Reframing Development from the South?
A Debate on the Internationalisation of Brazil’s Rural Policies

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I. Abstract

South-South co-operation is grounded in the rationale that partners from the emerging world are familiar with development challenges faced by developing countries and are well placed to propose solutions inspired by their domestic experiences. Several rural public policies formulated and implemented in Brazil have gained international reputation, inspiring a number of co-operation projects based on these policies. With a case study of Brazil’s relations with Mozambique and the country’s presence at multilateral organisations, this paper seeks to analyse the mechanisms and the effects of the internationalisation of Brazil’s policy instruments. Using an empirical basis, it seeks to combine advocacy coalition and policy socialisation frameworks to highlight the role of concurrent policy coalitions and of particular political structures as national prisms of policy internationalisation and appropriation. Unlike domestic policy building and change, this international move involves additional intermediary actors, such as the FAO and other international institutions, as well as political arenas which contribute to alter power relations and the set of actors.
II. Introduction

The recent changes in the world economy and the redistribution of power towards emerging countries has resulted in significant strategic benefits for Brazil (Hirst et al. 2010). The country’s foreign policy, historically guided by principles of autonomy and economic development and dedicated to affirming Brazil’s international credibility, has also been adapted to reflect these recent changes (Pinheiro 2004; De Lima 2005). Brazil, under the Lula da Silva administration (2003-2010), renewed an emphasis on leadership in the international arena though more active roles in several multilateral contexts aimed at promoting normative and operational changes towards more democracy in international decision-making institutions. Sustained by a rising political-economic presence, Brazil’s ties with African countries have become the main reference of these strategic interests, based on principles of South-South Co-operation (SSC) and on increasing outward investments (Marinov & Marinova 2012).

These ties are grounded in the rationale that partners from the emerging world are familiar with development challenges faced by developing countries and are well placed to propose solutions inspired by their domestic experiences (Costa Leite et al. 2013). Political dialogue, technical co-operation, investment and trade have been complementary factors deployed by the Lula administration to deepen Brazil-Africa relations (Milhorance & Goulet 2011). Technical co-operation, in particular, has garnered increased financial resources. Several new embassies have been established, making Brazil the fifth-most represented country in the African continent. The administration, during its two mandates, also launched a strategy to reinforce economic relations, as opposed to strengthening only trade relations and the performance of Brazilian companies (Flynn 2007). However, since the election of Dilma Rousseff in 2011, some changes to the diplomatic style have been effected and economic agendas have become a priority in the post-financial crisis years.

The international agenda goes hand-in-hand with domestic efforts to fight hunger and poverty, supporting the diplomatic focus on social issues and the sharing of experiences (Costa Leite et al. 2013). Several rural public policies formulated and implemented in Brazil have gained international reputation, inspiring a number of co-operation projects based on these policies. This context has created an opportunity for the participation of new policy coalitions from the Global South in the international formulation of rural policies. Therefore, instead of a simple diffusion of liberal/Western institutions and values through international co-operation, the increasing interactions among these actors has contributed to a change in sectorial policies of partner countries and to the internationalisation of policy instruments and ideas which have been primarily developed in Brazil. With a case study of Brazil’s relations with Mozambique and the country’s presence at multilateral organisations, this paper seeks to analyse the mechanisms of this internationalisation process, as well as their consequences in Mozambique.

III. Conceptual Framework

Development co-operation has largely been based on western institutions and beliefs – legatees of Bretton Woods – and hinged on ideas ranging from belief in progress to an economic perspective of social dynamics (Rist 2007). Co-operation initiatives have been founded on the conviction that the diffusion of western governance models can be achieved without rupture (Badie 1992; Rist 2007). However, the unifying vision of such a recipe shadows the heterogeneity of policies, carried out by a variety of actors and on behalf of ambitions and often conflicting objectives. Besides, these assumptions do not take into account the recent emergence of countries from the Global South. Brazil’s position in international system has been shaped by narratives seeking to symbolically overcome its “subaltern condition”, particularly regarding notions of Development (Tamanini 2011).
The country’s place has been, however, altered by its recent emphasis on economic emergence\(^1\) and its domestic initiatives in the fight against hunger and poverty.

