

UNEXPECTED CHANGES IN A MADAGASCAN AGRARIAN SYSTEM: THE ROLE OF CORPORATE AGRICULTURE

Katy Medernach, Perrine Burnod

Editions de l'E.H.E.S.S. | « *Etudes rurales* »

2013/1 No 191 | pages 63 - 76

ISSN 0014-2182

ISBN 9782713223976

This document is a translation of:

Katy Medernach, Perrine Burnod, « Recompositions inattendues d'un système agraire malgache par l'agrobusiness », *Etudes rurales* 2013/1 (No 191), p. 63-76.

Translated from the French by JPD Systems

Available online at :

http://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_ETRU_191_0063--unexpected-changes-in-a-madagascan-land.htm

!How to cite this article :

Katy Medernach, Perrine Burnod, « Recompositions inattendues d'un système agraire malgache par l'agrobusiness », *Etudes rurales* 2013/1 (No 191), p. 63-76.

Electronic distribution by Cairn on behalf of Editions de l'E.H.E.S.S..

© Editions de l'E.H.E.S.S.. All rights reserved for all countries.

Reproducing this article (including by photocopying) is only authorized in accordance with the general terms and conditions of use for the website, or with the general terms and conditions of the license held by your institution, where applicable. Any other reproduction, in full or in part, or storage in a database, in any form and by any means whatsoever is strictly prohibited without the prior written consent of the publisher, except where permitted under French law.

UNEXPECTED CHANGES IN A MADAGASCAN AGRARIAN SYSTEM: THE ROLE OF AGRIBUSINESS

Katy Medernach and Perrine Burnod

THE TERMINATION OF THE ENORMOUS Daewoo Logistics project, which was widely publicized in the media, and the deposition of President Ravalomanana did not put an end to large-scale agricultural investments in Madagascar (Andrianirina et al. 2010).

One such case is JT,¹ a European private company. In 2009, it opened in the Mivili area, in the island's northwest, planning to farm 30,000 hectares of *Jatropha* to produce bio-fuels for the domestic market. This investment aimed to create 150,000 jobs² and facilitate the construction of processing plants. The four villages consulted as part of the project welcomed it. However, in 2011 a conflict erupted, not between the investor and the villagers but between the four villages and the neighboring ones. The main village's chief was threatened with weapons, around fifteen houses were burned down, and dozens of zebus were stolen (Medernach 2011). Locally, everyone agreed that the attack had been organized by the neighboring villages to oppose the relationships established with the company.

This paper traces the changes in the agrarian system caused by the company's arrival. The

analysis is centered on access to property and labor organization, and it aims to go beyond a homogeneous view of local communities. On the basis of a case study conducted in 2011,³ we identify the interest groups, the gains and losses for each, and the processes underlying these changes (see Borrás and Franco 2012).

The development of mega-farms can lead to people losing land rights (Cotula et al. 2009; Anseeuw et al. 2011; Deininger et al. 2011) and to the proletarianization of farmers (Li 2011). What happens in the case under consideration? Is the establishment of the company a real game-changer, or does it simply precipitate existing processes? Finally, does it reinforce inequalities or rather reverse power relationships?

Changes in Land Access and Control

Land access and its control are a source of rivalries (Ribot and Peluso 2003). To avoid conflicts over land use, JT planned to consult the population of the four villages widely and to use only non-farmed land. Despite this, it reignited tensions between Sakalava livestock farmers and producers originating mainly from the Betsileo region.⁴

1. The names of the company and the area have been changed.

2. According to JT officials.

3. Initiated by the Malagasy Land Observatory (CIRAD) research team, this case study was expanded thanks to five-month-long fieldwork conducted by Katy Medernach and Heriniaina Rakotomalala based on 150 one-off and 50 repeated interviews (see Medernach 2011).

4. The Sakalava, Betsirebaka, Merina, and Betsileo are social and cultural groups in Madagascar.

SPACES AND SETTLEMENTS

The tensions between Sakalava people and migrants are ancient. We will begin with a brief contextualization.

Since the seventeenth century, the Sakalava have been practicing extensive livestock farming on the Marovoay flood plain. However, the gradual transformation of this space into rice fields by migrants coming from the southeast and center of the island (Betsirebaka, Merina, and Betsileo) (Schlemmer 1986; Herimandimby 1995; Jacquier-Dubourdiou 2002) forced them to look for new pastures. In Mivili, around thirty kilometers from Marovoay, the Sakalava were the first to exploit the land and to celebrate the rituals designed to ensure their status as *tompon-tany* (literally, “masters of the land”).

