

Document of
The World Bank

Report No: ICR00001686

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-H1260)

ON A

GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 16.4 MILLION
(US\$23.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF CHAD

FOR A

LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM SUPPORT PROJECT

December 30, 2010

Agriculture and Rural Development Unit
Sustainable Development Department
Country Department AFCW3
Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective November 2010)

Currency Unit = CFA Franc

At Appraisal:

FCFA 1 = US\$0.0017

US\$1 = FCFA 531

At ICR mission:

FCFA 1.00 = US\$ 0.0021

US\$ 1.00 = FCFA475

FISCAL YEAR

January 1-December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACD	<i>Assemblée Communautaire de Développement</i> (Local Development Assembly)
AFD	French Development Agency (<i>Agence Française de Développement</i>)
AEDE	Agency for Domestic Energy and Environment (<i>Agence pour l'Energie Domestique et l'Environnement</i>)
ASPOP	Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations Project (<i>Projet d'Appui aux Services Agricoles et aux Organisations de Producteurs - PASAOP</i>)
APL	Adaptive Program Lending
CBD	Community Based Development
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CDD	Community Driven Development
CLTO	Chadian Land Tenure Office (<i>Observatoire Foncier du Tchad - OFT</i>).
DDAC	Departmental Decision and Approval Committee
FACIL	Local Initiatives Fund (<i>Fonds d'Actions Concertées d'Initiative Locale</i>)
FADN	Fight Against Desertification National Plan
FCFA	<i>Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine</i> (Franc of the African Financial Community)
FENU	<i>Fonds d'Equipement des Nations-Unies</i> (United Nations Capital Development Fund)
GOC	Government of Chad
LPMU	Local Project Management Unit
LDP	Local Development Plan
MA	Ministry of Agriculture
ME	Ministry of Livestock
MEE	Ministry of Water and Environment
MED	Ministry of Education
MD	Ministry of Decentralization

MH	Ministry of Health
MIS	Management information system
MLMUH	Ministry of Land Management, Urbanism and Habitat
MPED	Ministry of Economic Promotion and Development
MTP	Ministry of Transport
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NEAP	National Environmental Action Plan
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PAPRONAT	<i>Projet d'Appui au Programme National de Transport</i> (National Transportation Program Support Project)
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PDO	Project Development Objectives
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PIDR	Rural Development Support Program (<i>Programme d'Intervention pour le Développement Rural</i>)
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PMU	Project Management Unit
PROADEL	Local Development Program Support Project (<i>Projet d'appui au développement local</i>)
SC	Steering Committee
SPDAC	Sub-Prefectoral Decision and Approval Committee

Vice President:	Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili
Country Director:	Mary Kathryn Hollifield
Sector Manager:	Karen Mcconnell Brooks
Project Team Leader:	Soulemame Fofana
ICR Team Leader:	Bruno Losch

Republic of Chad
Local Development Program Support Project
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A. Basic Information			
Country:	Chad	Project Name:	Local Development Program Support Project
Project ID:	P066998	L/C/TF Number(s):	IDA-H1260
ICR Date:	12/30/2010	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	APL	Borrower:	REPUBLIC OF CHAD
Original Total Commitment:	XDR 16.4M	Disbursed Amount:	XDR 16.3M
Revised Amount:	XDR 16.4M		
Environmental Category: B			
Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Land Management, Urbanism and Habitat			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: Agence Française de Développement (AFD)			

B. Key Dates				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	11/08/2001	Effectiveness:	03/28/2005	03/28/2005
Appraisal:	11/25/2002	Restructuring(s):		
Approval:	09/16/2004	Mid-term Review:	06/08/2009	06/08/2009
		Closing:	06/30/2009	06/30/2010

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes:	Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	Moderate
Bank Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)			
Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry:	Satisfactory	Government:	Moderately Satisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Moderately Satisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Bank Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory	Overall Borrower Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators			
Implementation Performance	Indicators	QAG Assessments (if any)	Rating
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality at Entry (QEA):	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Moderately Satisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes		
	Original	Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
General public administration sector	16	16
Other social services	20	20
Primary education	22	22
Roads and highways	22	22
Water supply	20	20

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Decentralization	25	25
Land administration and management	13	13
Municipal finance	13	13
Participation and civic engagement	24	24
Rural services and infrastructure	25	25

E. Bank Staff		
Positions	At ICR	At Approval
Vice President:	Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili	Callisto E. Madavo
Country Director:	Mary Kathryn Hollifield	Ali Mahmoud Khadr
Sector Manager:	Karen Mcconnell Brooks	Joseph Baah-Dwomoh
Project Team Leader:	Souleman Fofana	Noel Rene Chabeuf
ICR Team Leader:	Bruno Losch	
ICR Primary Author:	Bruno Losch	

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

PROADEL (Phase 1 of the Local Development Program) would assist the Government of Chad in designing and implementing a decentralized and participatory financing mechanism that will empower local communities and decentralized authorities to manage development funds by (i) strengthening the capacity and responsibility of local communities and decentralized authorities, (ii) implementing demand-driven subprojects, and (iii) supporting the emerging process of decentralization.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	75% of targeted communities in the 11 southern #strong intervention# départements that have adopted their Local Development Plans			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)		75%		100%
Date achieved		09/17/2004		06/30/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)	133%			
Indicator 2 :	50% of these communities have at least one subproject whose last financing tranche has been disbursed			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)		50%		83%
Date achieved		09/17/2004		06/30/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)	166%			
Indicator 3 :	95% of Decision Committees are in place in the 11 targeted départements and have met at least once			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)		95%		63%
Date achieved		09/17/2004		06/30/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)	66%			

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	N/A			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)				
Date achieved				
Comments (incl. % achievement)				


G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	12/15/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
2	06/27/2005	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.53
3	12/20/2005	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	3.38
4	06/09/2006	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	4.20
5	07/12/2006	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	4.20
6	12/21/2006	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	5.70
7	06/25/2007	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	6.32
8	12/13/2007	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	7.18
9	05/21/2008	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	9.32
10	12/01/2008	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	13.17
11	05/29/2009	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	19.31
12	11/12/2009	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	23.33
13	06/23/2010	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	24.92

H. Restructuring (if any)

Not Applicable

I. Disbursement Profile



Local Development Program Support Project (APL1)

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

(a) Country situation and main sector issues

1. The Local Development Program Support Project (*Projet d'Appui au Développement Local* - PROADEL) was appraised in 2003.

2. **Poverty in Chad.** At the time of appraisal, about 80 percent of the population lived on less than one dollar per day. Average annual income per capita was estimated at US\$250, but there was a marked disparity between rural areas (US\$133) and urban areas (US\$328). Because poverty in Chad has a distinctly rural character, Government programs to reduce poverty and increase growth have traditionally targeted rural areas.

3. **Development constraints and rural services.** The main constraints to rural growth in Chad were identified as: (a) weak and inefficient provision of basic services to rural communities, (b) poor organization of rural communities and their limited involvement in development decisions, (c) the absence of rural financial services, and (d) the fragility of ecosystems. Because PROADEL was designed to support decentralization and to help Government authorities and local communities manage development funds at the local level, the first two of these constraints were particularly targeted by the preparation team.

(i) *Weak and inefficient provision of basic services to rural communities.* At the time of appraisal, only 30 percent of the rural population had access to safe water, and even in villages that had pumps, many of these pumps were not working due to lack of maintenance. Schools were few in number and physically inadequate, enrollment rates were low, the quality of education was poor and showed wide regional disparities in performance, school attendance rates for girls lagged substantially behind those for boys, costs were high, and few students continued on to post-primary education. In N'Djamena, there was one doctor per 3,904 inhabitants, but nationwide this number was more than 10 times higher (one doctor per 41,000 inhabitants). One-half of births in urban areas were assisted, compared with only 16 percent of births in rural areas. Five percent of adult Chadians were infected with the HIV, compared with only 2.9 percent in 1994. Out of 6,200 kilometers of roads in the national road network, only 300 kilometers were paved. Since most unpaved roads were not accessible year-round, the cost of food was high; transport charges frequently made up 70 percent of the retail price, and food security was poor.

(ii) *Poor organization of rural communities and their limited participation in development decisions.* Most rural communities in Chad were poorly organized and had limited involvement in decisions concerning their own development. The Government of Chad had started decentralizing administrative functions and shifting responsibility for the provision of administrative services to the local level, but this process was still in the early

stages. There were as yet no elected decentralized authorities, and rural populations had little or no direct contact with decision-makers. Projects such as the Local Initiatives Fund (*Fonds d'Actions Concertées d'Initiative Locale—FACIL*) and the Agency for Domestic Energy and Environment (AEDE) had set up informal decision-making bodies for rural development, but these remained in the pilot stage and depended on international donors for financial support.

(b) Government strategy and rationale for Bank assistance

4. **Government strategy on poverty.** The PRSP, adopted in 2003, calls for sustainably increasing productivity and production, while at the same time reinforcing institutional and human capacities. Key elements of the poverty reduction strategy include:

- Raising agricultural productivity and marketing.
- Strengthening the capacities of existing rural organizations and promoting the emergence of new rural organizations.
- Promoting sustainable management of natural resources.
- Redefining the Government's role in rural areas through decentralization.
- Improving the provision of basic services in rural areas (e.g., in education, health care, communications, transport).

5. **Government strategy on rural development.** In 2003, the Government of Chad prepared a comprehensive rural development strategy, which was to be implemented through a series of programs and projects including the Rural Development Support Program (*Programme Intégré de Développement Rural - PIDR*). Working within the PIDR framework, the World Bank channeled its support to the rural development strategy via two “sister” projects, which were prepared, evaluated, and implemented in parallel. The Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations Project (ASPOP), which closed in 2009, focused primarily on productive investments: it was designed to raise agricultural productivity, improve the performance of agricultural markets, and build capacity among rural organizations. PROADEL meanwhile focused primarily on social investments: it was designed to promote decentralization and accelerate development of local communities through the provision of public goods, especially in the areas of water and sanitation, health, and education.

6. **Government strategy to address other sector-specific issues.** Rural development activities in Chad are taking place in the context of an overall effort on the part of the Government to decentralize decision-making power and management of public resources. The decentralization effort was launched in 1996, when the authorities introduced a new system of government that includes five administrative levels (nation, region, *département*, *commune*, and *communauté rurale*). Operationalization of the new decentralized system lagged, however, and by 2003 when PROADEL was being prepared, the legal and regulatory framework had not yet been put in place. Consequently, an explicit objective of the project was to help the Government complete

the preparation of the new regulatory framework, implement the long-planned decentralization measures, and accompany the future *communautés rurales*.

7. It was anticipated that activities to be financed under PROADEL might have unforeseen environmental and social impacts. To ensure that any such impacts would be managed responsibly, an Environmental Assessment (EA) and an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) were prepared before appraisal, with local stakeholders involved in the preparation. Procedures needed to mitigate potential adverse environmental impacts of project-supported activities were spelled out in the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) and the Fight Against Desertification National Plan (FADN), both of which were prepared prior to appraisal.

8. ***Rationale for Bank assistance.*** The overall goal of the CAS of 2003 was to strengthen governance (including institutional arrangements for public resource management and service delivery) and to enhance non-oil economic opportunities, while reducing sources of vulnerability, particularly for the poor.

9. PROADEL was seen as helping to expand opportunities for the poor, address the unmet needs of rural communities in basic infrastructure services, and reduce sources of vulnerability. Moreover, PROADEL was to contribute to the decentralization process. It was anticipated that a share of the new oil revenues would be used to finance the needs of rural communities, with these needs identified by the communities themselves. The project was selected for grant financing because of its importance in the Bank's program in Chad and its expected contribution to poverty alleviation.

10. PROADEL was to be implemented using a Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach; the beneficiaries were to become strong and effective participants in their own development. The selection of a CDD approach was innovative in the Chadian context and consistent with the objectives of decentralization.

11. Interventions supported under PROADEL were intended to be complemented by other Bank-supported activities aimed at developing market linkages and improving the road network. Rural roads were to be constructed and maintained through PROADEL; market infrastructure was to be developed through the Urban Development Project (UDP); and complementary investments in transport were to be made through the National Transport Program Support Project (PAPRONAT).

1.2 Original Project Development Objective (PDO) and Key Indicators

12. PROADEL was designed as an Adaptable Program Lending (APL) facility, to be implemented in three phases over a 12-year period. Following the establishment during the first phase of a legally recognized decentralization framework, the idea was to pilot investment activities in a few regions during the first phase and to scale up coverage in subsequent phases into a fully-fledged national program.

13. ***The Project Development Objective (PDO) for PROADEL-1*** was to *assist the Government of Chad in designing and implementing a decentralized and participatory financing mechanism that will empower local communities and institutions to manage*

development funds in a transparent and sound way and according to their own priorities and eventually contribute to the decentralization agenda. The PDO was to be pursued through three main sets of activities: (a) strengthening the capacity and responsibility of local communities and decentralized authorities, (b) implementing demand-driven subprojects, and (c) supporting the emerging process of decentralization.

14. PROADEL-1 was intended to cover 19 of the 47 country's administrative departments. Emphasis was to be placed on promoting community development in the 11 southern departments that produce oil and cotton, as well as piloting models for participatory development in eight northern departments in which pastoralism is the dominant source of livelihoods. In addition, support would be provided to help the Government complete the legal framework for decentralization and support democratically elected decentralized authorities.

15. **Key performance indicators.** The PAD included 21 key performance indicators related to the PDO and to the four project components.¹ Because the project was designed as the first phase of a three-phase APL, a set of key performance indicators for PROADEL-1 was selected as triggers for proceeding to PROADEL-2 (see Table 1).

Table 1: Performance indicators for PROADEL-1 selected as triggers for PROADEL-2

1.	50 percent of targeted communities have prepared and adopted their Local Development Plans in the 11 southern "strong intervention departments"
2.	50 percent of these communities have at least one subproject whose first financing tranche has been disbursed
3.	75 percent of decision-making committees are in place in these 11 departments and have met at least once
4.	Regulatory legal documents on decentralization have been enacted and adopted by the national assembly, and 50 percent of the application decrees are available
5.	Timetable for administrative elections (<i>communes</i> and <i>communautés rurales</i>) has been defined
6.	At least 0.5 percent of oil revenues devoted to priority sectors are disbursed for subprojects that come within the scope of Local Development Plans.

1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and Reasons / Justification

16. Toward the end of 2008, when the Project had been under implementation for nearly five years, the Government and the World Bank task team decided that the results framework needed to be revised for two reasons. Because the Project uses a CDD approach, the types and numbers of subproject funding requests submitted by local communities could not be known with precision when the Project was being prepared,

¹ All performance indicators are displayed in Section 3.2, Table 3.

and targets set at the time of appraisal had by then been shown to be off the mark. Moreover, the indicators and targets in the results framework reflected the outcomes and impacts expected at the conclusion of all three phases of the planned 12-year APL, not those that could reasonably be expected at the end of the first phase only.

17. In light of these considerations, during the Mid-Term Review (MTR) carried out in June 2009, the World Bank task team and the Government agreed to modify the results framework. The task team subsequently prepared a restructuring proposal that included minor revisions to the PDO. The revised PDO formulated in the wake of the MTR reads as follows: *“Increase access to basic infrastructure services in targeted poor communes and improve the capacity of local institutions and communities to manage the development process.”* In addition to proposing this change to the PDO, the task team also proposed to introduce several new performance indicators and to modify the targets for a number of existing performance indicators. The modified performance indicators are presented in Annex 2.1.

18. The revised PDO and the modified performance indicators prepared following the MTR were never officially approved by the World Bank.² Nevertheless, they are mentioned here because the modified indicators were subsequently used by the project M&E unit to track implementation progress, and they were also referred to during supervision missions carried out after the MTR.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

19. The main beneficiaries consisted of the people targeted by Local Development Plans (LDPs) in the 19 departments in which PROADEL-1 was active.³ Underprivileged groups were actively targeted, including women and transhumant herders.

1.5 Project Components

20. PROADEL-1 included four components: (1) Financial support to local development subprojects, (2) Capacity building for local development stakeholders, (3) Support for decentralization, and (4) Project management and information support.

21. **Component 1: Financial support to local development subprojects** (US\$13.95 million, of which US\$10.12 million in IDA funds). The objective of Component 1 was to

² Circumstances conspired to prevent the restructuring from being carried out, in that relations between the Bank and the Government of Chad were under review when the restructuring package was submitted to the CMU in August 2009. By the time relations were clarified (this process ended with the ISN of June 2010), the closing date was drawing near, and the CMU decided that there was no longer any point in changing the PDO.

