Is something wrong with the green economy?

Marcelo Poppe, Antônio Galvão, Mayra Jurua (CGEE), Eva Alfredsson (GA), Tancrède Voituriez (Cirad and IDDRI), Carole-Anne Sénit, Laurence Tubiana (IDDRI)

GREEN ECONOMY AS A CONTROVERSIAL INTERNATIONAL ISSUE
Green economy has transformative potential, and because this transformation entails costs and benefits unevenly spread across countries, negotiating green economy among nations is a prerequisite to design the most efficient and fair way for countries to move toward it. Therefore, decision was made by the United Nations to devote the Rio+20 Conference to the green economy as one of its two main negotiation themes. Yet instead of uniting countries, the green economy debate crystallized a North-South opposition on the ground, in particular, that the concept was OECD-biased and that environmental and economic issues would thereby take precedence over social, poverty and equity issues.

AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY FOR MORE CONVERGING POSITIONS
The results of a structured international survey on green economy perception suggest that the political divergence between countries expressed by their delegates during the Rio+20 negotiation process does not find substantial support in public (expert) opinion. Despite nuances, divergences and different priorities, the need to shift to a green economy is stressed, the radical changes it requires and implies emphasized, independently of a country’s national income. Cooperation in a positive-sum game is considered as a better option than the perpetuation of a status quo scenario.

CURBING RISK AVERSION TO GREEN ECONOMY
Some policy implications can be sketched out, pertaining to the possible use of international surveys during multilateral negotiation processes. If appropriately designed and appropriately linked to the negotiation process, international specific surveys could contribute to reduce uncertainty and curb risk aversion among negotiators and stakeholders. Compiling regional and national surveys in an international database could help crafting the Sustainable Development Goals and overcoming doubts on the green economy global governance.
Is something wrong with the green economy?

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This paper explores whether the political divergence between developed and developing countries over the green economy, as expressed by their respective delegates in the run up to the Rio+20 Conference, receives substantial public support. We analysed this subject by exploiting the results of a structured survey performed by the Center for Strategic Studies and Management (CGEE, Brazil) in partnership with the Agency for Growth Policy Analysis (GA, Sweden), which were joined during the consultation by the Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI, France). Our main finding is that the distinct perceptions of national respondents foster a better understanding of delegates’ positions on the green economy in many respects. The survey results also suggest commonalities between the societies of different countries which were absent in the negotiation rooms. By taking a constructivist approach, where negotiations are considered as learning processes, international surveys on perceptions and national preferences, when accurately designed, could bridge significant knowledge and information gaps such as those that arise during complex negotiation issues like Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for the near future.
1. THE GREEN ECONOMY IN THE RIO+20 CONTEXT

At the most basic level, a green economy is one that generates increasing prosperity while maintaining the natural systems that sustain us. Essentially, it is a fairly simple concept. “Unfortunately, translating the idea into reality is hugely more complicated”, the European Environment Agency acknowledges.1 “Clearly, it will require technological innovation. But it requires lots of other changes too—to the way we organise businesses; the way we design cities; the way we move people and goods around; the way we live, essentially.”2 The green economy has transformative potential, and because this transformation entails costs and benefits that are unevenly spread across countries, international negotiations on the green economy are a prerequisite for designing the most efficient and fair way for countries to move towards it.

For this reason, together with mounting public and civil society pressure and the publication of alarming reports by key international institutions in relation to the future,3 UN nations made the decision to devote the Rio+20 Conference to the green economy as one of its two main negotiation themes. For most enthusiastic supporters of the green economy concept, such as the EU, “Rio+20 [was] the opportunity for the world’s policy-makers to adopt a green economy roadmap for sustainable development for the next 20 years and beyond. It should contain specific goals and timetables as well as the policy actions these goals will require.” Yet fierce opposition from developing countries promptly led negotiations into an impasse, on the grounds that environmental and economic issues would thereby take precedence over social, poverty and equity issues, that the green economy was actually a form of green protectionism by OECD countries, and that bold technological and financial transfers to developing countries were crucially missing. In the Future we want (the outcome document of Rio+20 Conference) green economy (§56-§74) is not defined; what is basically defined is what it should not be used for. National circumstances and priorities, and national sovereignty, are reasserted in the very first paragraphs. The text “recognizes” and “acknowledges” without taking any decisions.