In the mid-twentieth century, during the extension of the agricultural front on the Marovoay plain, a number of Betsileo families founded villages in Mivili. Like pioneers, they appropriated the land and converted the low-lying areas into rice fields. Unlike other groups that settled in the neighboring Sakalava villages, these families did not engage in the gradual establishment of land access in the form of tutelage (Muttenger 2010). Yet to this day, these families continue to honor the Sakalava ancestors with various offerings (candy, chicken blood) before farming new plots.

Faced with limited open spaces due to the boost in rice farming practiced by migrants, the Sakalava staked out their territory (Sautter 1980; Fauroux 1997; Jacquier-Dubourdiou 2002), a move that led to the development of their own rice plots and the creation of a vast common pasture area, surrounded by Sakalava villages, called the “great *kijana*”⁵ (Figure 1).

Currently, Betsileo⁶ villages are located west of Mivili, where farmers have reclaimed the lowlands through the farming of rice and other annual crops (the area per holding is between one and four hectares) and the nearby hills as pastures for their livestock (5–15 zebus for the wealthiest holdings). Sakalava villages are located south and northeast of Mivili, where farmers practice extensive livestock farming on the *kijana* (from 50 to 300 zebus⁷ per owner) and limit their farming activities to the lowlands close to the villages.

The activities of these villages clash at the boundaries (see the boundary between Zones 2 and 3 in Figure 2). The Sakalava let their cattle graze on the *kijana* without tending them, and the animals sometimes devastate Betsileo crops. As the Betsileo families grow in size and gain new members, they tend to push the agricultural front forward and encroach on Sakalava pastures.

POLITICALLY MOTIVATED LAND REDISTRIBUTION

Accepting the Company to Support Land Access

Supported by the mayor,⁸ JT prospected the area close to four Betsileo villages. With

5. “Pasture” in the Malagasy language.

6. For the sake of simplicity and because the founding families of this village are of Betsileo origin, we will call them “Betsileo” even if this does not describe all residents.

7. Because zebus fear humans except for the herdsman who gathers them several times a month, they stay away from villages. This also protects them from thieves, who pose a serious threat in the region.

8. The mayor accepted this development project (Burnod et al. 2013) for its overall socioeconomic impact and especially for its annual tax revenues (€5,000 in property taxes per year, increasing the municipality’s 2011 budget by approximately 50%).

Fig. 1. Mivili area (detail)





Fig. 2. Agro-ecological transect and space allocation in Mivili



the consent of some of the villagers, the Betsileo village chiefs welcomed this project, which would create jobs and infrastructure. Furthermore, they accepted this project in the hope that before long, the *Jatropha* plantations would form a natural barrier against Sakalava zebus, and that later on they could develop new lowlands unfit for farming *Jatropha*. With this in mind, some of the villagers granted the investor a total of 50 hectares situated between their villages and the *kijana*. Then, with the consent of the mayor but not of the villagers, the investor planted *jatropha* on more than 200 hectares of Betsileo pastures and on the Sakalava portion of the *kijana*.

Like other societies in Madagascar (Jacquier-Dubourdiou 2002; Muttenger 2010) and more generally in Africa (Chauveau et al. 2006; Le Meur and Jacob 2010), the Betsileo gradually strengthened their hold in Mivili by accepting other migrants (mainly from their extended families). In this way, they increased their workforce, the extent of farmed land, and their sociopolitical influence relative to the Sakalava.

The Betsileo's strategy of strengthening their local community now depends on the investor. Unlike other communities that appeal to tradition or reinterpret it in order to defend their territory against private companies (see Brutti 2007), the Betsileo wanted to use JT (which was perceived as wealthier and more powerful than the Sakalava) to benefit from land use and control access to it and thus challenge customary laws.

Protesting to Reaffirm Authority and Territory

The *kijana* is more than pastureland with an economic function. For the Sakalava, it has

an identity function, which explains the intensity with which they defend it⁹ (Sautter 1980). Although their status as first settlers is ancient and has been necessarily transformed by successive migration waves, they can use it to legitimize their power and their land claims (Jacquier-Dubourdiou 2002).