³ The 11 core departments included: Mandoul Occidental, Mandoul Oriental, and Bahr Sara (region of Mandoul); Dodge, Lac Weye, Ngourkosso, Tandjile Est, and Tandjile Ouest (regions of Tandjile and Logone Occidental); and La Nya Pende, La Pende, and Monts de Lam (region of Logone Oriental). The eight additional departments in which PROADEL launched studies and pilot activities included: Chari, Baguirmi, Loug Chari, Dababa, Bahr El Gazal, Bahr Koh, Bahr Signaka and Fitri (regions of Chari-Baguirmi and Kanem).

provide matching grants to cofinance subprojects proposed by community-based organizations (associations, organizations, and others with legal status) or decentralized local government entities (at the commune or *communauté rurale* level, once established) in project areas. After local meetings were organized, each local development community (*Assemblée communautaire de développement*--ACD) would prepare a LDP detailing its priorities and listing activities to be financed (as subprojects).

22. **Component 2: Capacity building for local development stakeholders** (US\$18.68 million, of which US\$4.58 million in IDA funds). The objective of Component 2 was to strengthen the technical and organizational capacity for participatory approaches, needs assessments, project management, access to credit, or new poverty reduction methods. This component targeted local communities and their associations, subprefectoral and departmental decision and approval committees, and service providers (training institutions, NGOs, microfinance institutions).

Component 2 had three subcomponents:

- ***Subcomponent 2.1: Support to community participatory assessments and local development plan preparation and implementation.*** This subcomponent was to be executed by an *opérateur ensemble* (coordinating service provider) financed by AFD and recruited through an international invitation to tender based on the terms of reference detailed in the Project Implementation Manual (PIM). The component was to finance training at the local level for participatory appraisals and to pay the local service providers needed to plan and implement the subprojects, as well as to pay for complementary studies and pilot operations that would be launched in the pastoral departments, where the techniques to be used were different.
- ***Subcomponent 2.2: Training programs at the community level.*** Training programs were to be provided by local subcontractors (NGOs) and were to include a wide variety of modules determined during the participatory assessments.
- ***Subcomponent 2.3: Institutional support to microfinance institutions.*** The objective of this subcomponent was to help provide efficient financial services to poor communities in rural project areas. These include defining and implementing a regulatory framework for rural finance, providing basic training for microfinance institutions and communities on savings and credit, and reinforcing and expanding existing microfinance institutions through feasibility studies, business plans, equipment, and the like.

23. **Component 3: Support for decentralization** (US\$5.06 million, of which US\$3.5 million in IDA funds). The objective of Component 3 was to help the Government effectively implement its decentralization policy.

Component 3 had three subcomponents:

- ***Subcomponent 3.1: Support for the completion of the legal and regulatory frameworks of decentralization.*** The support was provided to finance studies and technical assistance to the Ministry of Decentralization to complete the

necessary laws and regulations and to formulate a master plan for implementing the decentralization program.

- **Subcomponent 3.2: Capacity building.** This subcomponent aimed to strengthen the institutional and technical capacities of all key stakeholders in the decentralization process at the national, regional, and local levels.
- **Subcomponent 3.3: Support for the definition of land tenure.** The project would improve the land tenure system in Chad by helping create a reliable database on land tenure, define new curricula and research programs on land tenure, help collect data needed for PROADEL's activities, and provide equipment to support the Chadian Land Tenure Office (CLTO - *Observatoire Foncier du Tchad*).

24. **Component 4: Management and information support** (US\$8.31 million, of which US\$4.9 million in IDA funds). Component 4 supported project coordination, evaluation, and monitoring.

Component 4 had two subcomponents:

- **Subcomponent 4.1: Support to project management.** Institutional arrangements for project implementation consisted of a Steering Committee,⁴ a Project Management Unit--PMU (*Unité de gestion du projet--UGP*), and Local Project Management Units—LPMUs (*Unité de gestion locale--UGL*) in each of the three regions where project operations were active. In addition, there were Decision Committees for subprojects at the regional level.
- **Subcomponent 4.2: Program monitoring and evaluation.** The planned management information system consisted of: (a) monitoring of accounting and financial information; (b) monitoring and evaluation of project activities; and (c) monitoring of development operations and processes.

25. **Causal linkages.** The decentralization strategy of the Government was designed to promote cooperation between elected authorities (regional and subregional) and rural communities, with the goal of jointly managing resources, including future oil revenues allocated to priority sectors. As reflected in the PDO, it was therefore deemed necessary to: (a) establish a decentralized administrative structure based on formal laws and a well-defined regulatory framework; (b) provide the facilities and competencies needed to operate the structure; and (c) finance local initiatives selected not by the central authorities but by stakeholders who are close to beneficiaries or are beneficiaries themselves. The activities supported under the project supported this paradigm, although it could be argued that they were not always implemented in the optimal order.

⁴ At the central level, there is a Steering Committee for all the projects of the PIDR, including PROADEL and ASPOP.

1.6 Other significant changes

26. During implementation, there were no major changes in the project strategy, components, or implementation arrangements. Following the MTR project funds were reallocated to better reflect the actual demand and use of funds up until that time.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

27. Two factors in the external environment affected project implementation: the breakdown in relations between the World Bank and the Government of Chad, and the civil conflict that gripped the country. The related disruptions slowed implementation of project activities and required many subprojects to stop and then re-start again.

28. *Breakdown in relations between the World Bank and the Government of Chad:* The relationship between the Bank and the Government of Chad was severely strained over disagreements concerning the use of oil revenues that negotiated in the context of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project. The Bank stopped its program in Chad in 2006, which led to the temporary freezing of disbursements to all projects including PROADEL-1. Consequently, project activities slowed or stopped altogether before eventually resuming when the situation improved.

29. *Civil conflict:* For much of the project implementation period the Government was engaged in what amounted to a low-level civil war, with opposition groups based inside and outside the country mounting regular armed attacks designed to destabilize the economy and overthrow the existing regime. The lack of security in many parts of the country, especially rural areas including many of those targeted by the project, often made it unsafe for project staff to travel to project sites and/or perform their activities in a normal way. In February 2008, the World Bank Country Office was closed following rebel attacks on the capital and remained closed throughout the entire year.

2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry

30. The Government fully endorsed the local development approach that PROADEL supported. It undertook the responsibility to prepare the three phases by establishing a national team (*Equipe Nationale d'Instruction du Projet—ENIP*) and using funds made available through a PPF funded by the Government of Japan. The multidisciplinary preparation team included representatives from the Government and from civil society. Furthermore, the Government placed PROADEL under a multisectoral Steering Committee composed of eight ministries to oversee the program (the same Committee supervises other rural sector projects). Prior to appraisal, the Government also organized preparation of the operations, financial, and M&E manuals.

31. Project preparation benefited from: (a) analytical work done when the national and sector-specific strategies were being developed (see Section 1.1.b); (b) lessons learned from other rural development projects, including CBD/CDD projects carried out not only in Chad but also in other African countries; (c) lessons learned from several

community-based development projects preceding this project; and (d) lessons learned from a number of bilateral projects for local development in Chad.

32. Technical support on the design of Component 3 was provided by FENU which was already active in Chad, and the appraisal mission included a decentralization and governance consultant who provided background support.

33. The design decided by the preparation team included a range of activities, including building capacity for planning of local development and implementing subprojects, transferring financial resources to communes and communities, strengthening financial management and procurement systems, introducing new policies and regulations for decentralization, and bolstering natural resource management.

34. The PDO was appropriate in light of the long-term development objectives of the overall 12-year program. At the same time, because the PDO related to the overall program goals, it did not lend itself easily to the definition of the detailed performance indicators needed to measure the achievements of the first phase of the project.

35. The design of the project and its components were appropriate. The program was intended to (a) run for an extended period; (b) cover multiple sectors; (c) encourage active participation of all population groups within the targeted communities; (d) develop and test decentralized financial management mechanisms; (e) provide mechanisms for financing local initiatives while attempting to ensure long-term viability of ecosystems and natural resources; and (f) facilitate making local governments or the private sector responsible for providing services previously provided by the central government.

36. The project design prudently called for project operations to be launched initially in one region only, with the objective of gaining experience before the approach was extended to other regions. In retrospect, it is apparent that the scaling up proceeded very slowly and it now seems that work in the two other regions should have been started simultaneously in the second year, rather than being phased in over two years.

37. Most risks and mitigating measures were appropriately conceived. Two risks were arguably underestimated: (a) the risk that planned capacity-building efforts might not be sufficient to ensure rapid and successful adoption by participating community organizations of decentralized financial management measures (including procurement activities), and (b) the risk that local administrations would require additional resources to be able to perform their functions effectively (see Annex 6—Stakeholder workshops).

2.2 Implementation

38. No major changes were made during implementation to the project design, and the project was never formally at risk, although risks inherent in the environment were high as noted earlier.

39. The Project succeeded in implementing most of the planned activities, and significant impacts were achieved. Selected achievements are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2: Main accomplishments of PROADEL-1

Component 1: Local development subprojects	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 247 classrooms constructed, providing 27,800 children with access to modern education facilities• 205 improved water supply points constructed or rehabilitated, providing access to clean potable water to 219,600 people• 11 health centers constructed, providing access to health care facilities to 41,500 people• More than 80,000 cattle provided with access to secure watering points
Component 2: Capacity building of local stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 5,215 local development assemblies and 210 cantonal development selection committees established• 174 Local Development Plans adopted• 312 subprojects management committees created
Component 3: Support for decentralization	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Six laws enacted on decentralization, along with 47 decrees preparing the ground for local elections (planned for 2011)

40. Several factors can be singled out as having contributed to the successful implementation experience:

- (i) Throughout implementation, the demand for project services was very strong, both with regard to financing of subprojects and with regard to supporting decentralization.
- (ii) The Government maintained its strong commitment to the project, participating in supervision missions, facilitating communication with the Bank, expediting the transfer of funds from the Bank, providing guidance through the Steering Committee, and ensuring a supportive policy environment
- (iii) Supervision missions, although not carried out as frequently as planned because of the protracted cessation of the Bank's operations in Chad, were characterized by strong collaboration between the Bank task team and project staff. These missions generated important feedback to the implementing authorities about the performance of the project, which helped to make up for the weak performance of the project M&E system during the first two years (see 2.3 below).
- (iv) Financial and technical support provided by the co-financier (*Agence Francaise de Developpement*) allowed field operations to proceed without interruption after the initial delay of eight months (caused by the difficulty of recruiting the *Opérateur Ensemble*).

41. During the project life cycle, however, implementation was slowed by a number of problems:

- (i) *Unfortunate timing of effectiveness:* The IDA grant was approved on 30 September 2004. However, due to delays in hiring the project coordinator, implementing the computerized accounting system, and transferring Government counterpart funds, the grant was declared effective only on 28 March 2005, and the special accounts received initial deposits of funds only in May 2005. This meant that the project had only four months in 2005 to implement activities before the onset of the rainy season.
- (ii) *Slow recruitment of project staff:* The international procurement procedure used to recruit the coordinating service provider funded by AFD took eight months; since the coordinating service provider was needed to build capacity in local communities and prepare local development plans, all activities in Components 1 and 2 were delayed.
- (iii) *Cessation of World Bank programs in Chad:* The year 2006 began with the halt of all World Bank programs in Chad, meaning that the planned first-quarter activities were transferred to the second quarter. In addition, the annual plan and budget of the project for 2006 was approved by the Steering Committee only in August, thus restricting the use of Government counterpart funds.
- (iv) *Civil disturbances:* Due to rebel attacks, the World Bank office in Chad remained closed throughout 2008, slowing the processing of replenishment requests. Security operations directed against the rebels disrupted fieldwork from February to April.

42. Four other factors adversely affected the speed and quality of implementation:

- (i) *Seasonal factors:* Many project-supported activities could be implemented only during the dry season (four or five months), when beneficiaries were not actively engaged in agricultural activities.
- (ii) *Non-availability of counterpart funds:* Delays in the payment of counterpart funds, and the Government's failure to honor all of its counterpart funds commitments, prevented timely implementation of some project-supported activities.⁵
- (iii) *Cash flow problems:* Transfer of project funds from N'Djamena to field locations and ACDs were difficult to arrange, in part because financial institutions are scarce in Chad. Delays in moving funds to the field were exacerbated by a cash-flow bottleneck that arose because of the very low limits that had been imposed on the two Special Accounts (these were originally set at US\$505,000 and US\$320,000 equivalent; only after the

⁵ It should be noted, however, that after the Project closed, the Government has continued to provide funding, thus allowing the project implementation unit to retain core staff and to continue implementation of non-completed subprojects.

midterm review were they raised to US\$1 million and US\$640,000, respectively).

- (iv) *Inconsistencies in project management:* Due to management shortcomings pointed by the MTR, at the end of 2009 the Government replaced nearly all of the management staff. Identification of a new Project Coordinator proved very challenging, in part because of political reasons. Eventually the supervising ministry (Ministry of Land Management, Urbanism and Habitat) exerted its authority and brokered the appointment of a new Project Coordinator. From that point on, implementation performance picked up again

43. As a consequence of the slow start and the many delays experienced during project implementation, the MTR originally scheduled to take place in March 2007 was significantly delayed. The MTR took place only in June 2009, 60 months after effectiveness was declared. Because of the lateness of the MTR, the project closing date was extended by one year.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

44. Design. Planning of the M&E system started before project appraisal. The manual was validated by the World Bank in 2004 with minor changes.

45. As designed, the M&E system had four major weaknesses:

- (i) **Overly ambitious design:** The original results framework was too ambitious and contained indicators that were challenging to measure under the difficult conditions prevailing.
- (ii) **Excessive data collection requirements:** Some of the M&E data could only be collected through formal surveys carried out annually.
- (iii) **Inadequate resources:** The resources allocated for M&E activities were inadequate.
- (iv) **Missing baseline:** Baseline data were not collected at project inception. A basic review of the existing infrastructure in the departments covered by the project was prepared only in November 2007. The lack of a detailed baseline proved to be a major limitation at the evaluation stage.

46. Implementation. During the first two years of implementation, the M&E system was unable to generate more than the most basic data on project activities, and the M&E function was consistently rated unsatisfactory by the supervision team during four years. These unsatisfactory ratings continued until the MTR (June 2009), when several one-off studies were carried out, these studies made clear that the original targets for subprojects were seriously flawed, and the World Bank task team and project management agreed that the targets for several key performance indicators should be revised.

47. The M&E system did manage to generate basic information about project activities. Twenty-five out of the 28 scheduled quarterly and annual reports were

completed on time (89 percent), and at the time of the ICR mission, project management was able to report on: (i) progress achieved against the original indicators; (ii) progress achieved against the “revised” indicators introduced at the time of the MTR; (iii) progress achieved against the Phase 2 triggers; and (iv) capacity building activities. However, the beneficiary survey planned at appraisal and the impact survey was still being completed when the ICR was being prepared. Preliminary results were transmitted at the end of November 2010, but the quality was compromised by methodological shortcomings compounded by a lack of baseline data.

48. **Utilization.** The data on project activities generated by the M&E system, while not very sophisticated, were used to good effect by project management and by World Bank supervision teams. Data produced by the M&E unit were also used to prepare detailed annual work plans, and these plans, in combination with financial management information, allowed project management to halt the approval of new subprojects before project funds became overcommitted.

2.4 Safeguards and Fiduciary Compliance

49. **Safeguard policies.** Four World Bank safeguard policies were triggered by the project: OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment), OP 4.04 (Natural Habitats), OP4.11 (Physical Cultural Resources), and 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement). An Environmental Assessment (EA) and an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMP) were prepared prior to appraisal. Based on the recommendation of the appraisal mission, project management recruited environmental and social specialists for the head office and for the regional offices. Beginning in the second year of implementation, the project transferred responsibility for selected environmental activities to the *Volet Gestion Communautaire des Ecosystems (VGCE)*, a Government project that was tasked with handling environmental management issues for several rural development projects. VGCE was effective in providing environmental management services during the identification, preparation, and implementation of subprojects. World Bank supervision missions consistently rated compliance with applicable safeguard policies as satisfactory.

