazil, it is also important to note that both countries have invested in the development of laboratories, think tanks and other departments for African studies within their own universities, growing knowledge of Africa in both countries as a result. While African studies are not a radically new subject in the two countries, both having produced information on and furthered their understanding of the continent since the 1950s, the popularity of the topic has grown significantly since 2000. Increasingly, there has been a focus on understanding African societies within a context of action and investment, which has also brought about a cultural transformation for Brazil in particular, which is re-examining its own history from the perspective of its African origins through slavery. As a result, teachings on African culture and history have become mandatory subjects across all levels of the Brazilian educational system since 2003.
As an extension to the work conducted for this study, several aspects point to relevant opportunities for related research into issues observed in the field and as a result of the overview of current work on the dynamics of South-South cooperation.

The first area of research stems from the interest of ethnographic approaches to cooperation mechanisms devised within the framework of this study. Many contributions document the macro scopes of the dynamics of cooperation, through the analysis of flows, political orientations, international relations, etc. In view of these ‘top-down’ approaches, it would now be useful to include ‘bottom-up’ approaches such as the practices of Brazilian and Chinese stakeholders operating in Africa in order to better understand how South-South cooperation works in local societies and cooperation environments. This research topic was very positively received during the Brasilia Seminar on South-South Cooperation (UNDP, DFID, CIRAD) held on May 15 and 16, 2012, and where we were present, and attracted the attention of observers as a novel complementary approach.

A second area for future research is the understanding and analysis of the ways in which the dual agricultural development models seen in South America – specifically, Brazil and Argentina – are reproduced and exported elsewhere. Both countries, either currently active in Africa or seeking to be active in Africa, are involved in South-South cooperation, to support family agriculture as well as agribusiness and crop exports such as soya. The rhetoric of South-South cooperation, which is a key part of foreign policy discourse, is also applicable to the fundamental issues surrounding the fight against poverty and international trade and investment. Agriculture is thus a particularly interesting field of research for analysing approaches to the interpenetration between development aid and economic development stakes for donor countries, with emerging countries offering a new focus for study in which both aspects of these international relations appear at once. The same applies to China, which proposes to share its own model in the fight against poverty.

Finally, a third area of research bears on producing knowledge regarding development and cooperation policies. What frames of reference have China and Brazil adopted? Who develops them (universities, think tanks, ministries, etc.)? How can we understand and analyse them, given our own experiences and accumulated knowledge?

These three areas of research should attract the attention of politics of cooperation and academics working on international cooperation and development.
Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABC Brazilian Corporation Agency
APLA Brazilian Confederation of Biofuel Companies
Biocom The Bioenergy Company of Angola
BNDES National Bank for Economic and Social Development
CAADP Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CADF China-Africa Development Fund
CIRAD Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement
COFCO China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation
CSFAC China State Farms Agribusiness Corporation
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DFID (UK) Department for International Development (UK)
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EMATER Instituto Paranaense de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural
EMBRAPA Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GIPC Ghana Investment Promotion Centre
IBSA Forum India-Brazil-South Africa Forum
INRAB The Benin Agronomic Research Institute
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
MDA Ministry of Agrarian Development
MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China
MRE Ministry of External Relations
NEPAD Nouveau partenariat pour le développement de l’Afrique
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