These references represented a set of subjective evidences that would allow Brazil to participate in development co-operation and be consistent with its gradual positioning as a *middle power*\(^2\). As mentioned earlier, this position has been consolidated through an experience-sharing narrative. Brazil has risen as an agricultural power, an exporter of many raw materials and biofuel, and has shown great progress in implementation of policies relevant to food security, allowing co-operation on public policies for both family farming and export-oriented industrial agriculture. Indeed, public policies are no longer the exclusive monopoly of a fortified state, governed by increasingly complex mechanisms such as European integration, liberalisation/privatisation dynamics and prominence of local elements (Massardier 2003). These phenomena include debates on environmental policy, migration flows and global health, which rely on cross-border processes, reframing patterns of collective construction of public action. Contemporary public policy analysis seeks to take into account the diversity of actors involved in its formulation and its implementation (Hassenteufel 2011).

In the 1990s, Rosenau had suggested that multi-level approaches would be useful in addressing challenges posed by the "turbulence" that confused actors and structures of world politics, highlighting the complexities of the international system (Rosenau 1990). Risse also suggested the overlapping of processes, and sought to understand internationalisation through the idea of “socialisation of international norms in domestic practices” (Risse 1995). The first aspect arising from these conclusions is the need to analyse Brazil’s foreign policy as a *public policy* – as the subject of negotiation between different politico-economic actors at the domestic level (Pinheiro & Milani 2012). The second aspect that emerges from our case study is the intersection of development and foreign policies. Brazil’s international co-operation policy, currently under construction, is a subject of debate and divergence among sub-national actors.

Notions of policy networks and advocacy coalition have been used to highlight power relations linked to actors’ resources and to political and institutional contexts. This increasing interest in actors’ interactions is a result of their multiplication, their interpenetration at different levels of action, and the erosion of public/private boundaries. Hence, this analytical framework focuses on actors, their interactions and their contexts. The orientation of actors’ strategies is based on a cognitive approach, which insists on the role of ideas and policy learning combined with that of interests and institutions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Muller 2011). Sabatier analyses public action as a result of conflicts between different belief systems brought by multiple policy networks (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993). The author proposes the notion of belief system which is less cohesive than that of Muller’s *frames of reference (référentiel)* (Muller 2011) and that of Hall’s policy paradigm (Hall 1993). The latter duo support the existence of a dominant cognitive universe while Sabatier relies more on the idea of concurrence and conflict between different cognitive systems (Hassenteufel 2011).

The concepts of advocacy coalitions includes actors from diverse public and private institutions at all levels of government who share a set of basic beliefs and who seek to manipulate the rules, budgets, and personnel of governmental institutions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993, p. 5). This framework is based on the idea that public policies are the product of interactions among several advocacy coalitions, structured through belief systems, which combines causal and other perceptions, as well as policy goals. It is worth noting that not all members of a coalition or of an administrative agency entirely share a belief system. Conflicting strategies from various coalitions are normally mediated by a third group of actors, the policy brokers. However, this framework is too restricted to the cognitive dimension of actors’ strategies and too focused on the role of policy learning in policy change.

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\(^1\) Despite the recent economic slowdown, South-South trade as well as trade in intra-South merchandise and manufactured products has grown to unprecedented levels (UNCTAD 2012; UNCTAD 2013; UNSG 2013).

\(^2\) Middle power notion includes aspects of material capacity, auto-perception, regional influence and recognition by other States (De Lima 2005; Soule-Kohndou 2010)
process, particularly through technical accumulation (based on policy effectiveness) and redistribution of political resources.

Hence, policy change may occur through the interaction between competing coalitions and replacement of dominant coalition within a policy sub-system, through changes external to the sub-system (such as socio-economic conditions), and through change of rules considered stable over the long-term (such as constitutional rules and natural resources distribution). Literature recognises the rather complex nature of internationalisation, which led to more detailed research on the means and mechanisms through which domestic dynamics are linked to the international system. Sabatier’s advocacy coalitions and belief systems were used in this article to analyse policy-sharing between Brazil and Mozambique. Advocacy coalitions involved in the internationalisation of Brazil’s public policies emerged particularly in the 2000s as a result of the country’s growing international action. Nevertheless, the international does not represent an additional level to the local, regional or national, but a level which interact with previous ones and produce a distinct logic (Hassenteufel 2005, p. 123).