50. **Fiduciary compliance.** Project accounts, including special accounts and regional subaccounts, were audited regularly. According to the auditors’ reports, many of the accounts contained numerous irregularities up until the last year, but these errors were mostly minor in nature, and only one audit report was qualified (the annual audit for FY2006). The irregularities identified by the auditors were successfully addressed, and all of the audits were eventually approved. The performance of the project’s financial management system was mixed. Because the planned financial management system (based on TOMPRO software) was never fully implemented, production of quarterly reports was impeded, and annual plans suffered because they could not be subjected to rigorous financial analysis. Throughout the life of the project, there were problems with the transfer of funds and delayed payments to service providers (see Annex 6).

51. Every supervision mission of the Bank carried out a procurement review. The performance of the procurement team that operated out of the project’s main office was consistently rated satisfactory, but it was pointed out on numerous occasions that Local

Development Committees sometimes failed to follow required procurement procedures. Because of the recurring problems with community-level procurement, the performance of the procurement function was rated moderately unsatisfactory in 2007 and 2008.

2.5 Post-completion Operation / Next Phase

52. The Government of Chad remains firmly committed to continuing the PROADEL APL series and has signaled its desire to scale up the program and to increase the coverage to include the entire national territory. Based on the performance of first phase, and taking into account the fact that the Phase 2 triggers have been met, preparation of PROADEL-2 was well underway in December 2010 when this ICR was being finalized.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

53. The project design, comprising four components, is appropriate.

54. The objectives of the Project are as relevant now as they were at appraisal. Poverty rates in Chad have come down somewhat since the Project was prepared, but poverty remains widespread throughout the country and is especially prevalent in rural areas.

3.2 Achievement of the Project Development Objective (PDO)

55. Evaluation of the achievement of the PDO is problematic, for three reasons. First, the PDO was formulated in terms that are worded very vaguely, making precise measurement difficult.⁶ Second, because the project uses a CDD approach, the activities to be financed could not be predicted accurately at the time of appraisal, so the targets set in the PAD for many output indicators were at best only “guesstimates.” Third, many of the original targets were modified after the MTR, and although the modified targets were never formally adopted, they were reported on by the project team.

56. *Progress achieved against the original indicators.* Despite these challenges, the effectiveness of the project in meeting its PDO can be evaluated based on the progress achieved in relation to the original indicators. Table 3 shows the achievements against the 21 original indicators given in the PAD, four of which are related to the general objectives and 17 of which are related to the sub-component objectives. In five cases the target values not achieved.⁷ These five cases involve indicators related to the subprojects that were financed under Component 1, a significant number of which could not be completed prior to the Project closing date due to delays in payment of counterpart funds.

⁶ Section 1.2 reports the wording of the PAD and the Grant Agreement is not more precise: “to empower local communities and decentralized authorities to manage development funds.”

⁷ Three indicators are not applicable due to change in Government’s policy, absence of selection by the local communities, and rescheduling. One output indicator is unavailable.

All of the targets for indicators associated with Components 2, 3, and 4 were fully achieved, and most were significantly exceeded.

Table 3: PDO Indicators and Achievements against Original Targets⁸

PDO General Objectives	Achieved	Achieved as % of target	Notes
75% of targeted communities in the 11 southern “strong intervention” <i>départements</i> that have adopted their Local Development Plans	100%	133%	170 communities adopted their LDP in the southern <i>departments</i>
50% of these communities have at least one subproject whose last financing tranche has been disbursed	83%	166%	256 out of 308 subprojects reached the last financing tranche
95% of Decision Committees are in place in the 11 targeted <i>départements</i> and have met at least once	63%	66%	10 out of 16 Decision Committees have met
At least 300 villages in the N’Djamena wood fuel supply basin and 100 villages in the Moundou and Sahr basin sustainably manage their wood resources	--	--	The GoC prohibited the use of wood fuel in 2008 and the related actions were cancelled
Component 1: Support to local development subprojects			
70% of approved subprojects are completed	84%	120%	341 out of 405 approved subprojects completed
80% of local beneficiaries contributions are actually paid	34%	43%	CFA279.1m out of CFA817.5m paid
At least 300 classrooms have been built or rehabilitated	247	82%	280 classrooms to be achieved by December 2010
At least 350 water supply infrastructures have been built or rehabilitated	205	59%	244 to be achieved by December 2010
At least 20 health posts have been built or rehabilitated	11	55%	
At least 50 km of rural roads have been built or rehabilitated	--	--	No rural roads selected in the LDPs

⁸ Sources: for the PDO indicators, the Project Appraisal Document; for the achievements, the Government’s ICR dated October 2010 and additional data and information provided by the PROADEL Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. The PAD also included two mid-term review indicators (for Component 1 and 2); these are not presented here.

Table 3 (continued): PDO Indicators and Achievements against Original Targets⁹

Component 2: Capacity building to local development stakeholders			
70% of infrastructures carried out under subprojects are well maintained and operational	94%	127%	
Implementation ratio of the training plans established by the LPMUs to the benefit of CBOs reaches 60%	78%	130%	612 completed out of 784 planned training sessions
10% of the training are specifically intended to vulnerable groups	25%	250%	3,536 women, youths and herders received training out of 14,388 people
10 microfinance institutions have been established or strengthened	20	200%	
Component 3: Support for decentralization	Achieved	Achieved as % of target	Notes
Decentralization legal texts have been adopted by the national Assembly and 50% of application texts projects are available	68%	136%	6 laws adopted and 47 out of 69 application texts available
Implementation of training plans established to the benefit decentralized authorities reaches 60%	87%	145%	52 out of 60 planned training sessions completed
The 3 CLTO decentralized units are operational	3	100%	
10 pilot decentralized governments (<i>commune</i> level) have been evaluated and 8 of them are capable of receiving and managing public financial resources to take over local development	--	--	Election of decentralized governments has been postponed to June 2011
Component 4: Management and information support			
70% of activity reports produced by the execution authorities of the project and by the communities are rated satisfactory	n.a.	n.a.	Activity reports are reported to be generally satisfactory
80% of the reports to be prepared by the PMU under the project monitoring and evaluation manual have been issued in a timely manner	89%	111%	25 out of 28 planned reports timely issued
80% of contracts signed by the PMU have been executed on time	100%	125%	All contracts signed executed on time

57. ***Progress achieved against the “revised” PDO indicators.*** Additional insights into the performance of the Project can be obtained by examining the progress achieved against the revised indicators (see Annex 2.1). Even though the revised indicators were never formally adopted, they reflect what the World Bank team and the Government felt, in the wake of the MTR, were reasonable outcomes for the project. Many of the revised indicators were less ambitious than the original indicators presented in the PAD, so the

⁹ Sources: for the PDO indicators, the PAD; for the achievements, the Government’s ICR dated October 2010 and additional data and information provided by the PROADEL M&E Unit. The PAD also included two MTR indicators (for Component 1 and 2); these are not presented here.

rate of progress achieved against the targets was generally higher, especially for Component 1.¹⁰

58. ***Progress achieved against the Phase 2 trigger indicators.*** A final measure of the performance of the project is provided by the trigger indicators (see Annex 2.2). For all trigger indicators, the targets set in the PAD were reached or exceeded, with the exception of Trigger 8 (percentage of oil revenues devoted to priority sectors). For this indicator, monitored data do not allow effective measurement.

59. The composite picture that emerges based on the different sets of indicators is that the PDO has been substantially met. All of the many partners and stakeholders contacted by the ICR mission agreed on this fundamental conclusion (see Annexes 5 and 6).

3.3 Efficiency

60. Consistent with ICR guidelines, since economic analysis was not carried out at the time of appraisal, economic analysis was not carried out for the ICR. The appraisal mission concluded that the Project did not lend itself to cost-benefit analysis, for two main reasons: (i) benefits could not be defined prior to implementation, because the subproject investments could not be identified ex ante due to the use of the CDD approach; and (ii) the activities most likely to be financed under the project produce benefits that are difficult to quantify in economic terms (e.g., strengthened institution, reinforced human capacity, improved and more transparent governance, improved welfare of rural populations).

61. The appraisal mission anticipated that a useful approach for evaluating the effectiveness of the Project would be to analyze least-cost alternatives for implementing project-financed activities. The appraisal mission did not perform any ex ante analysis of least-cost alternatives, but the Project M&E unit did collect and save data on the numbers and costs of different types of Project-supported subprojects. Using these data, the ICR mission was able to compute average costs of representative Project-supported subprojects. This analysis is presented in Annex 3. Because most of the contracts to implement subprojects were approved using the World Bank's simplified bidding procedures (which require that a minimum of three valid bids be received for each contract that is tendered), the average costs associated with Project-supported subprojects provide useful information that should help to inform the design of future operations, including PROADEL-2 which is currently under preparation.

62. The economic benefits generated by the Project are discussed in the impact assessment commissioned by the Government, a draft of which was made available to the ICR mission. Although the impact assessment suffered from a number of methodological weaknesses that cast doubt on the accuracy of many findings, the report points out that the FCFA7.7 billion worth of subprojects financed under PROADEL-1 generated substantial benefits in terms of local employment and income generation. The draft

¹⁰ The revised indicators are mentioned here because they were consistently reported in supervision missions carried out following the MTR, but since they were never formally adopted, they are of minor importance for purposes of this ICR.

impact assessment documents the involvement of 76 local construction firms, 10 furniture makers, 34 consulting engineers, 26 environmental consultants, and 287 miscellaneous goods providers.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: *Moderately satisfactory.*

63. The overall outcome of a project is assessed taking into account the extent to which the project development objectives were achieved or are expected to be achieved. The Project recorded significant accomplishments: most of the targets specified in the results framework have been met or exceeded, the remaining unfinished subprojects are all being completed, and efforts continue to ratify pending legislation on decentralization. The overall outcome is therefore rated as *Moderately satisfactory*.

- Although assessment of project achievements is hampered by a lack of data, it is clear that the development objective and most output targets were essentially achieved, and many targets were exceeded. The performance triggers for advancing to the second phase of the project were met, with the exception of Trigger 8, for which data collection was difficult (due to budget posting issues).
- Competitive procurement was used for most subprojects, with the goal of reducing implementation costs below the level that would have been incurred had normal government implementation procedures been used.

64. Several factors militate against assigning a higher rating for project outcomes:

- At the time the Project closed, more than 60 subprojects had not yet been completed, despite the fact that the closing date had been extended by a year.
- Several important legal documents on decentralization prepared under the Project remain to be processed.
- Due to difficulties faced by the M&E system and the unavailability of the final impact assessment at the time of the completion of the ICR report, data permitting more rigorous economic analysis of the performance of subprojects are not available, making difficult the quantification of project benefits.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

65. With available data it is not possible to assess the degree to which poverty has been reduced in the areas targeted by the project (three out of the country's 22 regions).

66. ***Gender and youth issues.*** The original PAD indicated that “women, youth, transhumant herders, and other underprivileged groups would be actively targeted.” Among the 405 subprojects financed under the project, only two are owned by women; the remaining 403 subprojects all have both men and women as members and beneficiaries. This does not alter the fact that PROADEL-1 has been instrumental in

promoting the welfare of women and in improving their status in the communities where the project is active. With 23% of the total cost of subprojects dedicated to water infrastructure and sanitation, the draft impact assessment rightly notes their specific impact on women and youth. The project led to a significant decrease of water chores for women, and reduction of fecal and water-related diseases for children. Women participate on project committees at all levels, and the ICR mission noted that all ACDs for village groups and subprojects have at least one or two women members. Youth are even better represented in the ACDs; each subproject that the ICR team visited had a minimum of two or three youths represented on the ACD. The ICR mission also observed that other underrepresented groups, such as transhumant herders, did not participate to the same extent in ACDs because of their transient way of life. However, almost all LDPs include provisions for sustainable land management activities, which typically provide safe passage corridors for livestock and watering points (see Annex 5, section 4).

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

67. Processes and procedures introduced under PROADEL-1, which were used to prepare local development plans in a participatory manner, select priority investments, and take investment decisions, are today being used not only in regions targeted by the project, but also in other regions throughout the country.

68. In addition to serving as a model, the project helped build capacity in the central institutions that implemented the project. The Ministries of Land Management and Decentralization in particular benefited through material support and training (capacity-building), while agencies located in the regions benefited from modernization of communication and other equipment. A particularly important contribution, and one that was not anticipated at the time of appraisal, was the provision of equipment to the Land Tenure Office (*Observatoire Foncier du Tchad*) and the construction of three branch offices. Every group of stakeholders contacted by the ICR mission agreed that without PROADEL (and to some extent its agricultural sister project, ASPOP), the Government's decentralization efforts would not have made nearly as much progress (see Annex 6—Stakeholders' workshops).

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

69. Under Component 1, support was to be provided to the *Agence pour l'Energie Domestique et l'Environnement*, to allow completion of activities that had been initiated under the IDA-funded Household Energy Project (CR 30820 CD, closed on June 30, 2004). The purpose of PROADEL-1 support was to create structures at the village level to allow sustainable management of fuel wood resources. This activity languished under PROADEL-1, and in 2007 the Government decided to cancel the program.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

70. *Beneficiary survey.* No beneficiary survey was carried out. The draft impact assessment displays results for 564 questionnaires which are statistically unusable. However qualitative feedback from beneficiaries shows a high level of satisfaction for all

subprojects, except for those involving water infrastructures (a significant number of wells financed by the Project were reported to have gone dry). During the course of 15 field visits carried out by the ICR mission, almost 100 project beneficiaries were interviewed, as well as members of project committees, and local administrations. The outcomes of this “mini beneficiary’s survey” are summarized in Annex 5.

71. *Stakeholder workshops.* The ICR mission interviewed stakeholders individually or in small groups. Key findings of the stakeholder interviews are summarized in Annex 6. The key lessons learned identified by stakeholders appear below in Section 6—Lessons Learned. This section presents some highlights of the proposed lessons:

- Phasing of project-supported activities was appropriate because of local capacity constraints. Even though the project design was relatively simple, and despite the fact that the participatory approach had been introduced earlier under PROADEL’s sister project, ASPOP, it was important for PROADEL to be launched in only one region, and then extended to other regions in subsequent years.
- Late payment (and in some cases non-payment) of service providers were chronic problems. In future, measures must be found to ensure that project managers and beneficiaries in charge of implementing subprojects respect contractual conditions and payment schedules. Engineering firms, construction firms, and other service providers must be paid in a timely fashion. A guarantee fund or payment system should be developed in case ACD committees abandon their subproject or misuse the allocated funds. The loss should not fall on the service providers who have done their work properly.
- Contracts for implementation of subprojects should not only provide general guidance on technical specifications and costs, but also should take into account specific conditions that are likely to vary from one subproject to the next (for instance, additional transport costs should be included for subprojects located in remote locations).
- Many local ACDs that awarded contracts for project-supported subprojects were initially unfamiliar with competitive bidding procedures such as those required for selection of service providers. During the first phase of PROADEL, some mistakes occurred that were subsequently remedied by training, but additional training will be needed even in PROADEL-1 project areas to consolidate local knowledge. A priority activity for procurement officers during Phase 2 should be to organize procurement and simple financial training in the field.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: *Moderate*

72. Risks to the development outcome and sustainability of project achievements are assessed against technical, institutional, economic/financial, social and environmental, political (including the Government's commitment), and stakeholder criteria. These are evaluated briefly below in relation to potential decentralization, subprojects' viability, and institutional concerns.

73. *Decentralization and financing of the established decentralized organs.* The Government of Chad has been working on decentralization since the 1990s, with relatively modest results to date. However, the Government's current commitment to continued decentralization cannot be questioned, especially in view of the already fixed election agenda. Of greater concern is the financial capacity of the central and decentralized public-sector units to perform their duties and provide services initiated by PROADEL funds. Mitigating this risk are the nearly finalized legal framework; the capacity-building that has already taken place in target regions, departments, and sub-prefectures; the rise in oil revenue for the Government; and the improvement in collection of taxes and other funds by regional and lower-level administrative units. Considering the enormity of the task of spreading decentralization to all 22 regions of Chad, the cost element cannot be ignored, however. The risk of rapid development in decentralization—which will take place during the second and third phases of PROADEL—is estimated as moderate, even when the funds provided by the World Bank grant are considered. (Other donors are waiting for actual results and elections before committing themselves to provide additional funds for decentralization.)