For the time being, the *Jatropha* holdings remain limited and the Sakalava livestock farmers have no information about the plans for extension. The disapproval of the Sakalava is only partially linked to the change in land use and is not aimed at the company directly. Their discontent is based mainly on the fact that the Betsileo authorized the company to set up there without consulting them and that the chief of one of the four villages might increase his power.¹⁰ Therefore, they are violently attacking the village of this chief to reaffirm their authority as *tompon-tany*, which gives them—and them alone—the authority to grant *kijana* usage rights.

In Mivili, the establishment of the company was detrimental to some of the main actors in the local political arena, who, unlike the more vulnerable ones, have more resources with which to defend their rights and socioeconomic status. In fact, threats and violence may well be effective ways to control or maintain land access (Ribot and Peluso 2003).

9. In Mivili, all attempts to claim part of the *kijana* by individuals from outside of the family (through the creation of a village by religious groups or a cashew plantation by an agribusiness, for example) encountered strong resistances or were abandoned.

10. As the leader of the *fokontany* (administrative body below the municipal level), the chief has certain prerogatives as concerns property and livestock farming.

LEGAL CHANGES TO LAND RIGHTS

Since the 2005 land reform, the state is no longer the default owner of the land, and claimed but untitled land legally belongs to its occupants (Teyssier et al. 2009). This ownership can be formalized by a land certificate released by a land office, a new municipal service established as part of the decentralization of land management. In Mivili, however, land-owners do not have title and, in the absence of a land office, they are not able to request a land certificate.

To obtain a lease over 5,000 hectares for thirty years, the company dealt with the state land services and obtained a lease for 2,000 hectares of land the boundaries of which had to be established and registered in the name of the state. This area encroaches substantially on Sakalava¹¹ pastures and on the pastures and land reserves of Betsileo villages.

The registration of the land thus turned these owners into squatters. While the Betsileo thought that they could use the company as part of their land expansion strategy, in the end, it is the company that could legally exclude them.

Changes in Working Relationships

The entry of agribusinesses into agrarian systems can have two main consequences at the local level. The appropriation of large areas can force farmers to sell their workforce (Li 2011; Kenney-Lazar 2012), as happens with enclosures (Polanyi 1975; Alden-Wily 2012), and they can cause a change in the production system through production purchase contracts.¹²

In Mivili, none of these changes can be detected for the time being. However, changes are emerging in relation to holdings. Changes

in production systems observed in 2011 concerned a reallocation of the workforce rather than visible change in land access (the company's plantations at the time covered only 236 hectares).

PROLETARIANIZATION THAT IS FAR FROM FORCED

Similar to many recent large-scale investments (Nhantumbo and Salomão 2010; Deininger et al. 2011), the JT project made slow progress. Raising funds was more difficult than anticipated, and little by little, objectives were revised. In 2011, the company was only aiming for 5,000 hectares instead of 30,000, and it initiated a diversification of crops (chili, maize, lima beans) as it waited for the production of *Jatropha*.

In practice, at the time of our fieldwork, 230 hectares of *Jatropha* and six hectares of chili had been farmed, 160 seasonal jobs (for between three and six months) and around 30 permanent jobs had been provided, a clinic had been built, a school had been outfitted, a doctor had been hired for the project, and two local teacher's salaries have been paid. Based on these early results and reasonable forecasts, to develop 5,000 hectares of *Jatropha*,

11. These are pastures whose extensive usage would not have allowed their owner to obtain a certificate had the municipality had a land office. Although according to the law on untitled private property, extensive pastures cannot be certified, this type of security could be invoked in case of intervention by a third party.

12. These contracts are often tied to access to credit, the municipal council, and markets for inputs, allowing farming systems to evolve and, depending on context, leading to an increase or decrease in incomes (Glover 1984; Singh 2002).

the company would employ between 2,500 and 5,000 seasonal workers (for six months) and 500 permanent workers. These numbers are high compared to other large-scale crops (Deininger et al. 2011)¹³ and for the one thousand active residents of the nearby villages.