Green economy is an empty concept from an international political standpoint. It has failed to unite developing and OECD countries. On the contrary, it crystallized a North-South opposition before and during the Rio+20 Conference. The very wording of the Rio+20 Conference theme itself—“green economy in the context of poverty eradication and sustainable development”—conveys the idea of a concept that is intrinsically biased towards the preferences and interests of Northern countries in their management of the economic crisis they face, and its awkward superimposition onto Southern countries.

This paper explores whether the political divergence between rich and poor countries expressed by their delegates during the negotiation process finds substantial support in public opinion. We analysed this subject by exploiting the results of a structured survey performed by the Center for Strategic Studies and Management (CGEE, Brazil) in partnership with the Agency for Growth Policy Analysis (GA, Sweden), which were joined during the consultation by the Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI, France). A full report presenting all of the general information related to this green economy survey

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1. See the “Green economy” webpage of the EEA: www.eea.europa.eu/themes/economy/intro
2. Idem.
has already been published; in this paper we focus on some of its most salient findings. The survey revealed a more intricate picture than that which had emerged from the debates. While acknowledging severe limitations in the interpretation and generalization of the survey results due to several biases explained below, we shed light on a mismatch between negotiator positions and (expert) opinion/perception of the green economy. The detected perceptions suggest common dimensions on the concept of green economy across countries that should be explored to promote SDGs, independently of a country’s national income. While opportunities are acknowledged, a wide and diverse range of risks are also highlighted, which ultimately appear to be a potential explanatory factor for the weak appeal that the green economy has thus far generated among policy makers and negotiators.

2. THE GREEN ECONOMY SURVEY

The survey was conducted by email in Brazil, Sweden, France and in a group of Annex I and non-Annex I countries of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), during the first semester of 2012. The mailings lists used to conduct the survey were very diverse. The Brazilian mailing list began from a search made using the Innovation Gateway (a CGEE-developed search tool) to identify Brazilian experts that had in their curriculum the expressions “sustainable development” and “green economy”. At this stage 1,939 experts were selected. To complete the Brazilian mailing list, some of the CGEE’s existing contacts were added; they were selected out of actions conducted by the CGEE in association with the green economy or sustainable development areas of concern. The targets were people from academia, government, organized society and industry, mainly related to the fields of science, technology and innovation. By this stage, 2,738 people had been selected. This resulted in the sending of 4,677 emails, which obtained a total of 1,270 respondents (27.15%), see Table 1.

In Sweden the survey was sent to 158 individuals previously selected by GA as experts or policymakers involved in issues related to the green economy and sustainable development. It obtained a total of 66 respondents (41.77%). Compared to the Brazilian and French surveys, the share of participants from government and parliament in the Swedish survey is significantly higher (see Table 2).

3. THE GREEN ECONOMY SURVEY RESULTS

3.1 Convergence in perceptions

We first learn a bit more about what green economy is not. For a majority of respondents (almost 84% in Brazil and 70% in France), the green economy is not restricted to environmental performance; it should also take into account social and equity issues. The lowest percentage of respondents holding this view was found in Sweden (see Figure 1).

It should not exclusively involve the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions either. The green economy is not a low carbon economy exclusively. Among the nine possible answers—economy greening, low-carbon economy, knowledge economy, reduction in the intensity of natural resources consumption, sustainable use of biodiversity, emphasis on ecosystem services, strengthening of regulation in market relations, establishment of commercial barriers to non-green products, and reduction of inequalities—a narrow range of 23.67% (France) to 29.31% (Sweden) of respondents associate the green economy with a low carbon economy. It should also involve the sustainable use of biodiversity (26.3% of respondents in Brazil), and for an almost equal percentage of respondents (22% on average) it should encompass a reduction in the intensity of natural resources consumption.