74. *Viability of subprojects.* The ICR mission and most of the supervision missions concluded that nearly all subproject structures financed under PROADEL are technically sound and well constructed. However, the economic viability of the subprojects financed under PROADEL-1 remains uncertain, and many subprojects (such as schools and health centers) must rely on public-sector financing to carry on their operations. These subprojects do generate significant non-monetary benefits, but their viability must be ensured nonetheless. In contrast, all local water and economic subprojects (butcherries, storing depots) have or will have subproject committees that collect money from users in order to be ready for maintenance expenditures when needed. PROADEL has, throughout its existence, insisted on budgeting and collecting enough funds for subprojects to ensure good maintenance of their investments, regardless of whether they are for productive or social purposes. In this respect, improved fundraising by decentralized administrative units, already mentioned, could provide some help for social subprojects. (This support would not have to cover 100 percent of operational and maintenance charges, however, as social subprojects are capable of collecting small fees from beneficiaries - see Annex 5.) The risk of failing to maintain subprojects is evaluated as moderate, mainly because the social infrastructures require public funds.

75. *Experienced staff for PROADEL.* Since the project was formally closed, funding constraints have forced the laying off of many project staff in the project head office and

almost all staff in regional offices, except for the M&E officers and some unskilled workers (cleaners, security guards). Even the project administrator is on a temporary transfer from another project (VGCE). The erosion in implementation capacity will be hard to reverse quickly. Replacement staff needed for the follow-on phase will be easy to find, but few will come with appropriate experience. It led to the selection of an international consulting firm to do the hiring. Bringing new staff up speed will take time, although the challenge will be mitigated by the existence of manuals and training materials developed during PROADEL I. This issue remains sensitive but the risk of not having experienced staff for PROADEL 2 is evaluated as low if adequate measures are taken in terms of selection and adequate complementary training.

76. All other risks (technical, social, environmental, and stakeholder commitment) are considered negligible.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: *Satisfactory.*

77. The role of PROADEL was to complement its agricultural sister project, ASPOP, in helping the Government to operationalize its Rural Development Support Program (PIDR) and improve the provision of basic services in rural areas. In addition, project financing was needed for a related program, that is, decentralization of Government administration and services. The Bank had earlier committed to supporting Chad's strategy for poverty reduction, and key elements in that strategy were decentralization and community-based or -driven development. The Bank also financed a Project Preparation Facility and advised the Government on the preparation and shared experience from similar projects, for instance, in Burkina Faso and Niger. The appraisal mission considered several alternatives, but eventually chose a long-term financing mechanism (APL), a CDD approach which was still evolving in its conception with reference to other projects, multi-activity intervention, and whole-hearted support for decentralization. In view of the poverty-reduction strategies of the Government, the objectives of the project were fully relevant at the time of preparation and the components were appropriate.

78. With the limited financial resources available, concentration on three regions—sufficiently diverse to generate a good experience base to inform later scaling-up efforts--was justified. The risk assessment was generally appropriate, although the Bank's design team should have better anticipated the challenges posed by a new type of project, the large size of the country, and long distances to the necessary service providers. Phasing the start-up of project-supported activities over a two- to three-year period was a practical choice, but the plans should have emphasized intensive training and guidance at all levels to avoid the slow pace of implementation in the early years. Also, even though the M&E manual was prepared well before appraisal, the M&E system turned out to be too

ambitious, and the systems eventually put in place to ensure collection of M&E data were inadequate, especially when it came to evaluating the project impacts.

79. Consistent with Bank policies prevailing at the time, the project design was not subjected to a formal quality-at-entry review. Improvements to the project design were discussed extensively during the decision meetings (which included participation of the Quality Assurance Group—QAG) and during the presentation of the project to the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: *Moderately satisfactory*

80. World Bank task teams carried out nine supervision missions during the project period and monitored implementation progress by reading the quarterly and annual reports produced by project management and by engaging in correspondence with Government officials and the project management team (particularly for no-objections). World Bank supervision missions were less frequent than would normally have been the case because World Bank operations in Chad were first suspended and then disturbed by the civil conflict (the Country Office closed for a full year). Generally speaking, the team charged with supervising the project included a suitable mix of specialty skills, spread among different missions. However, only one mission contained a specialist in decentralization (a decentralization lawyer).¹¹ The teams that carried out the supervision missions generally included 1-3 World Bank staff from Washington or external consultants; the remaining members of the teams usually were drawn from West Africa resident missions, thus economizing on supervision costs. Government ministries and agencies participated in all supervision missions, and so, occasionally, did the co-financier, AFD. Extensive aide-memoires recorded the main findings of the missions and provided adequate guidance to improve implementation performance. The MTR mission—carried out very late—generated a series of recommendations that among other things resulted in an attempt to revise some of the performance indicators.

81. The performance ratings recorded in the Implementation Support Reports (ISRs) were originally lenient, reflecting the consensus view of the task team that time was needed to get this new type of project started.¹² The ratings became stricter toward the end of the project, providing Bank management with more objective and more useful information needed to identify measures to improve project performance. Faced with evidence that performance was lagging, the supervision team can be credited with taking proactive measures to turn the project around, including convincing the Government to replace the underperforming project coordinator.

82. A noteworthy deficiency in the supervision effort was the failure to resolve the weakness of the project’s M&E system. This weakness was evident from the inception of

¹¹ Specialists from the Ministry of Decentralization participated in the implementation support missions.

¹² In 2006 and part of 2007, progress toward achievement of the PDO was rated *unsatisfactory*, but this did not reflect the actual performance of the Project. Following the cessation of Bank operations in Chad, management directed that the *unsatisfactory* rating be applied to all Bank projects in the country.

the project, when it emerged that no baseline survey had been carried out, and it was subsequently reinforced when it became clear that many of the performance indicators specified in the results framework were not being collected. While it is true that supervision teams regularly noted this problem in ISRs, no effective action was ever taken to resolve the problem and this situation complicated the ICR process. The M&E team was however able to speed-up and to provide most of the needed indicators with regard to the PDO.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: *Moderately satisfactory*

83. Based on the soundness of the project design, the adequation of the project objectives given the needs and potential of the country and its rural population, and the reasonably solid supervision effort (admittedly hampered by two interruptions of the Bank programs), the overall Bank performance is rated as moderately satisfactory.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

Rating: *Moderately satisfactory*

84. The Government made important contributions in the implementation of the project and showed its commitment to the project during the first phase. It had put in place strategies to reduce poverty (PRSP) and promote rural development (PIDR); and it prepared the project using its own personnel and consultants under the leadership of a special committee and high-level staff.

85. During the project, the Government took the following actions:

- Provided counterpart funds although below the agreed budgets throughout the project and continued to do so after the project's closing date, thus keeping alive the possibility that the project objectives would be reached.
- Required staff of the key ministries (the ministries dealing with land management, decentralization, and environment) to undergo project-financed training, and required the ministries to support the project's field activities and participate in the multiagency teams supervising the project.
- Promptly endorsed the recommendations of the supervision missions.
- Changed the project management staff when the project leaders proved inadequate to attain the expected results.

86. These positive contributions by the Government were however offset by a number of shortcomings in the support provided to the project by the Government.

- Project effectiveness—essentially controlled by the Government--was delayed by six months due to delays in meeting the effectiveness conditions.
- Throughout the life of the project, chronic delays in paying the annual counterpart funds and failure to contribute part of the committed funds made it

difficult to implement the disbursement categories where Government financing was needed.

- At the end of the first phase, the ICR team work was complicated by delays in the preparation of the national completion report (transmitted on November 8, 2010) and of the impact assessment (a preliminary draft was available only on November 29, 2010).
- These difficulties highlight the complexity of Government processes for approval of procurement decisions and replenishment of funds.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

Rating: *Moderately satisfactory*

87. The main implementing agencies are the project implementation unit (including the national office and three regional offices), as well as the coordinating service providers. These agencies made a number of important contributions to successful implementation:

- Establishment of the project management unit with new staff and field organization and recruitment of service providers before project effectiveness or soon thereafter.
- Successful promotion and financing of an impressive number of project-supported activities. Most of the burden was apparently carried by the regional offices and the supervising service provider, together with other service providers, and, as the final results show (Annexes 2 and 10), they did their work quite well.
- Conscientious adherence to a major tenet of the project implementation strategy—popular participation and consultation with beneficiaries and stakeholders—and provision of the necessary training.
- Carrying out of numerous studies that improved understanding of the complexities of rural development and implementation of CDD projects (see Annex 9)
- Effective work, toward the end of the project, in achieving results on the ground and meeting the triggers for entering the second phase of the program.

88. The performance of the implementing agencies was not without some problems, however, and the Government ICR strongly stressed their weaknesses. Areas in which their contribution could arguably have been better include the following:

- Delays in the recruitment of (attributable partly to complex AFD and Government of Chad procurement regulations).
- Weak quality control of the coordinating service provider and its subconsultants (local development NGOs) which were hired on a fixed rate basis. This choice led to a “cookie cutter” approach to the preparation of the Local Development Plans which affected their overall quality.

- Inadequate M&E system for impact evaluation, although basic records for management purposes were kept throughout the project (the M&E system improved toward the end).
- Inadequate budget control regarding the linkages with annual and quarterly plans, inaccurate accounting and misplacement of cost items (into the management and M&E component), giving an appearance of excessive management costs.
- Failure to ensure that NGOs and technical and engineering service providers were paid on time or at all.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

Rating: *Moderately satisfactory*

89. Taking into account the performance of the Government and the performance of the implementation agencies, Overall Borrower Performance is rated as *Moderately satisfactory*. The negative aspects observed in both are offset by the achievements that at the end were close to the targets set at midterm. The disbursement lag prevalent in the early project years was eliminated before the extended project period ended due to Borrower commitment.

6. Lessons Learned

90. *CDD approaches are challenging to implement.* An important lesson emerging from PROADEL-1 is that bottom-up development projects that use CDD approaches are challenging to implement, because they require extensive support with respect to capacity building. Projects that use CDD approaches involve more actors and many more phases (e.g., sensitizing the target population, identifying and prioritizing community needs, formulating subprojects, managing the approval process, contracting with service providers, constructing facilities, transferring money, making payments, and properly maintaining constructed facilities). Implementing such projects is particularly challenging in rural areas, where public services and institutions are often limited or nonexistent and where poverty levels are daunting. This is the case of Chad where the long-standing centralized form of government posed an additional challenge.

91. *Participatory approaches create expectations that can be difficult to meet.* To the extent that projects based on participatory CDD approaches succeed in mobilizing rural communities to articulate their development needs, they have a tendency to generate expectations that may be difficult to meet if significant amounts of financing cannot be mobilized. PROADEL-1 was able to respond to only a small proportion of the demand that was created: 5,840 local development assemblies were established under the Project, but only 405 subprojects were financed and completed. To avoid possible frustration, this reality should be kept in mind when subsequent phases of the Project are designed.

92. *Capacity of local communities to contribute co-financing may be limited.* The Project design called for beneficiaries to contribute 10 percent of subproject costs, but beneficiaries were able to contribute only 3 percent on average, and a significant part of

their contributions was in kind (e.g., labor, local building materials). The lower than expected rate of co-financing reflects the extreme poverty prevailing throughout much of rural Chad, which constrains the ability of beneficiaries to mobilize resources for social infrastructure. The inability of many rural communities to contribute co-financing has important implications for the design of subsequent phases of the Project and suggests that there is a need to identify ways to lower the cost of subprojects, for example through innovative design.

93. *Capacity building is a long-term process.* A consistent message heard from many stakeholders was the importance of continuing the capacity building activities that were launched during the first phase of the project. While the capacity building activities carried out under PROADEL-1 were extensive (see Annex 2.4), testimony from many stakeholders interviewed by the ICR mission as well as the Government ICR suggest that too often the emphasis was on meeting quantitative targets, and that the quality of the local development process often suffered. During subsequent phases of the Project, follow-up training will be needed to consolidate progress achieved in terms of building decentralized capacity and to further strengthen communities' ownership of the local development process.

94. *CDD approaches can be used to empower vulnerable groups.* PROADEL-1 demonstrated that by encouraging vulnerable groups to participate actively in local decision-making processes, CDD approaches can effectively empower these groups, amplify their voices, and ultimately improve their status in society. PROADEL deliberately promoted participation by women and youth in needs identification exercises, for example by making sure that the three-person training teams (*animateurs*) always included at least one woman. This ensured that the needs and concerns of vulnerable groups received attention and ensured that the interests of these groups were adequately represented in the selection of subprojects to be funded.

95. *Project management and oversight functions should not be politicized.* Implementation of PROADEL-1 was hampered at times by weaknesses in the Project management team resulting from the politicization of key staffing decisions, as well as by the overly interventionist stance of the Steering Committee. It goes without saying that selection of key staff must be nonpolitical and based strictly on merit. Chad disposes many experienced project managers and technical specialists, so if recruitment processes are conducted openly and transparently, it should be possible to recruit staff with the requisite skills and experience. Where skill gaps are identified, additional training on local development can be considered. Similarly, the role of the Steering Committee should be limited to review and approval of annual budgets, as well as providing guidance on key issues. The Steering Committee should not get involved in operational decisions, such as clearing the recruitment of staff.

96. *Results frameworks and M&E plans must be realistic given capacity constraints.* The results framework and the associated M&E plan for PROADEL-1 turned out to be extremely ambitious given the limited capacity available for their implementation. The Project M&E manual called for the collection of far too much information, excessively frequent reporting, and the use of overly sophisticated analytical procedures. The data

needed to report on many performance indicators proved impossible to collect in a country the size of Chad, especially since some indicators had to be collected from hundreds of subprojects. In subsequent phases of the Project, it will be important to revise the M&E manual in light of what is possible, with the goal of restricting regular data collection activities to focus on information that is critical for project implementation and supervision. Performance indicators should not be limited to quantitative outputs but also include quality indicators related to ownership of the local development process, adequacy of LDPs with local conditions instead of more standardized documents, and effective management capacity of the subprojects.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

Comments from the Government (Ministry of Land Management, Urbanism and Habitat) were promised, but they were not received prior to the ICR filing deadline.

(b) Cofinanciers

No comments were received from the Agence Française de Développement.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component 1/

Components	Appraisal estimate, total project costs (FCFA billions) 2/	Actual/Latest Estimate (FCFA billions)	Percentage of Appraisal
FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO LOCAL DEVELOPMENT SUBPROJECTS	7.60	8.55	113%
CAPACITY BUILDING FOR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT STAKEHOLDERS	10.17	3.53	35%
SUPPORT FOR DECENTRALIZATION	2.76	2.41	88%
MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATION SUPPORT	4.52	5.37	119%
TOTAL PROJECT COSTS	25.05	19.86	79%
(b) World Bank Financing			
	Bank financing; Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Bank financing: Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions) 3/	Bank financing: Percentage of Appraisal
WORLD BANK FINANCING	23.00	25.54	111%
Physical Contingencies	0.00	0.00	0.00
Price Contingencies	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total Bank financing	23.00	25.54	
Front-end fee PPF	0.00	0.00	.00
Front-end fee IBRD	0.00	0.00	.00
Total Bank Financing Required	23.00	25.54	111%

Source: PROADEL Accounting Unit.

1/ Project accounts have been kept only in FCFA, and an attempt to convert the amounts used for different components into dollars in retrospect would be inaccurate because of the varying exchange rates over the project period and because no records have been kept on the past exchange rates. However, as the latest estimate is based on actual accounting figures, the fourth column provides a good illustration of the percentages of funds planned and funds used for different components.

2/ The dollar amounts in the PAD have been converted into FCFA by using the original exchange rate 5.31. Because of the dollar devaluation in relation to SDR (the grant currency), there still was US\$200,000 (0.8%) available for disbursement at the time of the ICR mission.

3/ Actually disbursed amount (from the monthly report of the Bank's Disbursement Department).

(b) Financing 1/

Source of Funds	Type of Cofinancing	Appraisal Estimate (FCFA billions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (FCFA billions)	Percentage of Appraisal
AFD	Parallel	3.00	2.29	76%
Government of Chad	Counterpart	8.66	4.50	52 %
Local Communities	Counterpart	0.86	0.28	32%
World Bank Grant H 126 CH	Grant	12.54	12.80	102%
TOTAL FINANCING		25.05	19.86	79%

Source: PROADEL Accounting Unit.

1/ The project accounts were kept only in FCFA. The contributions were provided in different currencies over the five-year period (AFD in Euros and FCFA; Government and local communities in FCFA; and World Bank in dollars, whose amount has depended on the changing exchange rate between SDR and dollar. Any presentation of all the financing in dollars would thus be inaccurate. (For the actual/latest estimate of the World Bank financing, a median exchange rate of 5.01 has been used. Because of exchange variations over time, the use of Bank fund in dollar terms and in FCFA terms is not the same.)