Even if for the time being, jobs are much more limited, they are particularly sought after in the absence of a micro-local labor market and because of the obvious financial needs (the proposed daily salary is 3,500 ariary, or US\$1.67). Nevertheless, among the local population, interest in these jobs varies considerably between groups and depending on the time of year. During the dry season, Betsileo farmers, who are less busy with their holdings, favor this local work in order to avoid temporary migration to Marovoay. Conversely, during the rainy season, most of them prefer to work on their rice plots, which allows them to earn more,¹⁴ ensure on-farm consumption, and meet family obligations (rice donations, mutual assistance) as a form of risk management and social network maintenance. During that season, only Betsileo smallholders look for work on the plantations.

As in other regions around the world (Deininger et al. 2011; Li 2011), the jobs created in Mivili by the agribusiness are mostly taken up by smallholders and migrants (a total of 40 men and women in 2011). Despite its promise that it would prioritize locals, JT preferred to hire migrants available all year long in order to limit recruitment, training, and follow-up costs.

CHANGES IN MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

The establishment of the company in the local agrarian system did not lead to forced

proletarianization. As they did previously, Betsileo farmers are fully aware of their position and yet choose whether or not to enter the labor market and, if necessary, seek better work conditions. Clearly, they made specific claims to try and improve their circumstances.¹⁵ Yet what truly changed is that the company initiated a local job market and modified the content and frequency of mutual assistance.

In the villages under consideration, the mobilization of labor occurs mainly through mutual assistance, which is still widely practiced at the national level.¹⁶ This supports social networks and limits cash flow problems (Gannon and Sandron 2006). Smallholders generally invest more work in mutual assistance than what they obtain in return, even if they sometimes receive services (rice donations, credit, access to working animals) or monetary compensation (around 2,000 ariary, or US\$0.95). Despite these cash

13. For comparison, for 1,000 hectares of *Jatropha*, the company could employ 350–600 full-time equivalent (FTE) workers versus 350 FTEs for palm oil (in Indonesia) or sugarcane (in Mozambique) and 10 FTEs for fully mechanized maize production (Deininger et al. 2011).

14. Remuneration from rice is generally between 6,500 (US\$3.09) and 12,500 ariary (US\$5.95) per working day, that is, two to four times higher than if employed (Medernach 2011).

15. Compared to the contracts proposed in Marovoay, JT's seasonal contracts require two extra hours of work for the same salary, but do not offer any advantage in terms of a legal contract, retirement contributions, or access to health services.

16. This proportion is slightly higher than for farm workers, affecting 36 % and 27 %, respectively, of the plots identified in the 2006 national survey.

transfers,¹⁷ working relationships are based on reciprocity. Priority is given to people, not things, unlike in market transactions (Sahlins 1976; Godelier 1996).

Since JT's arrival, modes of mutual assistance have changed. The company increased the opportunity cost of local workers and facilitated access to cash for those employees who are looking for labor for their own plots during the rainy season. It encouraged farmers looking for labor to be as attractive as possible at peak times. Just as before, these farmers hire people close to them but also migrants who do not belong to their extended family and who have been attracted by the company. The farmers are now in alignment with the company, with a daily remuneration of 3,500 (US\$1.67) ariary instead of the former 2,000 (US\$0.95).

The addition of the company to the local agrarian system led to the first signs of a break or change in the management of work and mutual assistance, accelerating the monetization and commoditization of relationships (see Gannon and Sandron 2005; Sandron 2008).

AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE POOREST

In the current state of affairs, migrants and smallholders are those who benefit from the economic opportunities brought by the company in the form of jobs and cash payments. In fact, the smallest farmers stopped some of their activities in order to be able to work with the company. Some women stopped making straw baskets and vegetable production. Market production has become even more difficult for them as they face a lack of manure (usually free of charge) since JT as a large input user has started buying the manure (from zebu enclosures) from livestock farmers..

As observed in other African countries (Maertens and Swinnen 2009) and in other regions on the island (Minten et al. 2003), the development of the local labor market contributed to income growth for the poorest groups (+24% in 2011).¹⁸ Yet this increase is too limited to allow them to escape poverty. Moreover, this increase should be considered in relation to the counterfactual scenario, namely the availability of seasonal work in the Marovoay area, where some migrants have returned,¹⁹ and where salaries increased in 2011.