Contemporary phenomena of diffusion, transposition, convergence and international production of policy instruments and frames of reference have been addressed by several authors of international relations and compared public policies (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Bernstein & Cashore 2000; Dolowitz 2000; Evans & Davies 2002; Delpeuch 2008; Benson & Jordan 2011; Massardier & Sabourin 2013). In this context, the analysis of policy change through internationalisation processes may take into account some additional aspects such as the national prisms. In countries such as Mozambique, which are highly dependent on foreign aid and historically influenced in the formulation of its policy action, the absence of ownership of projects is considered a measure of state decision (Castel-Branco 2008). This may be especially true regarding Brazil-Africa relations, owing higher negotiation power the African governments hold vis-à-vis emerging countries than with traditional donors. Hence, coercion and policy-learning based on technical accumulation are not the only aspects of international policy change.

Therefore, next section will discuss the role of promoters and mediators of Brazil’s public policies in the international context and how domestic policy coalitions contribute to transpose domestic policies and conflicts. Then, section five will discuss the influence of Brazil’s policy instruments and belief systems in Mozambican context and its potential internalisation by national actors. It is worth noting that this process is circulatory and these different steps should not be considered as a sequential or unilateral logic.

This article proposes three main aspects to be considered in the appropriation of foreign models. First is the institutionalisation of norms and policy instruments within domestic framework, which may also contribute to increase legal and organisational capacities of implementation of these instruments. Second, based on Sabatier and Risse (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Börzel & Risse 2002), it is argued that policy change may occur through the replacement of the dominant policy coalition and the change in domestic opportunity structures that contribute to a redistribution of resources. However, change in domestic opportunity structure does not necessarily imply the shift of dominant policy coalition. It may also rely on the involvement of new actors and the mainstreaming of the dominant policy framing, as will be discussed in the case of ProSAVANA and the extractive model. Finally, appropriation may occur through a process of inter-cultural translation towards cognitive socialisation, which depends on the level of mobilisation of intermediary actors and on intense exchanges between politico-administrative groups.

As a methodology for this paper, social network analysis has been mobilised as a descriptive and exploratory tool, combined with qualitative and primary data. This includes 250 semi-direct interviews, institutional documents and six months of participant observation at the FAO office in Mozambique. The analysis relies on sociology’s interactionist perspective, which describes the system of interdependencies between actors, types of networks established among actors, and the influence of the relational structure (coalition) on the behaviour of actors (Lazega 2014). Network
analysis offers several analytical possibilities and may provide diverse information about, for instance, the roles of actors within a policy coalition, coalition membership parameters, learning, influence and hierarchical processes. However, given the scope of this article, these will not be explored. Our interest is to provide a more clear mapping of policy coalitions actors in the present sub-system and to highlight the utility of this approach in further policy transfer studies. Social network analysis reconstitutes the system of social exchanges among members of a pre-defined population (Lazega 2012), which in our case includes public policy instruments and ideas.

Using Gephi version 0.8.2, we intend to visualise distinct coalitions involved in Brazil- Mozambique policy circulation, including international NGOs and intergovernmental institutions. In this context, a few methodological choices require some mention. First, the network is defined by considering Brazilian and Mozambican organisations involved in this specific process. This is in addition to other organisations which have established initiatives in regions of Mozambique where Brazil is active (Tete, Nampula, Zambézia and Niassa provinces). These organisations include private actors and traditional donors. Data has been collected through interviews and institutional documents of each of these organisations (totalling 380). While not representing an exhaustive map, it provides an extensive effort to represent this specific policy system. Second, we employ some of the quantitative tools of network analysis, namely degree centrality, in order to identify a set of particular actors. The size of the node is hence considered as a function of this measure with the intention of capturing the importance of an organisation in the network’s connectivity.

IV. Concurrent Advocacy Coalitions in Brazil’s Foreign Policy to Africa

a. Building Brazil’s Rural Development Models

The internationalisation of Brazil’s public policies is shaped by competing domestic actors who form coalitions and interact with state bureaucracy in the dissemination of policy instruments, through bilateral and trilateral technical co-operation but also through economic relations. This section aims to demonstrate that the process of internationalisation does not reflect the interests of a monolithic state, but of sub-national actors that participate in coalitions with international and Mozambican actors to promote and implement policy instruments. The nascent condition of Brazil’s co-operation policy and the fragile nature of Brazilian Co-operation Agency (ABC) allow a more direct involvement of domestic actors in initiatives in Africa. Although co-operation policies of several countries are inspired by domestic experience, the weakness of Brazilian national institutions in mediating international co-operation allows a more direct involvement of sub-national actors and hence a more consistent reflection of the country’s internal policies and politics. This partial reflection holds true even in dynamics which appear contradictory or conflicting such the debate between family farming and agribusiness perspectives.