Annex 2: Outputs by Component

2.1: Targets and achievements for the “revised” performance indicators

Impact indicators	End target	Achieved	Achievement % of the end target
Number of classrooms constructed and accessible during the entire school year	250	247	99%
Percentage of households in the targeted communities having access to points of drinking water	30%	20%	66%
Percentage of completed subprojects that are of satisfactory quality	80%	90%	111%
Number of Local Development Plans adopted in the 11 departments of the “strong” intervention zone	170	174	102%
Number of infrastructures constructed and operational six months after completion	350	321	92%
Result indicators			
<i>Component 1: Support to local development subprojects</i>			
Number of subprojects approved and completed by the targeted communities	370	341	92%
Points of improved water supply in the rural zones served by the project	300	205	68%
Health centers constructed, renovated or equipped	20	11	55%
Number of classrooms constructed, renovated, and/or rehabilitated by the project	250	247	99%
Number of rural roads constructed or rehabilitated (km)	--	--	--
<i>Component 2: Capacity building for local development stakeholders</i>			
Training sessions of information/sensitization campaigns for local communities	784	612	78%
Number of local development assemblies (<i>assemblées communautaires de développement</i>) established	4,800	5,215	114%
Number of District Development Selection Committees (<i>Cadre de concertation cantonal pour le développement--CCCD</i>) established	170	210	124%
Number of Local Development Plans (PDL) adopted	170	174	102%
Number of subproject management committees for collecting funds for maintenance	370	312	84%

<i>Component 3: Support for decentralization</i>	End target	Achieved	Achievement % of the end target
Number of laws and decrees on decentralization prepared and adopted	75	53	71%
Number of training sessions for staff of the central and decentralized administrations	1,000	1,577	158%
Number of CLTO established	3	3	100%
<i>Component 4: Management and M&E</i>			
Number of M&E reports produced on time	28	25	89%
Percentage of goods and service procurement done according to the approved procurement plan	80%	80%	100%
Financial management reports (RSF) prepared on time	20	11	55%
Annual audits carried out on time and as unqualified	6	5	83%

Source: *Mission de revue à mi-parcours du PROADEL*, June 2009, and data by the PROADEL Monitoring and Evaluation Unit

2.2: Performance triggers monitored for entering into the second phase

Triggers	End target	Achieved	Achievement % of the end target	Comments
<i>Trigger 1:</i> 19 departments of 47 will be covered by the project	19	19	100%	
<i>Trigger 2:</i> 50% of targeted communities have prepared and adopted their Local Development Plans in the 11 southern "strong intervention" departments	50%	99%	198%	Because having a PDL is a condition for accessing PROADEL funds, all 176 departments have prepared a PDL and 174 of them have been adopted
<i>Trigger 3:</i> 50% of these communities have at least one subproject whose first financing tranche has been disbursed	50%	68%	136%	100 of the 147 targeted communities have subprojects that have been or are being finished
<i>Trigger 4:</i> 75% of decision committees are in place in these 11 departments and have met at least once	75%	91%	121%	All departmental decision committees are in place, except one (in Djodje in the South)
<i>Trigger 5:</i> Decentralization regulatory texts have been enacted and adopted by the national assembly,	12	6	50%	In addition more than seven laws have been published and one more has been submitted to the National Assembly for adoption. But the already adopted laws allow organization of local elections after the census of the population being made
<i>Trigger 6:</i> 50% of the application texts projects are available	50%	68%	124%	47 decrees (of application of laws) of the 69 projected by the Ministry of Decentralization are already available and allow organizing local elections
<i>Trigger 7:</i> Timetable for administrative election (communes and communautés rurales) has been defined	--	--	--	A technical inter-ministerial committee has been established by the Prime Minister to accelerate the election process. The first elections will take place in June 2011
<i>Trigger 8:</i> At least 0.5% of oil revenues devoted to priority sectors are disbursed for subprojects that come within the scope of Local Development Plans	0.5%	0.2%	40%	The monitoring system is not linked with the Government's oil revenue records and the percentage of oil funds used for subprojects cannot be estimated. However, of the Government's counterpart funds (that are mainly from oil revenue) about 40% is used for subprojects.

Source: data by the PROADEL Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (as per 30 June 2010)

2.3. Summary of Training Organized under PROADEL

According to the records of the PROADEL M&E unit, the training organized for local capacity building included the following:

Training for	Indicator	End target	Achieved	Achievement % of the end target
1. Information and sensitization	Number of sensitized persons	1,568,840	1,352,000	86%
2. Local subproject procurement	Number of trained persons	1,110	1,000	90%
3. Environmental and social management	Number of trained persons	1,215	954	79%
4. Data collection	Number of trained persons	60	60	100%
5. Decentralization issues	Number of trained persons	2,000	1,657	83%
6. Project design and implementation	Number of trained persons	80	60	75%
7. Project implementation management	Number of trained persons	11,550	10,607	92%
8. Accounting and financial management of subprojects	Number of trained persons	11,550	10,607	92%
9. Lobbying	Number of trained persons	11,550	10,607	92%
10. Subproject design and tender preparation	Number of trained persons	70	50	71%
Total number of trained persons¹³		16,085	14,388	89%
Including youth, women and nomadic herders		3,850	3,536	92%

The main capacity building efforts financed under Component 2 were directed to strengthening the technical and organizational capacity at the community level for participatory approaches, needs assessments, project management, and access to credit, or new poverty reduction behaviors. The component was to specifically target local communities and their associations, Subprefectoral and Departmental Decision and Approval Committees, and service providers (training institutions, NGOs, microfinance institutions).

¹³ The total number does not contain the people who have been sensitized on project operations. Because the same persons attended training in items 7, 8, and 9, they are counted only once.

Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis

Table 3.1: Types and Costs of Subprojects

Sector	Type of subproject	Subprojects		% of total cost of subprojects	Average cost (FCFA million)
		Number ¹⁴	%		
Education/health / communications					
	School buildings	102	25	42	33.8
	Cultural / training / apprenticeship centers	9	2	3	28.8
	Community radios	3	1	1	27.7
	Health centers	23	6	11	39.1
	HIV/AIDS welcoming centers	3	1	1	35.1
Subtotal		140	35	58	
Drinking water / sanitation					
	Deep wells	205	51	20	8.2
	Mini-water towers	5	1	2	34.5
	Sanitation	2	0.5	1	32.6
Subtotal		212	53	23	
Economic infrastructures					
	Pastoral wells	33	8	12	28.9
	Abattoirs/butcheries	4	1	2	5.9
	Cattle markets	3	1	1	5.2
	Storing depots	6	1	2	7.5
	Vaccination parks	2	0.5	1	0.8
	Ponds/pools	1	0.25	0.4	31.6
Subtotal		49	12	18	
GCE					
	Nurseries/reforestation	4	1	1	2.1
Grand total		405	100	100	

Contribution by community: 10% for all other types of subprojects than deep wells (*forage*) and mini-water towers (*mini-château d'eau*), for which 3% and 5%, respectively.

¹⁴ Including 64 subprojects that are still under construction.

Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending			
Supervision / ICR			
Fatime Mahamat Adoum	Executive Assistant	AFMTD	
Hugues Agossou	Sr Auditor	IADVP	
Nicolas Ahouissoussi	Senior Agriculture Economist	ECSS1	
Amadou Alassane	Sr Agricultural Specialist	AFTAR	
Andrew Osei Asibey	Sr Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist	AFTRL	
Mohammed A. Bekhechi	Lead Counsel	LEGEN	
Ningayo Charles Donang	Senior Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	
Lancine Dosso	Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM	
Emile Louis Rene Finateu	Consultant	AFTFM	
Soulemame Fofana	Operations Officer	AFTAR	
Anna Victoria Gyllerup	Senior Operations Officer	AFTRL	
Sekou Keita	E T Consultant	AFTFM	
Remi Kini	Sr Environmental Economist	ENV	
Lucienne M. M'Baipor	Social Development Specialist	AFTCS	
Pierre Morin	Senior Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	
Etienne Nkoa	Sr Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM	
Africa Eshogba Olojoba	Sr Environmental Specialist	AFTEN	
Korotimi Sylvie Traore	Program Assistant	MNACS	
Paulette C.E. Aida Thioun Zoua	Program Assistant	AFMTD	

(b) Staff time and cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY00	14	67.25
FY01	29	108.96
FY02	41	163.12
FY03	30	110.59
FY04	24	81.19
FY05	16	43.08
FY06		0.00
FY07		0.00
FY08		0.00
Total:	154	574.19
Supervision/ICR		
FY00		0.00
FY01		0.00
FY02		0.10
FY03		0.00
FY04		0.00
FY05	22	92.02
FY06	32	88.39
FY07	36	131.45
FY08	24	72.04
FY09	6	0.00
Total:	120	384.00

Annex 5: Beneficiary Survey Results

1. *Limited beneficiary survey*

1. No beneficiary survey was carried out during the project period, neither after the completion of the project. However, the ICR mission interviewed close to 100 beneficiaries during the field visits. The interviewees included subproject members, different levels of project committees, and local administrations (altogether 17 meetings). The following summarizes the outcomes of this “mini-survey.”

2. The methodology was based on an open approach, allowing the discussants to present their opinions freely, but at the same time aiming at getting them to answer questions about the approach used, the importance of the financial and technical support given, problems encountered, social issues such as the gender situation, and the future needs of the community.

3. This mini-survey is not considered to represent all the project areas because the sample was small and the survey concentrated on two of the three project regions (Moundou and N'Djamena), N'Djamena being the one where the activities started last, only about two years ago.

2. *Approach used for implementation of subprojects*

4. The members of the communities had become familiar with the community-driven development (CDD) approach or at least had heard of it under other programs or from the neighboring communities. Thus they were receptive to getting the information agents (“animateurs”)¹⁵ to visit their villages and organize meetings for the members of the community. In all cases except one, these animation groups were the source that brought the first news about the details of the PROADEL program and the opportunities it offered. In one village, some 10 km away from the main roads, younger people who had traveled further, were the first source of information about the forthcoming PROADEL, and in that village the preliminary subproject plans were waiting for the animators when they came. The animators also helped the villages, village groups and quarters in towns to form development committees (*Assemblée communautaire de développement*—ACD) and to prepare local development plans.

5. The ACDs were responsible for managing the implementation of the subprojects, including making contracts and taking care of the payments.¹⁶ For formulating the technical documents for subprojects and preparation of the financing requests and procurement documents the ACDs recruited technical service providers (*Cabinets*

¹⁵ NGOs recruited by the Coordinating Service Provider (“*Opérateur Ensemble*”) to be the trainers and advisors to villages and to assist them in organizing the village planning meetings, preparing Local Development Plans, and prioritizing the order of the subprojects to be financed.

¹⁶ These procedures were according to the Project Operations Manual of 2002, which was essentially based on the World Bank 1978 document “Guidelines for simplified community-based procurement and disbursement.”

d'ingénieurs conseils), and for construction and equipping the subproject facilities they contracted engineering enterprises.

6. All the subproject beneficiaries were satisfied with the help they had received from the animators and technical service providers. They were equally satisfied with the structures built by the engineering firms, but pointed out that there had been a few problems especially with deep wells that in a couple of cases had not reached the aquifer level or after a while had not produced as much water as expected. However, in most cases the engineering firms had made the necessary improvements within the guarantee period. (During the ICR mission an ACD committee pointed out a crack in a wall of one grain store and the engineer accompanying the mission promised that it will be repaired.)

7. The villagers highly appreciated the information, training, and technical assistance they had received through the project. The ACDs were now confident that they know the procedures well enough to be able to manage subproject implementation the next time without any outside assistance except for design of the structures, for which they would need to recruit technical service providers. In the discussions with the ICR team, it appeared that the villagers who had participated in training organized by the animators had internalized the principal elements of the procedures. As a result, there seemed to be a new sense of social dynamism among the villagers. (This self-containment view was contradicted by the all service provider, that is, both the animating NGOs and technical service providers and well as the Bank's procurement specialist—see Annex 6 on Stakeholders' views).

3. *Benefits of the subprojects*

8. The beneficiaries had retained well information about the benefits of the different types of subprojects, indicating that the animators and village meetings had served the intended purpose. For instance, for the deep wells ("*forages*") they were able to list the following benefits:

- Now clean drinking water was available close by, both saving time for women who had earlier to fetch water from a distance;
- Villagers (and people of neighboring villages) were now able to enter productive activities that require water (small-scale gardening and establishing nurseries);
- Other economic benefits such as increased the number of cattle and watering trees had become possible; and
- Clean water allowed maintaining better health.

9. As another example, the beneficiaries mentioned benefits of schools, such as:

- Improved literary rates;
- Better teaching facilities (earlier the schools were held under big trees without tables and fixed blackboards);
- Increasing the number of students. New schools appealed better to parents so that they would send their daughters to school. For instance in Bokora, in the semi-desert town 270 km northeast from the capital, the school enrolment in

five classes (three of them built by project financing) was 285 students, and 105 of them were girls (37 percent).

10. The beneficiaries also understood the necessity for maintenance of the constructed facilities. In all subprojects visited, the ACD committee collected small fees from the users for maintenance purposes. For instance in a subproject of a mini-water tower in Mayaguine Canton the money collected was FCFA 175,000 (equivalent of US\$365, but with much higher purchasing power) by charging FCFA 100 (US\$0.21) for each 200 liters of water. At the new school in Bokoro the parents-students association collected FCFA 1,000 (US\$2.20) per year for a male student and FCFA 500 (US\$1.10) for a girl to help in maintenance and small education needs. (Primary education is otherwise free in Chad.)

11. An important benefit mentioned by the villagers was that the local development plans (LDP—*Plans de développement local*) could also be used for getting funds from other sources than PROADEL for subprojects that could not be financed under this project.

4. Gender and youth

12. The original Project Development Objective stated that “particular attention will be paid on women, youth and marginalized groups.”¹⁷ Among the 405 subprojects financed under the project, only two are women-owned (*Centres de couture*) and all the rest are “mixed,” that is, contain both men and women as members and beneficiaries. However, PROADEL has been instrumental in promoting women and improving their status in the communities where the project is active. In project committees at all levels there are women members, and the ICR mission noted that in all ACDs for village groups and subprojects there are one or two women members. As for the youth, they are even better represented in the ACDs, because in the subprojects that the ICR team visited, there were present 2 to 3 youths. The ICR mission did observe that other underrepresented groups, such transhumant herders were not included in the same manner in ACDs, which would also have been more complicated due to their transient way of life. However, the LDPs included land management sections that provided them and their cattle with safe corridors and sometimes even cattle well (in Bokoro).

13. The positive development in this respect was caused apparently by two facts: (a) every three-member animation team organized by project-financed NGOs and going to the field contained one woman; and (b) they presented in the villages the project objective for underprivileged sections of the population and possibly in the manner that involvement of women and youth was a premise for getting financing for subprojects.

14. The mission’s visits were at the daytime, and although the beneficiaries reported the involvement of women and youth with obvious contentment, no women attended the

¹⁷ The various marginalized groups are listed in *Lutte contre la marginalisation* prepared by the Opérateur ensemblier, November 2006. (See listing in Annex).

meetings of the ICR mission at subproject sites or with the different levels of committees. (Women and girls were told to be “in the houses or in the fields”.) There were several young men present at each subproject site.

5. Problems encountered

15. In the first instance of interviews, the members of subprojects said that there had been no problems. However, when discussing the topic further, some problems that had been encountered emerged, such as:

- At the ACD level (usually covering several villages) there were more priority subproject ideas than was possible to implement (even in the most active ACDs not more than three subprojects were allowed under the first phase of the program). Also, because most of the ACDs contained several villages, some dissatisfaction had arisen among the villages because of the place selected for the subproject was not in their village;
- There had been far too many subprojects for the cantonal CCCDs (*Cadre cantonal de concertation pour le développement*) to consider and some villages had to be left out or made to use temporality the facilities built in nearby villages;
- The utilization level of grain storage facilities built (usually 300 tons) were severely underutilized during the first year, bringing very little income to the respective subproject committees. They had, however, plans to carry out information campaigns in neighboring villages to improve the use of utilization levels;
- Some village groups that had received the first training by animators had not received no other assistance and no subprojects. In these cases the problem apparently was in lacking initiatives among the villagers, because the neighboring village groups could have had more than one subproject at the same time;
- Some deep wells had not produced the water promised and the engineering firms had to come back to increase the depth of the wells (and at least in one case the well site was abandoned);
- Signing of the contract between PROADEL and the ACDs had to take place at the regional office of the project, sometimes 200-300 km away, which was considered expensive and difficult for the ACD committees;
- An account had to be opened in a bank for the cash deposit required for approval of a subproject, and sometimes the nearest bank can be more than 200 km away (as in Bokoro).