Unlike the smallest producers, the Betsileo, who own larger holdings, have to spend more in order to access labor (a shortfall in profits of between 5% and 15%).²⁰ As they only work occasionally, with some no longer having access to the pastures at the edge of the villages, they are disadvantaged to some extent from these changes. Likewise, Sakalava livestock farmers, who are the most disadvantaged in terms of access to land,²¹ are not interested in the jobs

17. According to those interviewed, it is "a way to thank the workers. It's not really a salary. No one would want to work for 2,000 ariary (US\$0.95) a day." It is also "a way to keep the money in the family."

18. This applies to those who worked for the company for four months during the dry season and one month during the rainy season.

19. In Marovoay in 2011, pay increased to 4,000 ariary (US\$1.91) per day. In this counterfactual scenario, farmers could have increased their incomes by 23%, which corresponds roughly to what occurred in Mivili.

20. Additional costs for rice production are from 50,000 ariary (US\$23.82) to 100,000 ariary (US\$47.63) per hectare and crop cycle.

21. Only one livestock farmer managed to obtain a significant concession from the company in exchange for access to pastures he presented as his own.

created by the company because of their physical distance and the limited benefits they could receive compared to livestock farming.²²

Changes and Tensions

If for the time being the reorganization of agricultural and pastoral activities can be interpreted mainly as reallocation of labor, locally, the main transformations relate to political and juridical changes in land management. The company's arrival heightened tensions over land control and unknowingly altered power relationships. These changes took place in the context of an ancient dynamic, and the Sakalava responded through violence. Using the law, the company shifted boundaries, making the state a landowner. In practice, no local actor reacted to these changes because of the lack of information and of perceivable consequences for the area. Ultimately, JT introduced land insecurity for everyone. Moreover, even if they obtained a legal lease, investors also encountered difficulties, as expressed by a Sakalava livestock farmer, who declared that "The official documents do not protect against the destruction of crops by cattle or against fires."

In a context of institutional and normative pluralism, legal access to land can be bitterly disputed if it is not the result of a process considered legitimate by local populations and authorities (Lund 2002). In fact, there is a risk that tensions between Betsileo and Sakalava groups may increase and that in the medium term, they may be legally but effectively excluded from their own lands as the investor can legitimately resort to the law or to force.

The establishment of the company had different consequences depending on interest group (see Table 1). In simple terms, the

impact was positive for the Betsileo (especially for smallholders) as concerns the creation of jobs and infrastructures, and negative as concerns land ownership for everyone (as local owners lost legal recognition of their rights and livestock farmers risk losing the use of pastures).

Combined with the fact that some owners were not consulted, this diverse impact inevitably rekindled preexisting tensions. Beyond the basic opposition between Betsileo and Sakalava, other tensions emerged because of the differential access to resources granted by the company, with infrastructures created for one Betsileo village only and competition between locals and migrants for jobs. These tensions were then maintained by the fear that the plantations might expand. In a context of little transparency, more and more Betsileo and Sakalava people are worried about their lands and their access to natural resources (water, palm trees). As one stated, "We do not dare oppose a decision that was made above [by the central government] and was accepted by other villagers."

As the most affected are the wealthiest stakeholders (large Betsileo producers and Sakalava livestock farmers), it is highly likely that a conflict will emerge, this time with the company, unless it reaches a compromise or grants compensation, as it did with some owners (as, for example, when a rental agreement was granted to two Betsileo owners and one wealthy Sakalava livestock farmer).

22. Sakalava livestock farmers generally have much higher incomes than others in this agrarian system (Medernach 2011).

Interactions between JT and various interest groups

	Betsileo farmers		Sakalava livestock farmers	New migrants
	Small	Large		
Infrastructure	+/- (in 1 village only)		No	No
Jobs	+/- New opportunities (not guaranteed over time) Changes in mutual assistance	+/- A few jobs Increase in labor costs	No	+
Incomes	+	-	+/- Risk compensation for 1	+
Land access		- Overlapping with pastures at village boundaries	- Risk losing access to the <i>kijana</i>	No
	+/- Lose access to small unfarmed plots Hope to access new lands			
Natural resources	- Eventually, competition over access to water and palm trees			No
Changes in agricultural practices	Yes Stop making baskets Hope to protect their rice paddies		No Threats to extensive livestock farming of zebus	No
Globally	+/-	-	--	++

Conclusion

Some of the recommendations usually put forward to ensure the respect of the rights of local populations and companies focus on consultation and prior agreement, the recognition of customary rights, and the definition of compensation (Anseeuw et al. 2011; Deininger et al. 2011).