This debate is based on different public policy belief systems, as shown below, which are associated with specific instruments of public action. The systems themselves have been built upon domestic social struggles. In the agricultural sector, institutional development gave rise to a general conception of the presence of “two mutually defined agricultures” which configure two major policy advocacy coalitions in the rural sector: i) a capitalist patronal agriculture integrated to logistics complexes and international markets (agribusiness); and ii) a small peasant production that takes into account a more heterogeneous set of social relations (Schneider 2003; Sabourin 2007; Delgado 2009). It should be noted that this duality minimises the diversity of both systems, particularly family farming and local situations in Brazil regarding structures, capabilities, access to markets and credit (Sabourin 2007). The agribusiness perspective is often associated with economically liberal and a conservative modernisation project (Collier, 2008; Collier and Dercon, 2013). The transformation of the technical basis of agricultural production in Brazil has relied heavily on public research and on
policy instruments such as favourable exchange rate for exports, minimum prices for agricultural products, credit instruments and tax incentives. The establishment of Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) under the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAPA) stimulated the development of appropriate technologies for different regions of the country.

This framework played a key role in the country’s macroeconomic management and the balance of payments stabilisation, particularly after the 1980s debt crisis. But the generalisation of the use of inputs and modern facilities has aggravated environmental impacts and social disruptions. Elements of these narratives still find space in Brazil’s trade, food pricing and rural extension policies, despite the challenge of the 2007-08 food crisis (Garcia and Vieira Filho, 2014). Growing criticism, social movement struggles, and the rising influence of several agrarian organisations since the end of the dictatorship regime contributed to the establishment of the National Program for Family Agriculture (PRONAF) in 1995, and the Extraordinary Ministry of Agrarian Policy (DPET) in 1996. DPET was responsible for establishing targets for land regularisation and has since been reconstituted as the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) in 2000. Albeit the existence of initiatives focused on smallholder agriculture, PRONAF was the first major government programme with an emphasis on family farming. This demonstrated the emergence of a "concept-synthesis" that would characterise a whole sector and legitimisation of this concept by the State (Schneider 2003). This dual aspect of the state explains the overlap and, in many instances, the contradictions of institutional models and different public policies adopted.

Under the Lula administration, the amount of funds allocated for family farming as well as the number of farmers receiving credit more than tripled. Another notable initiative was the institutionalisation of political mechanisms and the establishment of new legal frameworks. The Food Purchase Programme (PAA), for instance, created a new market for the commercialisation of family farm products which are purchased for distribution to social assistance networks, for the establishment of public stocks and price regulation as well as institutional procurement for food-based safety net programmes without public bidding process requirement. The National School Feeding Programme (PNAE) is other major source of structured demand for small farms, considering that 30 per cent of these resources is allocated to obligatory purchase of food from family farmers (Silva et al. 2011; Veras et al. 2013). The country’s food security system grew in reputation during the onset of the international food and economic crisis and the implementation of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP).

Despite recent changes, the importance of agribusiness has remained unchallenged in Brazil’s economic and political scene due to their strategic role in the trade balance. Brazil is currently facing a process of reprimarisation of its trade structure and the expansion of a “neo-extractive” development model promoted by an active nationalist State (Salama 2010; Lang et al. 2014). Mining and agribusiness are closely associated in the country’s political economy due to the establishment of logistics corridors that connect production sites to international markets. The State is involved both in the promotion of these exporting complexes and in the establishment of massive social programs aimed at redistributing revenue from economic activities and assuring new sources of social legitimisation through their efforts in the fight against hunger and poverty (Lang et al. 2014). This is the context of the growing political and economic relations with African countries, which involves different policy coalitions in the promotion of their political goals and belief systems at the international level. However, unlike in domestic policies and debates, the international movement engages other intermediary actors as well as mechanisms that may introduce elements in defining strategies and consequences of Brazil’s experience-sharing with African countries.