16. Supervision reports and the mid-term report of PROADEL have indicated that contribution of 10 percent of the investment by the beneficiaries was seen too high (the same is also implied by the fact that the total financing by beneficiaries was below the PAD estimates). The ACDs or review and approval committees that the ICR mission met at different levels did not consider the contribution level as an obstacle as such, especially as part of the contribution could be in kind (land, materials, labor). An obstacle in this respect was that the villagers had been given to understand (by politicians?) that

everything would be free because the country now had oil revenue. In addition, there had been some misunderstanding about the nature of the in-kind contributions and their valuation, because they were not mentioned in the contracts.

17. Also, the villagers did not consider it a problem that the implementation period for a subproject commonly extended to one to two years from animation to reception of the facility. The ICR mission concluded that their expectations in this respect were not very high.

6. Future needs

18. As already indicated, the demand for subprojects has been much large that the funds available have allowed to finance. For instance, the number of subproject documents prepared for the consideration of the *sous-prefectoral* committee of Mayaguine Canton, subprojects was 36, of which only 26 were possible to finance. In the same canton, there are 45 villages and only seven wells.

19. The visited ACDs mentioned their future priorities of subprojects to include, in a varying order in different communities:

- School buildings to replace the *Ecoles saccos* (under trees);
- Canteens and fencing for schools
- Health centers;
- Grain stores;
- Deep wells and wells for animal herders; mini-water towers
- Mosques;
- Vehicles to transport grain sacks and village needs;
- Culture or sport centers for the youth;
- Animal vaccination centers; and
- Transit corridors for cattle.

20. An apparent need, but not mentioned by the current beneficiaries, would be find a solution to the drudgery of grinding grains, which affect in particular women and girls. In the neighboring countries some groups have obtained flour mills under the projects financed by the World Bank, and although many of these mills have not worked well or have broken down, with the fee collection, maintenance and bookkeeping culture already established in Chad they would have a good chance to be successful.

21. At appraisal, feeder roads had been believed to become one of the priorities. However, none of them was as high in the priority list as several other needs and had not been financed under this phase of the program.

7. Observations on local governance

22. The project authorities that the ICR mission met at the local level (representatives of traditional authority, cantonal, sub-prefectural and departmental levels) confirmed that the project had been very important for development of their areas (commonly saying

that “without PROADEL we would have nothing at all of the type of subprojects we now have). Also, they confirmed that they had received training to carry out their activities for the project, but also emphasized that more is needed, for instance for procurement. As for future needs, they mentioned essentially the same types of subprojects, but in addition the mayor of Bokora (member of the departmental approval committee) brought up the need to improve the leisure facilities such as parks with more trees.

23. The civic authorities were not as satisfied with the competencies at the subproject level as the ACD committees, mentioning problems of procurement and lack of adequate capacity among the engineering enterprises.

24. As for decentralization, the governmental and elected authorities emphasized the importance of PROADEL not only for having helped in developing the legislation, but also as facilitator of training of civil servants and elected bodies and as provider of a variety of equipment for offices, including computers. They also suggested that more training would be needed at all levels of decentralization, possibly in form of well-planned workshops or seminars, to ensure the consolidation of the decentralization steps taken. However, they were confident that they will successfully manage the sub-departmental elections planned for April-June 2011.

Annex 6: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

1. Stakeholder workshops

1. The ICR mission met with key stakeholder representatives in individual or small group sessions. The stakeholders met included the following:

- (i) the Secretary General and other senior officials of the Ministry of Land Management, Urbanism and Habitat, which is the supervising ministry for the project and which chairs the Steering Committee,
- (ii) the Secretaries General and other senior officials of the line ministries that were directly involved with the project (i.e., the Ministries of Planning and Economy, Decentralization, and Environment);
- (iii) the Coordinator of the *Cellule Permanente de Suivi* that is in charge of monitoring of all externally financed projects;
- (iv) PROADEL management and senior staff;
- (v) Staff of PROADEL Regional Coordination Units;
- (vi) Private sector operators, that is, *NGOs pour animation* and *prestataires de service* (technical advisory agencies and engineering firms), which have assisted in implementing subprojects;
- (vii) The development partners those are most active in rural development in Chad (AFD, EU, GTZ, and the World Bank).

2. Methodology

2. Stakeholders were asked the following key questions:

- What was the relationship of your ministry/agency/organization vis-à-vis the project? In other words, how did your ministry/agency/organization engage with the project?
- What were the most significant results/achievements of the project?
- What were the main problems encountered that negatively affected implementation of the project?
- What are the most important lessons learned from the project and its implementation that can help to inform the design of a follow-on project in Chad, or similar projects in other countries?

3. Main achievements

3. All of the stakeholders interviewed expressed appreciation for the achievements of the project, a couple of the Government representatives even saying that “this is the best project we have had.” They strongly endorsed the general approach of the project, i.e., decentralization of service provision and administrative structures and bringing

development finance to the local level and helping rural communities to decide on their priorities in a participatory manner. They also emphasized that for the participatory approach to be effective, it needs to be provided with even more of information, training, and technical support.

4. In their own work and organizations they attributed several results to the project. As a summary, the public- and private-sector partners reported that the project had:

- Despite a slow start (the activities really started in January 2006), the project succeeded in achieving its main goals in terms of subprojects, as 428 subprojects have been planned on the basis participative and local development approach, 405 of them have been financed, 341 completed, and the rest are under work. Altogether 174 cantonal Local Development Plans have been prepared, and they cover the key project areas, each including several cantons, and including hundreds more of potential subprojects.
- Awareness of PROADEL facilities have been spread to a large number of villages, where it trained and helped organize as many as 5,840 villages to participate in local development groups (*Assemblée communautaire de développement*). All this is an important step for making the local population responsible for their own development (*“changement de mentalite”*), participating in the selection of their own priorities, and giving them a certain degree of autonomy. (There also was an opinion that the local people do not still feel fully responsible for their subprojects.) The demand of subprojects is now estimated to be in thousands.
- Because the project was among the first in the field of decentralization and also in some areas in community-driven development, it initially served as a pilot program and developed approaches and methodologies that facilitating more extensive efforts to come.
- The basic procedures, from the decisions of priorities in the villages to formulating and implementing subprojects, have now been developed and tried out, and they provide a basis for a countrywide approach if finances so allow. The project also allowed correcting the earlier expectations of the local people that they did not need to make their own contribution to get new facilities and services.
- Through linking with and partial financing of the *Volet Gestion Communautaire* des Ecosystems project, PROADEL ensured environmental protection and improvement activities, reforestation schemes, and enforcement of environmental standards relating to infrastructures.
- The project combined the necessary decentralization effort that the Government had promoted since the previous decade and the community development approach to the fight against the poverty in Chad. The decentralization is needed for the country as the basis of long-term development, but, in addition, local development requires local initiative,

skills, investments, and involving of all population there through a participatory approach.

- The decentralization effort has advanced on the legislative side as most of the key laws and regulations have been drafted with the help of PROADEL financing and largely approved, providing a basis for organizing local administrations (some laws and regulations are still pending) and preparations for local elections at the subprefecture level. The project also acquired or facilitated acquiring of information technology and materials for the departmental administrations. As preparation for the local elections, PROADEL has helped to finance the defining the arears and borders of 200 communes.
- The project facilitated organization of workshops, seminars, and conferences for training for capacity buildings among the local populations, the participating agencies and NGOs, and the Government administration at the national, regional and departmental levels.
- In the departments, the officials appreciated that project had allowed an increase in the coverage of wells (the demand for more is still great), facilitating potable water to thousands of people, as well as building of new schools and health centers.
- The private technical service provider and engineering firms were particularly satisfied with new contract opportunities that the LDPs brought up, and while not always making profit, PROADEL gave opportunities to expand their sphere of work and employment opportunities for their staff and workers, and, as partners of a World Bank-financed project, important exposure and contacts in the country.
- For these firms a major achievement was that they were able to complete 341 of the 405 subprojects started despite the various delays and payment problems they encountered (see the next section about problems). Also the rest are expected to be completed within next few months.
- The project also helped substantially in establishing offices for land management (*Observatoire de Foncier*), land recording, and training in land-management aspects.
- Despite the communications and other problems between the four project offices, project finances have been recorded properly (after numerous corrections), annual accounts have been audited by qualified auditors, and audits have been unqualified. Project monitoring and evaluation arrangements have improved, the M&E unit has prepared detailed annual plans, and during the last two years—after the mid-term review--the projects M&E reporting has become satisfactory.

4. Problem areas and difficulties

5. Stakeholders also recognized that a number of problems had arisen during implementation of PROADEL and that they should be avoided in any eventual follow-on operation:

- Because of a very slow start of the project (blamed on inefficient management), the supervising ministry and the World Bank implementation support missions became very much involved in project management and implementation. Most views were that this involvement probably saved the project (200 subprojects were processed and implemented in the last less than two years. However, there also was a contrary view among the stakeholders according to which the Government and the World Bank should maintain an advisory and oversight role and not start “running the projects” (“il faut responsabiliser l’équipe”).
- When dismissing a project management team, it always takes months for the new team to catch up the working level of the previous team. In the case of PROADEL, after removing the original project management teams after mid-term, there still were two more changes in top management because of resignations or staff transfers.
- The World Bank teams did not work enough with the *Cellule Permanente de Suivi* (however, they visited this unit during missions). Also, the gap between World Bank projects (in this case between the phases) is harmful for effective implementation of the program.
- Training at the field level of ACDs and various project committees was inadequate to make them really familiar with their duties partly because the project represented a piloting exercise and also because there was a rush during the last two years of the project to catch up with the indicator targets. (Most stakeholders mentioned procurement problems and that the capacity of service providers was often not adequate.) Also, under the decentralization component more training would be needed.
- When the international coordinating service provider (*Opérateur Ensemblier*) left at the end of their contract in early 2010, the activities seemed to stop in many areas in the field.
- Delays in the disbursement of government counterpart funding resulted in frequent disruptions to the project implementation schedule, delaying the timely implementation many field activities. However, when the project ended in June 2010, the Government continued to supply funds, thus facilitating completion of subprojects that had been financed during the project period. (At the time of the ICR mission, 65 subprojects had not been finished.)
- The quantity and sometimes the quality of technical assistance provided to the project by the service providers (technical engineers and contractors) were sometimes inadequate, especially the technical assistance relating to management of water resources. A reason for this problem was the far-away location of many subprojects where the service providers were able to employ

only engineers just out of school (but where they gained experience necessary for their trade.) On the other hand, because no consideration had been given in the contracts for differing physical conditions (especially the distance to the work area) and population readiness for starting a subproject, NGOs and other service providers had to accept contracts that they knew were not profitable for them.

- The cost projections during project preparation and at appraisal were unrealistic, resulting in consistent underestimation of subproject costs. As a result, the projected numbers of subprojects to be financed was too large, and more subprojects were planned than could eventually be financed. (This situation was partly corrected at mid-term, when it was better known what type of subprojects the population wanted and what were their costs; at appraisal the types of priority subprojects could not be more than “educated guesses.”)
- Implementation of many subprojects was delayed by late payments to contractors (*entrepreneurs*) and other service providers (*irregularité de financement des microprojets*). Many technical service providers and contractors had to wait for 6 to 12 months for their payments, or even longer.
- Service providers also experienced socio-economic difficulties and difficulties in getting consensus when an ACD sometimes comprised as many as 10 villages of different sizes and should have included besides local pastoralists, also transhumant herders and other underprivileged groups.
- The flow of funds was slow at all levels. Replenishment requests addressed to the World Bank took longer time than necessary, even though the Financial Monitoring System was supposed to speed up disbursements. The Government’s counterpart contributions were late. Transactions between the central PMU and the regional LPMUs and subprojects also frequently took weeks or even months, usually because the needed supporting documents had not been provided. The lack of financial institutions outside major cities is also a factor that slows down the money flow. Also, there was nobody guiding ACDs in the payment issues, and they made errors (this task was not in the TOR of either the animators or technical advisory agencies.)
- The contributions required from local communities were too high because of the general poverty, especially in the more remote areas where cash economy is not very common and among the marginalized groups. This situation led in a few cases to abandoning of the subproject. Also, it appeared that at least in the N’Djamena region, the Government (politicians) had indicated that the population did not need to provide any contribution, but everything was free.
- When it took a long time to implement a subproject, the prices of materials increased and caused financial problems, even losses to service providers. Also, the service providers ran out of funds as no refinancing was provided for their services.
- The whole decentralization activity has been slow and resources limited.

- In principle, decentralization should cover the whole country; it is difficult politically to explain to people in left-out provinces and departments why their turn would come later, although economically it seems reasonable. There also was lack of written material for local administration (GTZ/Government collected the decentralization laws and regulations into one book to be distributed to new counselors, but this book may need to be updated.)
- There is no juridical status for the Local Development Plans and ACDs that could be used in potential disputes.
- For the *Observatoire foncier* the process of funding has been slow, as it had first to refinance the activities from its own budget and then get the eligible items refunded from the project (there was no convention). This unit would have liked more flexibility in using the funds. Also, the students under this university-run unit suffered from financial problems and would have needed scholarships.

5. Lessons learned

6. Based on the positive achievements of the project but also in recognition of the problem areas and difficulties, stakeholders identified lessons learned in a number of areas.

*Project management.*¹⁸

- An experienced project management team is very important for the start and eventual success of the project. Selection of the key staff must be non-political and strictly based on merit. Academic qualifications are not an adequate basis, and as Chad already possess experienced project managers and other senior project staff, only those with earlier experience in similar assignments and proven initiative should be chosen for so important and innovative projects as those supporting decentralization and local, participative development.
- Monitoring and evaluation manuals are often asking too much information and also asking for it on regular, usually quarterly basis. Much of such information is not possible to collect in such a large country as Chad and from hundreds of subprojects or governmental units. In M&E manuals and PADs it would be important to concentrate “on the possible” and on information and data that are critical for project implementation. For more general impact oriented indicators, special studies should be carried out, for instance, every two years.

Project design

- The project design for local development was relatively simple and the participatory approach had been at least partially experimented under ASPOP

¹⁸ Problems with project management and management of human resources was mentioned by nearly all the stakeholders

and bilateral field programs. However, PROADEL was still correctly started in one region, and then annually extended to two more regions, because it was known that project's field work would be challenged by the limited implementation capacity.

- The projects can be designed in such a way (for instance in phasing their implementation) that not many preconditions are needed. (An opinion: *Le PROADEL était le premier projet au Chad sans ces conditions*).
- The contracts for subprojects, while providing guidance for their contents and costs, should also allow taking into account the different geographical and other conditions (for instance allowing inclusion of transport and additional material costs for far-away locations). Also, a guarantee fund or payment system should be developed for the case that ACD committees abandon their subproject or misuse the allocated funds. The loss should not be on the service providers who have done their work properly.

Capacity building

- Although more training would have been needed and the training should be provided before entering into the cycle of subprojects, local communities benefited from the training and capacity building facilitated by the project. This empowered them to become organized, identify development priorities in their own communities, prepare development plans, and prepare and implement subprojects identified in the development plans. Training was also beneficially for the Ministry of Decentralization and other ministries involved in the project, as well for the local governmental administrations in the project regions.
- Training of ACD committees should continue after the subproject has been implemented (for instance to secure the committee's financial competence and maintenance of the facilities).
- At the start of a project such as PROADEL, there may not be many competent service providers. Adequate training and guidance for the new aspirants may be needed.

Financial management of the project

- Interruptions of disbursements by the World Bank slow down implementation progress, increase costs (because activities must be repeated), and compress the implementation time line. Therefore with projects such as PROADEL, the World Bank should be favorably disposed to grant extension requests (as it did in the case of PROADEL by extending the project period by a year).
- Late payment and non-payment of service providers was a chronic problem. Measures must be found to ensure that in future contractual conditions and payment schedules will be respected by the project and especially by project beneficiaries in charge of implementing subprojects. The engineering firms and other service providers must be paid in timely fashion. One option would

be to involve the technical service providers (Conseiller technique) in supervising the payments to be made by ACDs committees.