Last, the green economy is not restricted to the economic dimension of sustainable development; it is not a restricted concept of sustainable development. Instead of these two possible responses,
Table 1. Breakdown of survey respondents by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups of participants</th>
<th>BRAZIL</th>
<th>SWEDEN</th>
<th>FRANCE</th>
<th>OTHER ANNEX I</th>
<th>OTHER NON-ANNEX I</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>78.11%</td>
<td>4.06%</td>
<td>10.02%</td>
<td>4.24%</td>
<td>3.57%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Respondents’ sector of activity, by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector of activity</th>
<th>Government and parliament</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Academia and research</th>
<th>Non-governmental organisation</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRAZIL</td>
<td>Count</td>
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<td>96</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>17.24%</td>
<td>7.56%</td>
<td>66.14%</td>
<td>4.09%</td>
<td>4.96%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>Count</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>4.55%</td>
<td>30.30%</td>
<td>10.61%</td>
<td>4.55%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>22.09%</td>
<td>16.56%</td>
<td>36.20%</td>
<td>14.11%</td>
<td>11.04%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER ANNEX I</td>
<td>Count</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>15.94%</td>
<td>4.35%</td>
<td>56.52%</td>
<td>17.39%</td>
<td>5.80%</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTHER NON-ANNEX I</td>
<td>Count</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>20.69%</td>
<td>6.90%</td>
<td>36.21%</td>
<td>15.52%</td>
<td>20.69%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Is the concept of the green economy restricted to environmental performance?

Source: CGEE Green Economy Survey, question 5
Is something wrong with the green economy?

A relative majority of respondents in all countries regard it as a tool to promote sustainable development, ranging from 38.51% (France) to 65.36% (Brazil). The green economy is perceived as a comprehensive tool to promote sustainable development. This should leave room for the negotiation of a consensual agenda, e.g. a green economy agenda of interest for both OECD and non-OECD countries.

But what is meant exactly by a comprehensive tool to promote sustainable development? A number of converging positive answers to what the green economy is and/or implies also emerge from the survey. Three striking results are worth noting. First, a shift towards a green economy requires major transformative changes (see Figure 2).

Second, a large majority of respondents, ranging from 71.19% (other Annex I) to 80.07% (Brazil), consider that a country cannot become green on its own. And third, a green economy is unlikely to leave GDP unchanged. Nearly two thirds of Swedish and French respondents believe in either a better or similar performance of a green economy in terms of GDP, against a lower majority for Brazilian and other Non-Annex I country respondents (between 54% and 56%). The idea that potential gains are at stake for any country seems to be shared by all respondents, whatever their country. This leaves further room for cooperation in a positive sum game. Respondents clearly stated that: “no country can be green on its own”.

What then prevents countries from seizing the low-hanging fruits of the green economy? The striking answer to this question is cooperation institutions. On average, more than 90% of respondents believe it is necessary to reform institutions, particularly at the international level (see Figure 3).

Thus, the green economy is deemed unlikely to occur within the current global institutional framework, which is bad news for some international institutions promoting the green economy. Furthermore, neither can the green economy occur within the current national institutional framework. Barriers to the introduction of a green economy cannot be restricted to the lack of availability of environmentally-friendly technology (16% of respondents held this view) when considered among the ten possible barriers suggested in the survey (namely: price distortion, inadequate tax structure, inadequate mechanism of incentive and credit, insufficient public investment, insufficient private investment, environmentally-friendly technologies not yet economically viable, inappropriate incentives to environmentally-friendly innovation, inadequate current system of intellectual property rights, inadequate legal and regulatory apparatus, lack of payment for ecosystem services). Institutions matter, in the green economy more than ever.

Concerning the energy sources that should receive the greatest stimuli in the promotion of a green economy, all respondents indicated that solar, wind and biomass should be the highest priorities (see Figure 4).
Is something wrong with the green economy?

**Figure 3.** Institutional reforms as a prerequisite for the green economy

Is it necessary to reform the institutions at these different levels?

Source: CGEE Green Economy Survey, question 22

**Figure 4.** Sources of energy that should receive the greatest stimuli

What sources of energy should be privileged?