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2 Implemented with resources from the Ministry of Social Development (MDS) and the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA), in partnership with the National Food Supply Company (CONAB), states and municipalities.
b. From Domestic Struggles to International Arenas

Brazil found itself endowed with diplomatic, technological and policy credentials to become a prominent actor for policy dialogue and co-operation in agriculture and food security, as mentioned earlier (Pieri 2013). During the 2010 Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Brazil laid the groundwork for its Sub-Saharan co-operation policy with African leaders, including initiatives such as the Fight against Hunger and Rural Development Dialogue (Brasilia, May 2010). Both international and domestic drives have led to the intent of sharing social policies such as the Zero Hunger framework with the international community. The diversification of Brazil’s exports of goods and services to Africa has also been highly dependent on public support. The diversification of exports has included primarily large companies in infrastructure construction and the mining sector, which increases the sensitivity of economic flows to intergovernmental decisions (World Bank & IPEA 2011). Coincidentally, the visibility of Brazilian investments in Mozambique rose in the 2000s, with a significant role played by mining company, Vale SA.

Important current public and private initiatives in Mozambique include: i) Vale investments in mineral research, operation of the Moatize Coal Mine and the Sena Corridor, and ongoing development of the Moatize Mine II and Nacala Logistics Corridor; ii) Brazil-Japan-Mozambique Triangular Programme (ProSAVANA), aiming at developing the agribusiness sector and agronomical public research (and initially inspired by the Brazilian Cerrado development programme, PRODEDEC); iii) Brazil-FAO-WFP Food Purchase Programme for Africa (PAA Africa) and the Brazil-Mozambique School Feeding Programme (PRONAE), inspired by public policies with the same name in Brazil, aiming to establish public food procurement from farmers and to contribute to a foundation of social protection system in the country. Another relevant initiative, the More Food Programme which focuses on providing Brazilian public credit for family farmers to acquire adapted equipment and machinery, is also in development. ProSAVANA is Brazil’s main programme in its international public portfolio, and is implemented in association with Mozambique’s Agricultural Ministry (MINAG). The programme focuses on the Nacala Corridor region in northern Mozambique and intends to foster policy instruments such as agronomical research for varieties adaptation, establishment of production clusters and special economic zones, contract farming arrangements and a financial mechanism to promote foreign investments. It brings together Brazil’s Embrapa in charge of the technical assistance component, and the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV Projetos), a private consulting firm responsible for the formulation of the Nacala Corridor Master Development Plan as well as the Nacala Investment Fund. FGV Projetos is reputed in Brazil for its relations with agribusiness corporations. The design of ProSAVANA has been closely connected with Vale’s investments in logistics infrastructure in the Nacala Corridor region. It has however drawn heavy criticism from Brazilian organisations historically involved in the criticism of Brazil’s agribusiness model.

The Lula administration did make efforts to apply a discursive strategy of "peaceful co-existence" between the two rural models, in attempts to overcome the reflection of domestic conflicts at the international level. President Lula reaffirmed that strategy in several speeches (Brasilia, September 30, 2005; Brasilia, July 24, 2006; Maringa, September 23, 2010; and in Cape Verde, MRE 2010, p. 34 – author’s translation):

“Brazil is a partner for Africa [...]. Our soils, our climate and our genetic resources also bring us together. The Brazilian cerrado, where we developed a growing agriculture and livestock, has strong similarities to the African savannah. In many countries of the continent we can reproduce the revolution of Brazilian agriculture. [...] We have created a harmonious coexistence between modern agriculture and a robust entrepreneurial family farming. »

The Brazilian Co-operation Agency, attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), has low financial and operational capacity and weak political presence. Thus, the formulation of this co-operation policy remains loosely bound. Several arenas have been created, and sub-national
Institutions have played a direct role in international co-operation initiatives. The actors formulating and executing PAA Africa, for instance, are the officials involved in the Brazilian version of programme: the Ministry of Social Development (MDS), the MRE’s Department which is responsible for the international promotion of the Zero Hunger Program (CGFOME/MRE), in addition to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP). It is also supported by civil society actors promoting the family farming agenda in the domestic context. Parallel, the More Food Programme is managed by the Brazilian Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) in collaboration with the Foreign Trade Chamber (CAMEX/Ministry of Commerce).

These international initiatives embody concurrent rural policy belief systems, involving virtually the same players supporting each perspective in Brazil. In addition, several policy forums such as the Africa Working Group (GTEX-Africa) – established within the Ministry of Trade to develop Brazilian economic policy towards the continent – have emerged and evolved from this context. The National Food Security Council (CONSEA), considered both an actor and a forum, is increasingly engaged in the formulation and monitoring of the co-operation policy. Brazilian diplomatic actors and government agencies have also increasingly participated in the formulation of norms and best practices in international sectorial organisations such as the FAO, WFP and UNDP. These organisations are an additional platform for dialogue and dissemination of Brazilian policy instruments related to food security and family farming (eg. the right to food; social participation in rural policies; and local procurement for institutional markets), with engagement from Brazilian civil society organisations and CONSEA representatives. The election of José Graziano, a former Brazilian minister, as the Director-General of the FAO has also contributed to raising Brazil’s profile.