- With the objective of ensuring equitable treatment for all service providers, PROADEL (like its agricultural-sector sister project ASPOP) introduced a standardized country-wide payment system for the preparation and implementation of subprojects. This turned out to be unfair, because the cost structure differed significantly in different parts of the country.
- Shocks stemming from global economic downturns, dramatic and unanticipated changes in the exchange rate, suspensions of World Bank lending programs for political or other reasons, and other external factors often affect the amount of money available for the project purposes. In the case of PROADEL, it allowed more dollars to be disbursed (because of the rising rate of SDR), thus partially balancing the devaluation of dollar in relation to FCFA (from 1 dollar giving originally FCFA 535 and finally FCFA 475).
- Many local ACDs that awarded contracts for project-supported subprojects were initially unfamiliar with simplified competitive bidding procedures such as those required for selection of service providers. Training in this respect improved the situation but not sufficiently, and more consolidation training will be needed in this respect even in the Phase I project areas. Although introduction of the competitive bidding procedures may have delayed the initiation of field work, use of the approved procedures enabled ACD committees in most cases to choose the best and least expensive NGOs and other service providers to carry out the field activities.
- Decentralization is a complex, costly, and long-term program, and it should be given more time to be implemented. (Some bilaterals had given conditions for their participation that elections must be made at the certain date.)

Donor coordination and harmonization

- PROADEL, together with agricultural-sector sister project ASPOP, has played an influential role in Chad in introducing a new approach to the fight against the poverty, one that has been successfully integrated into the Government's strategic planning and decentralization effort. It has mobilized the Government and donors that are active in the rural development field to coordinate better around a common set of decentralized, participatory approaches
- The few international financing agencies and bilaterals active in the local development field have worked in a relatively good harmony and aimed at learning from each other (for instance by participating in a GTZ-financed workshop). Currently, when the European Union is planning its second tranche of local assistance, it is basing the approach very much on the similar lines with PRODEL.

Annex 7: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

7.1. Summary and Conclusions of Government's ICR

RÉSUMÉ DU NIVEAU D'EXECUTION ET D'ATTEINTE DES OBJECTIFS DU PROADEL¹⁹

1. Le Projet d'Appui au Développement Local (PROADEL) a pour objectif global de promouvoir le développement local et la décentralisation par l'amélioration de l'accès des populations aux services sociaux de base notamment la santé, l'éducation, l'alimentation en eau potable et à l'utilisation rationnelle des ressources naturelles grâce au renforcement des capacités des communautés en matière d'organisation, de planification, d'exécution des activités issues des priorités de leurs plans de développement. Il vise également à permettre aux communautés locales de certains écosystèmes fragiles du Tchad de mieux combattre la déforestation et la dégradation des terres et mieux gérer les aires protégées.
2. Du fait de son ambition de s'attaquer à la situation de pauvreté des populations et de soutenir le processus de décentralisation, le PROADEL s'inscrit dans un Projet à long termes. C'est pourquoi, l'instrument APL (Adaptable Program Loan) a été choisi afin de disposer d'un horizon flexible qui permet d'atteindre les objectifs.
3. La première phase du PROADEL, conduite de 2004 à 2010 poursuivait deux objectifs de développement à savoir i) accroître l'accès aux services d'infrastructures de base dans des communautés pauvres ciblées et améliorer la capacité locale des institutions et communautés à gérer le processus de développement et ii) permettre aux communautés locales de certains écosystèmes fragiles du Tchad de mieux combattre la déforestation et la dégradation des terres et mieux gérer les aires protégées.
4. Cette première phase a été financée par l'Association pour le Développement International (IDA), l'Agence Française de Développement (AFD), l'Etat du Tchad et les populations bénéficiaires pour un montant total de 46 millions de dollars US.
5. La stratégie d'intervention a été basée sur trois principes fondamentaux qui sont i) une démarche participative avec des interventions multisectorielles émanant des besoins exprimés par les communautés, ii) le renforcement des capacités des communautés pour fixer des priorités, planifier le développement au niveau locale, mettre en œuvre des microprojets et iii) un partenariat avec diverses institutions de l'Etat, le secteur privé et les ONG.
6. Le PROADEL a mis en place et a apporté son appui aux Assemblées Communautaires de Développement (ACD) et aux Cadres Cantonaux de Concertation pour le Développement (CCCD) répartis dans 19 départements du pays. De manière générale, la zone d'intervention compte environ 2 600 000 habitants soit 25 % de la population du Tchad.

¹⁹ In *Rapport d'achèvement*. Rapport final, octobre 2010, pp. 7-16.

7. Au terme de cinq années d'exécution effective de ses activités, la première phase du PROADEL a enregistré des résultats perceptibles sur le terrain. Ces résultats sont présentés ci-après selon une démarche qui nous indique quel a été le niveau des fonds mobilisés, pour quelles réalisations physiques et pour quels effets observés sur les bénéficiaires. Les résumés de ces résultats sont présentés à travers cinq parties qui sont:

- (i) les niveaux des effets observés par les bénéficiaires ;
- (ii) les niveaux de performance sur la base des indicateurs de performance et déclencheurs de phase ;
- (iii) les niveaux des réalisations physiques ;
- (iv) les niveaux de décaissement des ressources financières ;
- (v) Principales contraintes rencontrées dans l'exécution de la première phase
- (vi) Recommandations à prendre en compte dans la deuxième phase du projet

1. Les niveaux des effets observés par les bénéficiaires au cours de la première phase.

8. Les investigations menées sur la base des rapports internes (Suivi et évaluation), externes (Aides mémoires des missions de supervision, rapports d'audit) et les rencontres des différents acteurs au niveau central et au niveau du terrain ont permis de mettre en relief les principaux résultats observés par les bénéficiaires. Ces résultats démontrent que le PROADEL a eu des effets globalement acceptables malgré les différents événements qui y ont pesé négativement dont notamment:

- le retard de 8 mois pour l'approbation du marché de l'Opérateur Ensemblier chargé de préparer les communautés à l'élaboration des Plans de Développement Local (PDL) où sont identifiés les microprojets à financer;
- la suspension des décaissements des fonds IDA intervenue le 6 janvier 2006 pour ne reprendre que le 15 mai 2006 et de ce fait la plupart des activités planifiées au premier semestre 2006 ont été décalées pour le second semestre 2006 ou reportées en 2007;
- L'adoption tardive du PTBA de l'année 2006 par le Comité Technique de Suivi (CTS) de la Consultation Sectorielle sur le Développement Rural assurant la fonction de Comité d'Orientation et de Pilotage (COP).

9. Toutefois, il y a lieu de noter que le projet n'a pas été géré avec rigueur et compétence par l'Unité de Gestion du Projet (UGP). L'intervention du PROADEL a couvert 5215 Assemblées Communautaires de Développement (ACD) et 210 Cadres Cantonaux de Concertation pour le Développement (CCCD). Plus de 8 milliards de FCA ont été gérés par les communautés pour financer leurs microprojets par les procédures de passation de marchés communautaires. L'analyse des données de suivi-évaluation et les différents rapports sur les effets du projet démontrent le niveau des résultats importants que le projet a obtenus, parmi lesquels on peut citer les éléments suivants :

En matière d'accès aux infrastructures socio-économiques de la zone du projet

10. le PROADEL a contribué significativement à augmenter la couverture des besoins en eau de 16 % à 20 % avec 204 points d'eau potable (181 forages, 21 puits et 2 mini châteaux) réalisés (le taux de couverture issu de la situation de référence du PROADEL est de 16% alors que le schéma directeur de l'eau table sur 17%), à la couverture des besoins sanitaires (avec 11 centres de santé et 3 centres d'accueil des personnes vivants avec le VIH/SIDA réalisés), à l'équipement en infrastructures scolaires (avec 253 salles de classes construites), au renforcement des capacités des jeunes à la création d'emplois (création de 9 centres culturels et de formation des jeunes et adultes femmes et hommes). Ces infrastructures ont permis respectivement à près de 250 000 personnes d'accéder à l'eau potable (sur la base d'un point d'eau pour 1150 personnes (selon le schéma directeur de l'eau, l'hydraulique villageoise vise à donner accès à l'eau potable aux populations qui habitent dans des villages de moins de 2 000 personnes. Dans ce cas, les normes actuelles (en 2002) d'attribution de points d'eau potable établies par l'Administration sont les suivantes:

- la population du village doit être supérieure à 300 personnes;
- l'acceptation par les villageois des conditions de participation, soit la création d'un comité de gestion et la constitution d'une caisse-eau.), à près de 50 000 personnes d'accéder chaque année aux soins de santé de base (5000 personnes par centre de santé) et à près de 49 000 enfants d'étudier dans des conditions sécurisées. En tenant compte de la taille des populations des villages couverts on peut estimer que près de 2 600 000 personnes ont bénéficié directement ou indirectement des activités du projet.

11. De ce fait, les populations bénéficiaires apprécient fortement les effets très positifs de ces infrastructures dans l'amélioration de leurs conditions de vie.

12. Ces résultats auraient pu être meilleurs si des difficultés de planification, de gestion, et de suivi du projet avaient été maîtrisées. Ces difficultés sont entre autres:

- La faible mobilisation des contributions des populations bénéficiaires (il reste un peu plus de 400 millions de F CFA auprès des communautés bénéficiaires que le projet n'arrive pas à mobiliser);
- L'insuffisance de planification adéquate dans le temps et l'espace des microprojets;
- Le non paiement à temps des décomptes financiers des entrepreneurs;
- Les délais de réalisation des infrastructures qui ont en général largement dépassé les délais prévus;
- L'insuffisance de suivi des chantiers par les ingénieurs-conseils dont les prestations de services ne sont pas régulièrement payées dans les délais;
- L'insuffisance de suivi des activités sur le terrain par les UGL;

- L'insuffisance de l'application des mesures de sauvegarde environnementales et sociales dans l'exécution des microprojets.

En matière de Gestion Communautaire des Ecosystèmes

13. Sur la base des documents exploités, 192 microprojets ont été approuvés par les instances locales dont 67 sont achevés et 56 en cours d'exécution et qui ont touché près de 72 000 bénéficiaires. Des sites pilotes ont été retenus et aménagés avec la formation de près de 1050 personnes sur des thèmes spécifiques divers comme la production et l'entretien de plants, la pisciculture, l'apiculture, les foyers améliorés etc. Ces microprojets ont permis entre autres le reboisement de sites dégradés, la vulgarisation de foyers améliorés auprès de 300 femmes pour réduire la consommation du bois, la création de jardins botaniques, des mises en défens de ressources halieutiques, l'aménagement de micro-barrages et des mares.

En matière de mise en place et de renforcement des capacités des structures locales

14. L'appui financier de l'AFD à travers le PROADEL a permis la mise en place de 5215 ACD et 210 CCCD, et 19 CDSA. Ces différentes structures ont été mises en place et formées par des ONG locales recrutées par l'opérateur ensemblier (OE). Cela a permis l'élaboration et l'adoption au niveau communautaire de 174 Plans de développement local, démontrant ainsi une bonne capacité des communautés locales à planifier leurs actions prioritaires.

15. Les ACD et les CCCD sont capables de définir leurs priorités et reconnaissent leurs droits. Aussi, 612 sessions de formations ou de campagne sensibilisation ont été réalisées sur 784 prévues. Au regard des chiffres enregistrés, un nombre important de sessions de formation ont été organisées ; cependant sur le terrain il a été constaté que les personnes formées ne maîtrisent pas le cycle de mise en œuvre et de gestion des infrastructures. Ceci atteste que la qualité de la formation est insuffisante. Ceci est liée à un certain nombre de contraintes qui sont entre autres : i) une durée très courte de temps de formation (maximum 2 jours) ii) des procédures de recrutements des ONG locales qui ne sont pas basés sur l'appréciation à la fois de la qualité et le coût des opérations envisagées, iii) l'insuffisance du suivi de ces ONG par l'OE, iv) des animateurs recrutés sur le tas et peu expérimentés, v) un manque de synergie d'intervention entre l'OE et l'UGP.

16. Ainsi, dans la plupart des cas les sessions de sensibilisation ont pris le pas sur les sessions de formations formelles. Les rares formations dispensées par les ONG ne sont pas accompagnées d'outils permettant aux communautés la maîtrise de la gestion de leurs activités notamment dans les passations de marchés, la gestion financière, la tenue des réunions.

En matière d'appui à la décentralisation:

17. Les services du Ministère chargé de la Décentralisation estiment que l'exécution de cette composante du projet a été satisfaisante car elle a permis l'adoption de 6 projets

de lois et 47 projets de décrets d'application et la délimitation des territoires de 200 communes. De plus la création des CCCD a permis de clarifier le niveau le plus pertinent pour l'implantation des communautés rurales. C'est ainsi que le PROADEL a permis au Ministère concerné d'identifier 412 communautés rurales potentielles pour les futures élections.

18. Cependant l'appui du projet n'a pas été suffisant pour former les autres échelons locaux du processus de décentralisation.

19. Le projet a appuyé l'Observatoire National du Foncier au Tchad par la formation de 10 spécialistes dans le domaine foncier et la mise en place de 3 observatoires pilotes locaux du foncier. Ce qui a permis de commencer à sensibiliser les acteurs à délivrer les actes fonciers au niveau communal et de prévenir les conflits sociaux.

2. Les niveaux de performance sur la base des indicateurs de performance et déclencheurs de phase

20. Le niveau de performance globale du PROADEL au cours de sa première phase d'exécution est globalement acceptable comme l'indique les valeurs atteintes par les indicateurs de performances et déclencheurs de phase. La majorité de ces indicateurs ont atteint et dépassé leurs cibles en fin de phase. L'objectif de développement et ces indicateurs ont été revus lors de la revue à mi-parcours et ont fait l'objet d'un suivi.

21. Au 26 octobre 2010, la situation des indicateurs de performance et déclencheurs de phase se présente dans le tableau ci-après

Tableau 1: Indicateurs de performance et déclencheurs de phase :

Indicateurs	Valeur initiale	Valeur actuelle	Valeur cible	Commentaires
19 départements sur 47 sont couverts par le projet	0	19	19	19 Départements ont été couverts par le PROADEL
50% des Communautés ciblées ont élaboré et adopté leur Plan de Développement Local (PDL) dans les 11 départements soudaniens	0%	102%	50%	Le PDL étant une condition d'accès au financement du PROADEL, un engouement pour son élaboration est observé dans tous les départements soudaniens. 174 PDL sur 170 prévus ont été adopté
50% de ces communautés ont au moins mis en oeuvre un microprojet de leur PDL pour lequel la première tranche a été décaissée	0%	68%	50%	100 communautés des 147 ciblées des 11 départements soudaniens ont mis en œuvre au moins un microprojets pour lequel la 1 ^{ère} tranche est décaissée.
75% des comités de décision sont en place et se sont réunis au moins une fois dans les 11 départements du sud	0%	91%	75%	Les objectifs du projet ont été atteints et dépassés
Les textes de loi de la décentralisation sont prêts et ont été adoptés par l'Assemblée nationale	0	6	7	6 lois qui permettent d'organiser les élections sont promulguées sur 7 prévues à partir de l'année 2006
50% des projets de textes d'application sont disponibles	0	68%	50%	47 décrets d'application sont déjà disponibles sur 69 prévus par le Ministère chargé de la décentralisation et permettent valablement d'organiser les élections locales.
Le calendrier des élections locales (communes et communautés rurales) a été défini		Fait	Fait	5 février 2011 : élections législatives - 2 avril 2011 : élection présidentielle - 25 juin 2011 : élections locales
Au moins 0.5% (un demi pourcent) des revenus pétroliers alloués aux secteurs prioritaires ont permis de financer des micro-projets inscrits dans les Plans de Développement Local	0%	0,2%	0,5%	Les circuits de décaissement des revenus pétroliers sont complexes : des infrastructures sont effectivement construites dans les départements où intervient le projet. Mais les montants décaissés ne sont connus, à part les fonds ayant transités par le projet dans le cadre de la contrepartie Etat.