In the case under consideration, despite its intent to conduct negotiations at the local level, the investor could not grasp the complexity of social relations in the area. In fact, it is not rare for investors to approach local communities as if they were homogeneous entities and to see elected authorities (especially mayors) as their sole representatives (German, Schoneveld, and Mwangi 2011; Borrás and Franco 2012). In Mivili, those with land rights on the targeted lands were not all consulted. Conducting negotiations at the local (or in this case, the micro-local) level does not necessarily guarantee the protection of the rights of all stakeholders (Colin, Le Meur, and Léonard 2009; Borrás and Franco 2012).

In Mivili, despite the new legal framework supporting local owners, land rights are not fully respected, and property rights on extensive pastures are not recognized. Without knowledge of the law, local populations are not able to use it to protect their rights. In addition, some state representatives are also likely to ignore the law (intentionally, in some cases) to maintain control over the area (Burnod, Andrianirina-Ratsialonana, and Teyssier 2013; Burnod, Gingembre, and Andrianirina-Ratsialonana 2013).

Consultation with populations and rights protection are complex issues that cannot be isolated from sociopolitical dynamics and local economic interests (Colin, Le Meur, and Léonard 2009). In fact, the establishment of agribusinesses can create or reignite tensions, especially if their impact is heterogeneous and if they damage the most powerful interest groups.

JT's establishment in Mivili caused transformations in the local agrarian system that precipitated existing processes, including rivalry over land access and the transitioning of work relationships from mutual assistance to a market economy, and emphasized imbalances in socioeconomic relationships, including political tensions between Betsileo producers and Sakalava livestock farmers, loss of access to resources, and an increase in expenditures for large Betsileo farmers.

It is also crucial that the various parties concerned be better informed (the investor about local issues, local communities about the company's objectives, and everyone about the legal framework) and that more exchanges and dialogue be promoted at all levels (local and national). While the increased number of actors adds to the complexity of the situation, it would be appropriate to have civil society, researchers, experts, and public decision makers participate in devising alternatives to avoid violent conflicts and resource losses.

A better understanding of agrarian systems and of local interest groups, as well as more effective protection of rights, are essential before considering large-scale land transfers to third parties.