Some examples of this effort include the establishment of the International Year of Family Farming (YIFF 2014), which according to some representatives from the Brazilian Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG) constitutes an important step in their efforts to promote the family farming agenda internationally. Another example is the establishment of a forum for debate about family farming, right to food and social participation within the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) with the support of the FAO. In parallel, CONSEA has been defined at the Committee of the Food Security (CFS) as a model to reinforce civil society participation in the design and monitoring of food security policies. Even the process to institutionally strengthen CFS’ is an example of fostering social participation within the FAO system. Additionally, Graziano is currently enhancing FAO’s expertise in the field of social protection – an important aspect of Brazil’s policies in the fight against hunger and poverty – as set out in the Medium Term Plan 2014-17 and Programme of Work and Budget 2014-15 (C 2013/3). This includes providing incremental resources in the area, establishing a Social Protection Division and an inter-departmental working group to strengthen coordination of analytical work and policy support related to social protection.

Therefore, different advocacy coalitions embedded in political struggles in Brazil have been involved in the process of internationalisation of their instruments and belief systems through development co-operation with Mozambique and through higher participation in multilateral organisations. The two domestic coalitions interact differently with State bureaucracies – particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – and partner with distinct international actors to establish an international coalition. Hence, albeit the political and economic asymmetry between these groups domestically, power relations are altered in international context through the establishment of renewed partnerships with the FAO and civil society organisations active internationally and in Mozambique. Some of the broad consequences of this process will be discussed in the next sections.

The figure below illustrates the two coalitions described throughout the article, particularly the interactions with actors based in Mozambique (governmental, private and traditional donors) both at the national and at the territorial level (territories where Brazil is active: Tete, Nampula, Zambézia and Niassa provinces). The network is decomposed into modular communities that identify major
policy coalitions (Blondel et al. 2008). The nodes are the organisations (total of 380) and the edges are the links or relations between the nodes (which include collaboration, funding/support or institutional affiliation). This figure is useful in highlighting the distinction of the two policy coalitions in terms of their regular interaction.

Figure 1: Gephi Illustration of policy coalitions involved in the internationalisation of Brazil’s policy instruments

Legend: Pink and red nodes represent actors involved in the “extractive” coalition both from Brazilian and Mozambican side. It includes institutions mainly related to this group which is gathered according to the intensity of their interaction (and not their attributes or belief systems). As expected, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), Brazilian companies such as Vale, and Mozambique’s governmental agencies responsible for investments promotion (such as CPI and CEPAGRI) appears in this coalition. Mozambique’s Ministry for Agriculture (MINAG), the country’s agricultural research centre (IIAM) and other traditional donors (USAID and JICA) as well as the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and Embrapa are more integrated to this network, despite their connections with actors in the other coalition. Some NGOs working on the promotion of agricultural value chains and partnerships with the private sector (such as IKURU, OLIPA and Clusa) also appear here.

The blue nodes represent the broad family farming/social protection coalition which brings together several civil society organisations in Brazil (CONTAG, FASE, MPA) and Mozambique (UNAC, ORAM, AAJC, ADECRU) but also international organisations (particularly the FAO and the WFP’s Centre of Excellence), some governmental agencies (such as the Brazilian Ministry of Agrarian Development) and some traditional donors and mechanisms involved in civil society promotion in Mozambique (We Effect, MASC). The size of the nodes represents the degree of a node – or the number of relations (edges) it has. This implies some degree of importance of the particular organisation within the network.

5 This structure describes how the network is compartmentalized into sub-networks (or communities). It is worth of noting that this is a simple heuristic method based on modularity optimization intending to identify the clusters of nodes that have many links inside clusters and few links across clusters. But it presents some methodological limits such as the so-called resolution limit (Traag et al. 2013).
V. Models’ Internationalisation and Policy Change in Mozambique

a. Donors’ Community and Rural Development in Mozambique

Mozambique has attracted significant international aid since its independence in 1975, which attests to the influence of foreign political dynamics in the country’s domestic structure. After the colonial period, the country adopted a political regime of socialist orientation which deeply transformed social organisation in the rural areas (Mosca 2010). This process coincided with a civil war that contributed to destroy much of rural and agricultural infrastructure, and a displacement of rural populations. In the late 1980s, Mozambique was chosen by international agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF as a target country for the implementation of structural adjustments. The government followed a pragmatic foreign policy to ensure international support for its national development interests. Therefore, dependence on international donors has influenced the way the country is inserted at the regional and international arenas (Lal bahadur & Otto 2013).