Source PROADEL

Dans le cadre de l'appui aux microprojets de développement local (Composante 1)

- 68 % de communautés ont mis en œuvre au moins un microprojet de leur PDL pour lequel la première tranche a été décaissée alors que la valeur cible en fin de phase est fixée à 50%;
- 0,2 % des revenus pétroliers alloués aux secteurs prioritaires ont permis de financer des microprojets inscrits dans les Plans de Développement Locaux alors que la valeur cible en fin de phase est fixée à 0,5 %;

Dans le domaine du renforcement des capacités des communautés (composante 2)

- 91 % des comités de décision sont en place et se sont réunis au moins une fois alors que la valeur cible en fin de phase est fixée à 75 %.

Dans le cadre de l'appui à la décentralisation (composante 3)

- 68 % des projets de textes d'application sont disponibles alors que la valeur cible en fin de phase est fixée à 50 %;
- 6 textes de loi de la décentralisation sont prêts et ont été adoptés par l'Assemblée nationale alors que la valeur cible en fin de phase est fixée à 7.

En matière de gestion, suivi et évaluation du projet (composante 4)

- 25 rapports de suivi – évaluation produits à temps sur 28 rapports attendus en fin de phase;
- 66 % des marchés de biens et services exécutés conformément au plan de passation de marchés approuvés alors que la valeur cible en fin de phase est fixée à 80 %.

3. Niveaux des réalisations physiques du projet

22. La première phase du PROADEL a permis la réalisation de plusieurs activités qui ont touché la vie socio-économique tant au niveau local que national notamment:

- Le financement de 341 microprojets dont les plus importants sont 204 pour l'eau potable, 91 bâtiments scolaires soit 253 salles de classes pour l'éducation primaire et secondaire, 9 pour l'éducation et la sensibilisation de la population, 14 pour la santé, et 15 infrastructures économiques. La nature des microprojets réalisés dénote le caractère multisectoriel du PROADEL;
- Pour la gestion communautaire des écosystèmes, 67 microprojets ont été achevés;
- Des formations diverses et des conseils au profit des organisations communautaires de base qui ont porté principalement sur i) la mise en place et le renforcement des capacités des organes de gestion, ii) l'élaboration des plans de développement local, et iii) l'accompagnement dans l'élaboration,

l'approbation et la mise en œuvre des microprojets issus des plans de développement;

- La conduite par les Ministères partenaires de plusieurs études devant contribuer à l'amélioration de l'exécution du projet. Il s'agit de:
 - (i) l'étude sur les bases de données régionales;
 - (ii) la rédaction du livre blanc pour le schéma national et régional d'aménagement du Territoire effectuée par le Ministère de l'Aménagement du Territoire, de l'Urbanisme et de l'Habitat;
 - (iii) l'étude sur les potentialités économiques des communes;
 - (iv) l'étude sur le plan de développement communal;
 - (v) l'étude de la stratégie de communication du MCD effectuée par le Ministère chargée de la Décentralisation.
- La réalisation de plusieurs outils méthodologiques dont les plus importants sont: le guide de planification participative et le guide d'élaboration des PDL;
- La mise en place d'un cadre de collaboration en vue d'améliorer la synergie d'action avec:
 - (i) les services techniques déconcentrés dont le niveau opérationnel prévu par le montage du projet (le CDSA au niveau départemental) a été fonctionnel;
 - (ii) les partenaires du niveau national dont le Ministère chargé de la décentralisation, et l'Observatoire National du Foncier;
 - (iii) les autres projets dont principalement le PSAOP intervenant sur le terrain pour financer des activités génératrices de revenus portées par les communautés de base.

Il apparaît clairement que les réalisations physiques ci-dessus énumérées ont permis d'enregistrer au niveau des bénéficiaires plusieurs résultats (en termes d'effets) notamment une contribution effective des services techniques de l'Etat à l'atteinte des objectifs du projet et une amélioration significative des conditions de vie des communautés locales.

4. Niveaux des réalisations financières

23. Les décaissements des fonds ont été faibles notamment pour le financement des microprojets entre 2004 et 2007 (avant la revue à mi-parcours en 2008). Mais il s'est progressivement amélioré pour atteindre et dépasser pratiquement les 100 % en 2010. En effet, les niveaux de décaissement des fonds à la date d'achèvement par source de financement, par catégorie de dépense et par composante sont globalement satisfaisants comme l'indiquent les tableaux ci-dessous. Cependant du fait de l'épuisement des catégories de dépenses Ateliers/formations et fonctionnement du projet, l'Unité de gestion du projet a été amenée à solliciter des réallocations de fonds afin de corriger les déséquilibres constatés durant l'exécution du projet.

24. Il y a lieu de rappeler que le calcul du taux de réalisations financières est fait sur la base des fonds IDA libellés en Droits de Tirages Spéciaux (DTS) et convertis en Dollars US, les fonds AFD en Euros et les fonds de la contribution de l'Etat du Tchad et des Bénéficiaires en Francs CFA.

4.1. Utilisation des fonds

25. Au 30 septembre 2010, le total des fonds utilisé par composante donne des dépenses de **19 008 841 137 FCFA**, pour un cumul d'encaissement à partir des différentes sources de **19 209 641 625 FCFA**. La situation de trésorerie à la même date est de **200 800 488 FCFA**

4.2 Suivi financier et budgétaire

Tableau N°2: Situation du niveau de décaissement par source de financement.
1\$= 500,71 F CFA

SOURCE DE FINANCEMENT	Prévision	Réalisation	Taux de réalisation
IDA	12.538.416.098	12.129.722.856	97%
AFD	2.997.500.000	2.292.355.455	76%
ETAT	8.720.000.000	4.307.656.353	49%
BENEFICIAIRES	817.500.000	279.106.473	34%
TOTAL	25.073.416.098	19.008.841.137	76%

Source PROADEL

26. Commentaires du tableau N° 2: Les décaissements par source de financement montrent que des efforts restent à faire au niveau de l'Etat et des bénéficiaires avant la clôture des comptes du projet.

Tableau N°3: Situation du niveau de décaissement par catégorie de dépenses.
1\$= 500,71 F CFA

Catégories concernant les fonds de l'IDA	Prévision (en FCFA)	Réalisation (en FCFA)	Ecart	Taux de réalisation
Travaux	720.076.000	704.690.356	15.385.644	98%
Fournitures et véhicules	1.887.927.098	1.441.497.685	446.429.413	76%
Services de consultants et audits	10.175.150.000	4.358.898.970	5.816.251.030	43%
Formation	716.850.000	723.850.112	-7.000.112	101%
Dons pour micro-projets	7.607.273.000	7.619.998.780	-12.725.780	101%
Charges d'exploitation	3.137.780.000	3.334.549.994	-196.769.994	106%
PPF	828.360.000	825.355.240	-3.004.760	100%
Total	25.073.416.098	19.008.841.137	6.064.574.961	76%

Source PROADEL

27. Commentaires du tableau N° 3: Les réalisations financières par catégorie de dépenses montrent une faible absorption des fonds de la catégorie service des consultants et audits (43%).

Tableau N°4: Situation du niveau de décaissement par composante.
1\$= 500,71 F CFA

Composante	Prévision (en FCFA)	Réalisation (en FCFA)	Ecart	Taux de réalisation
Appui aux microprojets de développement	7.607.273.000	7.695.640.568	-88.367.568	101%
Renforcement des capacités locales	10.175.150.000	3.527.144.530	6.648.005.470	35%
Appui au processus de la décentralisation	2.761.771.098	2.418.193.854	343.577.244	88%
Appui à la gestion et Suivi Evaluation	4.529.222.000	5.367.862.185	-838.640.185	119%
Total	25.073.416.098	19.008.841.137	6.064.574.961	76%

Source PROADEL

28. Commentaires du tableau N° 4: Les réalisations financières par composante sont conformes aux proportions de départ excepté au niveau de la composante 4 (gestion, suivi et évaluation) où il apparaît un taux de 119%. Cette situation s'explique par le fait que les charges liées à la composante 4 ont mobilisé des fonds depuis l'année 2004 jusqu'à la prolongation du projet en 2010, soit 7 années de fonctionnement.

5. Principales contraintes rencontrées dans l'exécution de la première phase

29. Les principales contraintes rencontrées dans l'exécution de la première phase du PROADEL identifiées portent sur trois principaux éléments qui sont:

- Les contraintes liées à l'insuffisance constatée dans l'accomplissement des rôles des différents acteurs pendant la mise en œuvre du projet;
- Les contraintes liées à l'insuffisance du management global du projet, notamment, la gestion financière, la passation des marchés, le suivi évaluation);
- La capacité des communautés à jouer pleinement leurs rôles de maîtres d'ouvrage.

5.1 Le rôle des différents acteurs dans la mise en œuvre du projet:

30. Les rôles des différents acteurs ainsi que les partenariats établis entre eux ont été jalonnés de difficultés liées dans la plupart des cas au non respect du manuel d'exécution et de leurs cahiers de charges:

- (i) les procédures de recrutement des ONG par l'OE n'a pas respecté le principe du choix basé sur la qualité et le coût ; les ONG ont exécuté leurs missions sur la base d'un coût forfaitaire déterminé d'avance par l'OE sans tenir compte des spécificités du terrain, amenant du coup ces ONG à expédier parfois leur travail;
- (ii) les décomptes des travaux d'infrastructures préparés et soumis par les entrepreneurs dans la majorité des cas n'ont pas été payés dans les délais, provoquant ainsi de la part de ceux-ci des retards importants voire même des suspensions de certain chantiers;
- (iii) l'application des mesures de sauvegarde environnementales sont insuffisantes et se limitent dans la plupart des cas à des plantations d'arbres pour les infrastructures de génie civil;
- (iv) Les ACD n'ont pas versé la totalité de leur contribution dans la majorité des cas par incompréhension de leurs devoirs en la matière du fait de la désinformation venant de diverses sources (animateurs, personnalités politiques etc....).

6. Recommandations à prendre en compte dans la deuxième phase du Projet

- (i) En matière de renforcement des capacités locales, les unités locales devront avoir la responsabilité de recruter, suivre et évaluer les opérateurs prestataires de services;
- (ii) En matière d'appui au financement des microprojets, le projet devra disposer d'un spécialiste de contrôle des microprojets au niveau de chaque unité qui assurera la supervision des ingénieurs conseil recrutés pour garantir une meilleure qualité des microprojets réalisés sur le terrain. Les ingénieurs conseil appuieront la préparation des marchés communautaires en collaboration avec les responsables des UGL;
- (iii) En matière de pérennisation des investissements réalisés au profit des communautés, celles-ci doivent être suffisamment formées et outillées pour suivre la réalisation et assurer la gestion des investissements;
- (iv) La contribution demandée de la part de ces communautés doit être revue et adaptée aux réalités locales (contribution en nature ou en espèce).

7. CONCLUSION²⁰

31. La première phase du Projet d'Appui au Développement Local a pris officiellement fin le 30 Juin 2010 avec une prorogation d'un an. Au cours de cette première phase, le Projet a couvert 5215 ACD et 210 CCCD pour une population totale estimée à 6 millions d'habitants. Les résultats obtenus ont été satisfaisants. Le projet a eu un impact visible sur l'amélioration des conditions de vie des communautés. Les résultats présentés dans ce document selon la logique d'intervention ont permis de connaître l'importance des réalisations physiques et financières et les effets observés sur les bénéficiaires. Ainsi, près de 6 milliards de FCA ont été mis à la disposition des communautés pour financer leurs microprojets par les procédures de passation des marchés communautaires.

32. Le niveau de performance globale du PROADEL au cours de sa première phase d'exécution est satisfaisant comme l'indiquent les valeurs atteintes par les indicateurs de performances et déclencheurs de phase.

33. Cependant, à côté des résultats relativement satisfaisants obtenus par le projet, des insuffisances ont été constatées tout au long des cinq années d'exécution du projet dont les plus importantes sont liées à la coordination générale du projet.

34. Sur la base de ces résultats, le Gouvernement du Tchad et la Banque Mondiale ont entamé le processus de préparation de la deuxième phase pour éviter un long délai entre la clôture de la première phase et le démarrage de la seconde phase.

7.2 Comments on Draft ICR

N/A

²⁰ In *Rapport d'achèvement*. Rapport final, octobre 2010, p. 37.

Annex 8: Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

N/A

Annex 9: List of Supporting Documents

General documentation:

Gouvernement du Tchad: *Document de Stratégie de Croissance et de Réduction de la Pauvreté: SNRP II: 2008-2011*, April 2008
Gouvernement du Tchad/GTZ: *Recueil des Lois et Regements sur la Decentralisation*, 2008
Republic of Chad: *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2003-2006*. June 2002.
UNDP: *Human Development Report 2010*.
WorldBank: *Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Central Africa*. January 10, 2003.
World Bank: *Country Assistance Strategy, World Bank report for 2004-2006*(Document No. 26938-D)

PROADEL documentation:

Project Appraisal Document, August 19, 2004 (Report No: 24101-CH)
Development Grant Agreement; September 30, 2004 (Grant Number H126-CH)
Mid-Term Report, June 2009
Project Implementation Support Reports (13 reports 2003-2010)
ISR mission aide-mémoires (11 reports 2004-2010)
Audit reports and auditors' management letters 2005-2009

République du Tchad / MATUH / PROADEL: *Etude de la situation de référence des départements couverts par le PROADEL*. Rapport final, SOGEC International, novembre 2007.
République du Tchad / MATUH / PROADEL: *Rapport d'achèvement*. Rapport final, octobre 2010 (transmitted on 8 November 2010)
République du Tchad / MATUH / PROADEL: *Etude d'impact de microprojets et analyse de la satisfaction des bénéficiaires dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du PROADEL*. Rapport provisoire, SERF, novembre 2010 (transmitted on 29 November 2010)

PROADEL manuals:

- *Manuel d'Exécution, Juin 2002.*
- *Manuel d'Exécution--les modalités de gestion et d'exécution par les bénéficiaires eux-mêmes des micro-projets communautaires (Tome II).*
- *Manuel d'Exécution--les modalités d'exécution par le PROADEL en maîtrise d'ouvrage déléguée (de routes rurales et ouvrages s'y rapportant de moyenne envergure) (Tome III).*
- *Lutte contre la marginalisation (par Operateur ensemblier), November 2006.*
- *Manuel de l'animateur et autres outils methodologiques de processus, (par Operateur ensemblier), 2009.*
- *Manuel de suivi et evaluation du projet PROADEL, 2002, revised in 2004.*

List of studies prepared with PROADEL funds:

1. *Méthodes et outils d'analyse en étude d'impact environnemental, mars – avril 2003;*
2. *La problématique foncière au Tchad, juillet 2003;*
3. *Etude de faisabilité d'un projet national d'appui à la microfinance, février 2005;*
4. *Mission d'appui à l'Opérateur Ensemblier du PROADEL: actualisation de la méthodologie: diagnostic participatif et plan de développement local, janvier-février 2007;*
5. *Etude sur les matériaux de construction dans les zones de PROADEL, mai 2007;*
6. *Elaboration du plan de communication du PROADEL, juin 2007;*
7. *Diagnostic des établissements de microfinance évoluant dans la zone d'intervention du projet d'appui au développement local (PROADEL), août 2007;*
8. *Document de méthodologie pour l'élaboration d'un microprojet environnemental, janvier 2008;*
9. *Mission d'appui à la définition du rôle et des responsabilités des intervenants du PROADEL dans la mise en œuvre des microprojets villageois, mai 2008;*
10. *Etude complémentaire d'identification d'une démarche adaptée pour la zone pilote de l'Unité de Gestion Locale de N'Djamena, juin – août 2008;*
11. *Elaboration des trois modules de formation des techniciens d'appui de PROADEL en gestion de l'environnement: législation et réglementation en matière d'évaluation environnementale au Tchad, septembre 2008;*
12. *Le suivi - évaluation participatif communautaire, septembre 2008;*
13. *Manuel de procédures de gestion du crédit solidaire, octobre 2008;*
14. *Module de formation sur le montage et analyse des microprojets – PROADEL, octobre 2008;*
15. *Conception d'une base de données régionales, octobre 2008;*
16. *L'aménagement du territoire au Tchad : Livre blanc, décembre 2008;*
17. *Budget communal, janvier 2009;*
18. *Elaboration et exécution du plan de développement communal, février 2009;*
19. *Module de formation des formateurs en passation des marchés communautaires, février 2009;*
20. *Etude sur la géomorphologie dans la zone soudanienne, octobre 2009;*
21. *Mission de capitalisation des acquis de la planification locale et d'appui à la maîtrise d'ouvrage, novembre 2009.*

MAP

Chad: Local Development Program Support Project