Bibliography

- Alden-Wily, Liz.** 2012. "Looking Back to See Forward: The Legal Nicteties of Land Theft in Land Rushes." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39 (3–4): 751–75.
- Andrianirina-Ratsialonana, Rivo, Landry Ramarojohn, Perrine Burnod, and André Teyssier.** 2011. "Après Daewoo? État des lieux et perspectives des appropriations foncières à grande échelle à Madagascar." Rome: International Land Coalition.http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/publication/905/CIRAD_OF_Mada_FRE_web_16.03.11.pdf
- Anseeuw, Ward, Liz Alden-Wily, Lorenzo Cotula, and Michael Taylor.** 2011. "Land Rights and the Rush for Land: Findings of the Global Commercial Pressures on Land Research Project." Rome: International Land Coalition.http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/publication/1205/ILC_GSRreport_ENG.pdf
- Borras, Saturnino M., and Jennifer C. Franco.** 2012. "Global Land Grabbing and Trajectories of Agrarian Change: A Preliminary Analysis." *Journal of Agrarian Change* 12 (1): 34–59.
- Brutti, Lorenzo.** 2007. "From Fertility Rituals to Mining Companies: Eco-cultural Issues and Land Rights in Oksapmin." *Journal de la Société des Océanistes* 125:249–55.<http://jso.revues.org/979>
- Burnod, Perrine, Rivo Andrianirina-Ratsialonana, and André Teyssier.** 2013. "Processus d'acquisition à grande échelle à Madagascar: Quelles régulations sur le terrain?" *Cahiers Agricultures* 22 (1): 33–8.
- Burnod, Perrine, Mathilde Gingembre, and Rivo Andrianirina-Ratsialonana.** 2013. "Competition over Authority and Access: International Land Deals in Madagascar." *Development and Change* 44 (2): 357–79.
- Chauveau, Jean-Pierre, Jean-Philippe Colin, Jean-Pierre Jacob, Philippe Lavigne Delville, and Pierre-Yves Le Meur.** 2006. *Modes d'accès à la terre, marchés fonciers, gouvernance, et politiques foncières en Afrique de l'Ouest: Résultats du projet de recherche CLAIMS.* London: IIED.<http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/12528FIIED.pdf>
- Colin, Jean-Philippe, Pierre-Yves Le Meur, and Éric Léonard,** eds. 2009. *Les politiques d'enregistrement des droits fonciers: Du cadre légal aux pratiques locales.* Paris: Karthala.
- Cotula, Lorenzo, Sonja Vermeulen, Rebeca Leonard, and James Keeley.** 2009. "Land Grab or Development Opportunity? Agricultural Investment and International Land Deals in Africa." London/Rome: IIED, FAO, IFAD.http://www.ifad.org/pub/land/land_grab.pdf
- Deininger, Klaus, Derek Byerlee, Jonathan Lindsay, Andrew Norton, Harris Selod, and Mercedes Stickler.** 2011. *Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can It Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits?* Washington, DC: World Bank.<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/Rising-Global-Interest-in-Farmland.pdf>
- Fauroux, Emmanuel.** 1997. "De la complémentarité à la concurrence: Sakalava et migrants dans l'espace social de l'ouest malgache." In *Les territoires de l'identité: Le territoire, lien ou frontière?* Vol. I., edited by Joël Bonnemaïson, Luc Cambrézy, and Laurence Quinty-Bourgeois, 269–81. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Gannon, Frédéric, and Frédéric Sandron.** 2006. "Échange, réciprocité, et innovation dans une communauté paysanne: Une lecture conventionnaliste." *Économie Rurale* 292:6–23.
- German, Laura, George Schoneveld, and Esther Mwangi.** 2011. "Processes of Large-Scale Land Acquisition by Investors: Case Studies from Sub-Saharan Africa." Paper presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing (Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, April 6–8). http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/OccPapers/OP-68.pdfhttp://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/OccPapers/OP-68.pdf
- Glover, David J.** 1984. "Contract Farming and Smallholder Outgrower Schemes in Less-Developed Countries." *World Development* 12 (11–12): 1143–57.
- Godelier, Maurice.** 1996. *L'énigme du don.* Paris: Flammarion.
- Herimandimby, Vestalys.** 1995. "Étude des systèmes agraires de Marovoay (Madagascar)." Senior thesis. Paris: INA-PG.