Source: CGEE Green Economy Survey, question 18
3.2. Nuances in perceptions

The survey makes clear the variation in the perceptions of the risks at stake when moving (or not) towards the green economy. When asked what would be the main risks of adopting a green economy, 5 Brazilian respondents believed it would be the expansion of developed countries’ control over the technology market, as they traditionally hold the scientific and technological knowledge that underpins its establishment. This option accounts for more than 21% of the total responses, followed by the restriction of the growth perspectives of developing countries, which account for 19%. The establishment of barriers to international trade is another risk hypothesized by Brazilian respondents, accounting for 17% of responses. In addition to barriers to non-green products, it is possible that, if the World Trade Organization (WTO) disregards these issues, countries will mask protectionist measures as green measures.

Results among Brazilian, Swedish and French respondents differ slightly. A considerable proportion of Swedish and French respondents are very confident about a green economy—worth noting, respectively 18% and 15% of respondents think its adoption would not offer risks at all. Perpetuation of the status quo is a major concern among French respondents, as the alternative with the largest share (20%) is the maintenance of the disparities between developed and developing countries, followed by the transformation of social inclusion and poverty eradication objectives, with almost the same percentage.

Swedish respondents, similarly to Brazilian ones, have shown concern about the establishment of barriers to international trade (15%), but a slightly higher share believes that no such risk exists at all (18%).

There seems to be great consensus among countries regarding the question of what would be the main risks of not adopting a green economy.6 More than 77% of Brazilian respondents cite risks that are related to the environmental challenge posed by the current economy. The irreversible loss of biological diversity and of the potential use of ecosystems accounts for 40% of answers, while the acceleration of climate change and its impacts accounts for 37%. Swedish respondents have shown more concern about the acceleration of climate change and its impacts, an option that accounts for more than 47% of their total answers. For French respondents, this number was about 39%.

In addition, while some Swedish respondents believe that not adopting a green economy increases the risk of worldwide economic stagnation (8%), more believe that adopting a green economy could have this effect (11%). Brazilian respondents are less concerned about this risk, with only 3% of the total responses mentioning it. Also, on a smaller scale, French respondents believe that not adopting a green economy may delay the attainment of the millennium goals (8%), while Brazilians are more convinced of the maintenance of the disparities between developed and developing countries (7%).

The fact that the risk of moving to a green economy is much more controversial than the risk of not moving to a green economy supports the idea that the payoff matrix associated with the green economy differs significantly among countries. The asymmetry in the payoff matrix and the lack of cooperation among countries lead to the prisoner dilemma situation where the status quo is preferred to the green economy, even though every country ends up worse off.

Respondents from France and Sweden have given even more relevance than Brazilian ones to energy efficiency as the energy technology that should be privileged in the promotion of the green economy. This result may be related to the fact that the energy sectors of Sweden and France are more carbon intensive than Brazil’s. Even though respondents from Brazil have designated solar energy as the energy source that should be the highest priority, photovoltaic cells are not among the key technologies mentioned for the promotion of the green economy. For French and Swedish respondents, on the other hand, it is considered the second most important technology, followed by smart grids. Also, most respondents considered the thermal conversion of biomass and waste to be a key technology. It is worth noting that Brazilian respondents are the only ones to consider biodiesel and bioethanol as relevant energy technologies for the promotion of the green economy (see Figure 5).
**Figure 5.** Which key energy technologies should be privileged?

Source: CGEE Green Economy Survey, question 19

**Figure 6.** Divergences in perceptions on the agenda for institutional reforms

Source: CGEE Green Economy Survey, question 14
3.3. Divergences in perceptions

We have highlighted the importance, according to our survey, of the reform of global institutions in the making of a green economy. Yet, nuances and even divergences arise among respondents when asked for their priorities in the institutional reform agenda (see Figure 6).

The option that accounts for the larger share of total answers among Brazilian respondents is the establishment of targets and a compliance system for meeting SDGs (about 26%). The majority of answers seem related to governance issues given that progress in the implementation of the UN conventions raised at Rio 92 (such as biodiversity, climate change and desertification) is next on the list with 21%. Almost 20% of answers correspond to taking into account environmental and social concerns in issues dealt with by the WTO.