Recent discoveries of vast mineral resources renewed foreign interest in the country and raised the Mozambique government’s bargaining power with international donors. According to Mozambican scholars, the country has focused on building an “extractive economy” in recent times, based on the export of natural resources and agricultural commodities (Mosca & Selemane 2012; Castel-Branco). However, unlike Brazil, Mozambique has not gone through a process of import substitution which contributed to the country’s industrialisation. Alongside mineral resources, foreign direct investments (FDI) to agro-food sectors in Mozambique and other developing countries has been on the rise since 2007 (FAO 2012). Arguments for this trend range from the role of FDI in job creation, technology transfer, increase in prices paid to small producers and infrastructure development to the threats to livelihoods of the most vulnerable farmers and even a surge of neo-colonialism (Boche & Anseeuw 2013).

This trend is also highlighted by international institutions as an opportunity for African countries, (Morris et al. 2009) and appears in strategies such as the Programme for the Development of Agriculture in Africa (CAADP / NEPAD) and New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition G8. Successive administrations in Mozambique have defined this as a model for rural development, and more recently it has been promoted by ProSAVANA. Over the past decade, Mozambique has experienced an intense process of institutional reconfiguration and formulation of strategies for the rural sector⁶. Based on the development perspective established by the Green Revolution Strategy and the CAADP (2003), the Strategic Plan for Development of the Agricultural Sector (PEDSA) came to systematise this wide range of orientations for agriculture.

However, despite the co-existence of “multiple strategies” (Mosca 2010; Castel-Branco 2013), the focus on production growth and productivity and the role of private sector in production and services through commercial farming, technological packages, mechanisation and processing (MINAG 2010) has been a consistent focus in Mozambique development plans. On the other hand, smallholders are placed as subject of assistentialist social welfare policies – which is no longer the mainstream vision in Brazil. They are expected to “evolve” and become “capable” farmers before being included in major agricultural public policies. Therefore, the extractive economy, based on production and export of agricultural and mineral commodities, has been configured as the mainstream development model in Mozambique. Family farming and social protection represent important components of Brazil’s domestic policies for the rural sector, but are not considered by Mozambican government as central to production and poverty reduction plans. The early effects of Brazil-

Mozambique experience sharing will be discussed below and rely on the change of domestic opportunity structures, leading to the mainstreaming of the extractive model, and on the institutionalisation of family farming instruments without a policy socialisation of this perspective.

b. Policy Incrementalism and Social Contention of Brazil’s Extractive Model

As already mentioned, ProSAVANA is aimed at developing agricultural research capacity and economic development in the Nacala Corridor. It was initially inspired by PRODECER, a Brazilian development programme oriented towards commodity exports and implemented in the 1970s (CCUB 2011; Funada Classen 2013; FGV Projetos 2014). Brazil’s agribusiness internationalisation effort to Africa is largely connected to ProSAVANA and to a growing Chinese commodities market, bringing supply geographically closer to sites of demand. Political efforts have intensified to consolidate the initiative: business missions, public-private seminars, technical reports and strategic meetings (SERE/MRE 2011; Brazilian Embassy in Maputo 2011a; Brazilian Embassy in Maputo 2011b). The key lines considered in ProSAVANA are the increase of productivity and the establishment of agricultural value chains and special economic zones (ProSavana 2013). It intends to include smallholder farmers in support initiatives only through contract farming and cluster-based agricultural growth (GRAIN & Justiça Ambiental 2013; ProSavana 2013).

ProSAVANA has been formulated in close connection with Mozambique’s Agricultural Development Plan (PEDSA) and it is coupled with an entire scheme to attract investments: infrastructure development, research for adaptation of agricultural varieties and institutional security. The programme benefits from high-level support from Mozambique’s government, including the President’s himself. The Minister for Agriculture affirmed ProSAVANA as the government’s priority during a public meeting with civil society organisations in Maputo (August 2013). The initiative is also connected to Vale’s infrastructure development throughout the Nacala Corridor. Official letters demonstrate that this agribusiness-logistics complex was discussed under an integrated perspective: in 2003 Mozambican officials expressed interest in Mozambique benefiting from Vale’s investments in transport infrastructure for other sectors, particularly agribusiness, to the Brazilian Ambassador (Brazilian Embassy in Maputo 2003).