- Jacquier-Dubourdieu, Lucile.** 2002. "Les modes d'intégration de l'étranger dans les sociétés sakalava du Boïna: Impact des migrations de travail." In *La nation malgache au défi de l'ethnicité*, edited by Françoise Raison-Jourde and Solofo Randrianja, 289–303. Paris: Karthala.
- Kenney-Lazar, Miles.** 2012. "Plantation Rubber, Land Grabbing, and Social-Property Transformation in Southern Laos." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39 (3–4): 1017–37.
- Le Meur, Pierre-Yves, and Jean-Pierre Jacob.** 2010. *Politiques de la terre et de l'appartenance*. Paris: Karthala.
- Li, Tania M.** 2011. "Centering Labor in the Land Grab Debate." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 38 (2): 281–98.
- Little, Peter D., and Michael Watts,** eds. 1994. *Living under Contract: Contract Farming and Agrarian Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Lund, Christian.** 2002. "Negotiating Property Institutions: On the Symbiosis of Property and Authority in Africa." In *Negotiating Property in Africa*, edited by Kristine Juul and Christian Lund, 11–43. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
- Maertens, Miet, and Johan F. M. Swinnen.** 2009. "Trade, Standards, and Poverty: Evidence from Senegal." *World Development* 37 (1): 161–78.
- Medernach, Katy.** 2011. "Appropriations foncières à grande échelle: Quelles interactions au niveau local à Madagascar?" Master's dissertation. Paris: ISTOM.
- Minten, Bart, Lalaina Randrianarison, and Jean-Claude Randrianarisoa,** eds. 2003. *Agriculture, pauvreté rurale, et politiques économiques à Madagascar*. Antananarivo: Cornell Food and Nutrition Policy Program. <http://www.ilo.cornell.edu/ilo/bookfr.html>
- Muttenter, Frank.** 2010. *Déforestation et droit coutumier à Madagascar: Les perceptions des acteurs de la gestion communautaire des forêts*. Paris, Geneva: Karthala, Institut des Hautes Études Internationales et du Développement.
- Nhantumbo, Isilda, and Alda Salomão.** 2010. *Biofuels, Land Access, and Rural Livelihoods in Mozambique*. London: IIED.
- Polanyi, Karl.** 1975. "L'économie en tant que procès institutionnalisé." In *Les systèmes économiques dans l'histoire et la théorie*, edited by Karl Polanyi, Conrad Arensberg, and Harry W. Pearson, 239–60. Paris: Larousse Université.
- Ribot, Jesse C., and Nancy L. Peluso.** 2003. "A Theory of Access." *Rural Sociology* 68 (2): 153–81.
- Sahlins, Marshall.** 1976 [1972]. *Age de pierre, âge d'abondance*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Sandron, Frédéric.** 2008. "Le Fihavanana à Madagascar: Lien social et économique des communautés rurales." *Tiers Monde* 195:507–22.
- Sautter, Gilles,** ed. 1980. *Changements sociaux dans l'ouest malgache*. Paris: Orstom.
- Schlemmer, Bernard.** 1986. "Les royaumes sakalava et la colonisation: Hypothèses pour une recherche comparative." In *Afrique plurielle, Afrique actuelle: Hommage à Georges Balandier*, edited by Georges Balandier and Alfred Alder, 241–51. Paris: Karthala.
- Singh, Sukhpal.** 2002. "Contracting Out Solutions: Political Economy of Contract Farming in the Indian Punjab." *World Development* 30 (9): 1621–38.
- Teyssier, André, Rivo Andrianirina-Ratsialonana, Ramy Razafindralambo, and Yolande Razafindrakoto.** 2009. "Décentralisation de la gestion des terres à Madagascar: Processus, enjeux, et perspectives d'une nouvelle politique foncière." In *Les politiques d'enregistrement des droits fonciers: Du cadre légal aux pratiques locales*, edited by Jean-Philippe Colin, Pierre-Yves Le Meur, and Éric Leonard, 273–97. Paris: Karthala.

Abstract

Katy Medernach and Perrine Burnod, *Unexpected Changes in a Madagascan Land System through Agribusiness*

What is the impact of the inception of mega-farms on local interest groups? Do they cause significant changes or do they simply precipitate existing processes? Based on a case study in Madagascar, this paper examines recent changes in a Madagascar agrarian system as a result of the arrival of a private foreign company. While the increase in employment has benefited local smallholders, the wealthiest livestock farmers suffered as a result of recent changes in land use and access. The company unknowingly enabled the descendants of Betsileo migrants to expand their territory to the detriment of the Sakalava, who see themselves as the rightful owners of the land. However, land tenure security became increasingly precarious for all parties involved. In short, the company's arrival reignited tensions. By signing an emphyteutic lease with the State, the company deprived local communities of their land rights. As a result, its own right to use the land may be challenged by local actors.

Keywords

Madagascar, agribusiness, access to land, labor market, conflicts, agriculture, livestock farming

Résumé

Katy Medernach et Perrine Burnod, *Recompositions inattendues d'un système agraire malgache par l'agribusiness*

Quels sont les effets de l'implantation de méga-exploitations agricoles sur les différents groupes d'intérêt des territoires locaux ? Cette implantation provoque-t-elle de fortes ruptures ou une simple accélération des dynamiques en cours ? Sur la base d'une étude de cas à Madagascar, cet article s'intéresse aux recompositions du système agraire à Madagascar engendrées par l'installation récente d'une entreprise privée étrangère. Tandis que l'emploi se développe au bénéfice des plus petits agriculteurs, l'accès à la terre évolue au détriment des éleveurs les plus aisés. À son insu la firme offre aux descendants de migrants *betsileo* l'opportunité d'étendre leur territoire agricole face aux éleveurs *sakalava* se revendiquant comme les propriétaires ancestraux de la terre. Toutefois la sécurisation foncière se dégrade pour tous. L'entreprise réveille des tensions : ayant obtenu un bail emphytéotique auprès de l'État, elle prive les communautés de leurs droits fonciers. Ce faisant, elle risque de voir contesté son propre accès au foncier.

Mots clés

Madagascar, agribusiness, accès à la terre, marché du travail, conflits, agriculture, élevage