French and Swedish respondents consider that taking into account environmental and social concerns in issues dealt with by the WTO is the most important change that has to be made in order to make feasible a transition to a greener economy worldwide, an option that accounts for 23% and 22%, respectively. Brazilian respondents, on the other hand, do not consider it as important as the need to establish targets and a compliance system for meeting SDGs or making progress in the implementation of the UN Rio 1992 Conventions. French respondents share the Brazilian priority for making progress in the implementation of the UN conventions raised at Rio 92, a response that ranks third with 16%. Swedish respondents agree on the need to establish targets and a compliance system for meeting SDGs, which is the second highest response with 17%. Strengthening UN environmental institutions does not appear among the top four priorities for any country.

International competition rules—and whether or not they require reform—seem to be one of the main contentious issues in response to the question of the required changes to the international order. This finding mirrors the risk perception problem raised above. For Brazilian respondents, the control of developed countries over the technology market was the main risk associated with the adoption of a green economy—suggesting a belief that competition was biased in favour of the latter to the detriment of the former. The green economy and globalization rules cannot be thought of separately. The extent to which their agendas should be merged remains an open question.

4. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Survey responses clearly delineate commonalities in the perception of the green economy in terms of its substance, potential and obstacles. They reveal a shared interest for the green economy as a transformative concept, dismissing the idea of it as a political concept forged by OECD countries out of self-interest and on tactical grounds. They highlight commonalities in the analysis of the role of global and national institutions—and on the need to reform them. The green economy is not a marginal adaptation of the conventional economy; it requires a complete revision of our institutional framework, which in itself is a plausible explanation for its difficult handling by the UN secretariat and related UN agencies.

Differences emerge pertaining to the urgency (or otherwise) at which action to shift towards a green economy should be taken, Brazilian respondents being a bit less “pessimistic” on the outcome of current trends than other countries. Differences also arise on the matter of what one country can learn from another, proving that some respondents in some countries consider their economies as more sustainable than others.

When asked the question: “What is your view concerning the following statements about your country?” about 60% of respondents from Brazil (37% of Swedish respondents, 68% of French respondents) disagree or strongly disagree that their economy is economically sustainable. One can note that more than 23% of Swedish respondents strongly agree with the statement that the Swedish economy is economically sustainable, whereas only 8% and 3% of Brazilian and French respondents, respectively, agree with this statement in reference to their own countries. This does not mean that Swedes are reluctant to enter into a learning process, but it simply points to a possible asymmetry in the expectations on negotiation outcomes among countries. What is to be negotiated may in turn reasonably differ among countries depending on their perception of their own performance.

Variations also emerge in the responses to the risks at stake when moving towards a greener economy and on the priority sectors and technologies for action. Brazilian respondents believe that the most relevant sector for the implementation of a green economy in Brazil is water, waste and sanitation. This option accounts for nearly 15% of total answers, followed by industry and transport, with 13% each. Swedish respondents have not given much importance to water, waste and sanitation, but they do say that transport and industry are relevant sectors for the implementation of a
green economy in their country. These options account for 21% and 17% of their answers, the largest shares. The energy sector was also considered as relevant, representing 14% of their answers. Results for French respondents differ a little from those of Brazilian and Swedish ones. French respondents considered agriculture, cattle and fishing as the most important sector for the implementation of a green economy in France. This option represents 18% of their answers, followed by transport with 16%, an option also considered as fairly important by Brazilian and Swedish respondents. Energy and construction and building sectors are the next most highly ranked, with 15% and 14% of total answers, respectively.

There is some variation in opinion regarding the instruments to be used in a green economy, providing further support for the rejection of a one-size-fits-all approach, such as the one implicitly framed by OECD conceptual work. “Internalizing environmental externalities with market-based instruments” in substance of the OECD work is not an operative contribution to the green economy implementation issue. When asked “What are the main instruments to stimulate a green economy?”, Brazilian respondents were the only ones that did not suggest taxes and market-based instruments for the pricing of externalities and to enhance incentives for green innovation as the main instrument to foster a green economy. For them, this option ranks in second place, with nearly 10%, which lies behind incentives for public-private partnerships towards environmentally-friendly technology projects, which accounts for more than 12% of answers.

Last and most importantly, divergences on the global governance setup are made explicit, with two open questions of utmost importance, the first being: are the sustainable development goals (SDGs) enough to reform global institutions so as to enhance a green economy transition? While the second is: should globalization rules (WTO and IFIs) be reformed and made a part of the global negotiations on the green economy?

5. CONCLUSION

Our survey reveals a mismatch between the positions of negotiators and (expert) opinions on the green economy. The need to shift to a green economy is stressed and the radical changes this requires and implies is emphasized. The civil society participation processes that were organised in the framework of the Rio+20 Conference (“Thematic days”) have confirmed the existence of such a consensus among the public and expert opinion on the need to move towards a green economy. On the one hand, the international civil society deliberations that took place during the Sustainable Development Dialogues resulted in the definition of consensual recommendations to Heads of States and Governments, in particular on how to meet future SDGs as a means to shift to a green economy. On the other hand, a significant number of side events were organised by institutions of developing countries to establish proposals and roadmaps towards a green economy (“Managing natural resources in Namibia in the green economy context”, Namibia; “Green economy as an inducer of conservation in Brazilian Amazon”, Brazil; “Green development, perspective from Vietnam and Bangladesh”, Vietnam; etc.).

A decisive aspect of the green economy is the diversity of risks that it entails, either by occurring or by not occurring. How these various risks were assessed, compared and eventually balanced, resulting in the status quo at the Rio+20 Conference, was not explicitly part of the survey questionnaire. Still, all the responses collected seem to suggest that the negotiators from developing countries, by ignoring the actual preferences regarding the green economy of the populations they represented, overplayed a classical North-South diplomatic game during the negotiation phase and chose to adopt a risk-adverse stance, deemed acceptable by their constituencies, against what could be labelled as an OECD concept. The green economy, the survey tells us, is a transformative concept and tool. However, on the route to Rio+20, it was instead used as a device to freeze negotiation positions.

This theory requires testing on a wider scale, since the sample size and distribution across countries limits the explanatory power of our results. It can only be a hypothesis and not a finding, given the structured survey we have used. Nevertheless, a number of policy implications can be sketched out, pertaining to the possible use of international surveys before and during a multilateral negotiation process. The CGEE green economy survey, if appropriately designed to cover a larger number of countries and to meet in all of them the statistical requirement of sampling methods and, in addition, if it was appropriately linked to the negotiation process, then it could contribute to the reduction

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8. Details of side events at Rio+20 are given here: http:// www.uncsd2012.org/meetings_sidevents.html
of uncertainties throughout the whole process and curb risk aversion strategies among negotiators and stakeholders. By taking a constructivist approach, where negotiations are considered as learning processes, surveys on perception and national preferences, when accurately designed, could bridge significant knowledge and information gaps such as those that arise during complex negotiation issues like the green economy and sustainable development. In this line of thought, the construction of a “commonality database” at the global level, on the basis of national or regional surveys, would be a promising move towards the crafting of SDGs and making them deliver, at a time when most national leaders are ignoring the very content of these goals.
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The Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI) is a Paris based non-profit policy research institute. Its objective is to develop and share key knowledge and tools for analysing and shedding light on the strategic issues of sustainable development from a global perspective.

Given the rising stakes of the issues posed by climate change and biodiversity loss, IDDRI provides stakeholders with input for their reflection on global governance, and also participates in work on reframing development pathways. A special effort has been made to develop a partnership network with emerging countries to better understand and share various perspectives on sustainable development issues and governance.

For more effective action, IDDRI operates with a network of partners from the private sector, academia, civil society and the public sector, not only in France and Europe but also internationally. As an independent policy research institute, IDDRI mobilises resources and expertise to disseminate the most relevant scientific ideas and research ahead of negotiations and decision-making processes. It applies a crosscutting approach to its work, which focuses on five threads: global governance, climate change, biodiversity, urban fabric, and agriculture.

IDDRI issues a range of own publications. With its Working Papers collection, it quickly circulates texts which are the responsibility of their authors; Policy Briefs summarize the ideas of scientific debates or issues under discussion in international forums and examine controversies; Studies go deeper into a specific topic. IDDRI also develops scientific and editorial partnerships: among others, A Planet for Life. Sustainable Development in Action is the result of collaboration with the French Development Agency (AFD) and The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), and editorial partnership with Armand Colin for the French edition, Regards sur la Terre.

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