Despite diplomatic discourses related to similarities between Brazil and Mozambique, the Programme has faced many challenges. ProSAVANA has been subject to strong criticism by local and international civil society organisations, following the already intense debate and denunciation of impacts of Vale’s investments in the country. As argued by Rosenau, “globalizing dynamics tend to create resistance and opposition, since any expansion of governance is bound to be detrimental to those who have a stake in the status quo” (Rosenau 2006, p. 129). This process is particularly strong considering emerging economies whose political ambition is to become major international players, frequently making use of narratives of horizontal relations, no political conditionality, and economic partnerships. In practical terms, emerging countries have barely promoted democratic institutions or civil society in partner countries - an orientation largely followed by ProSAVANA promoters, who lacked dialogue with local and national organisations other than governmental bodies.

Hence, a transnational civil society campaign against ProSAVANA has garnered support, in parallel to the expansion of the transnational “Movement of those Impacted by Vale to Mozambique”. Moreover, the growing international interest in the emergence of Brazil drew the mobilisation of financial resources for these networks. Alarmist articles were produced by national and international media, intending to draw attention to the risk of ProSAVANA’s “land grabbing” and environmental impacts (GRAIN et al. 2012). Representatives of the Mozambican Peasants’ Union (UNAC) and other local Mozambican organisations of the Nampula Province Civil Society Platform (PPOSC-N) participated in technical visits to Brazil in 2012, with the technical support of organisations

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7 It is worth noting that despite the political non-conditionality discourse, which contributes to foster the Brazil’s economic relations with dictatorial countries in Africa such as Equatorial Guinea, economic conditionality are well accepted such as in the case of MFP’s soft loans.
historically engaged in the activism against “agribusiness model” such as FASE. The Brazilian Peasants’ Movement (MPA), the National Confederation of Rural Workers (CONTAG), the Movement of Peasant Women (MMC), and other organisations have strongly adhered to the campaign and demanded a dialogue with the Brazilian government about the modalities of its development co-operation.

Shared values and a common discourse towards agriculture modernisation and large-scale investments bound these activists together and continued financial support from international NGOs ensured the increasing exchange of information, international meetings and open letters to national leaders. The impact of criticism has also alarmed potential investors who have recognised costs related to the increased opposition. However the opposition has not paralysed the initiatives and Agribusiness Program (AgriFUTURO) and the JICA operation or brought about an exit of private investors. ProSAVANA has actually contributed to mainstream a particular development model which may influence further public policy formulation. This includes the consolidation of the role of the State as “facilitator” of private investments; establishment of logistics corridors; promotion of smallholder agriculture through contract-farming schemes; and promotion of technical assistance based on a technological green revolution packages and on public research. Therefore, Brazil’s initiatives in the agribusiness and mining sectors have been aligned to major Mozambican government’s orientations.

Brazil’s extractive economy model resonates (fit) with Mozambique’s political and economic structures; hence, foreign instruments are more likely to be incorporated into domestic context. This south-south exchange contributes to mainstream and consolidate an extractive private-led development. However, the presence of a new emerging partner also provides greater complexity to actors’ interactions in Mozambique. So, policy change may occur through small incremental changes by the incorporation of some of Brazil’s policy instruments, but the extractive coalition’s lack of dialogue with civil society organisations collided with an established political context based on the donor’s promotion of civil society. Brazil’s presence has then created an opportunity structure to civil society activism aiming to increase participation in policies formulation. It is important to highlight here that the criticism towards ProSAVANA has not been accompanied by denunciation of other donors who also promote export crops in Nacala Corridor. This fragmented approach may be the result of ProSAVANA’s lack of transparency, strong activism and support from Brazilian organisations, and Brazil’s lack of support to civil society which is justified by principles of non-conditionality. Therefore, if there were no major change in policy orientation, actors’ political dynamics have been gradually altered.

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8 Larger-scale investments have recently been directed by the Programme to Niassa province, less populated, and to the Pemba-Lichinga Corridor (north of Nacala Corridor) where agricultural conditions and weaker civil society articulation are positive.
9 Based on Börzel and Risse’s concepts of fit/misfit in the analysis of foreign influence in domestic change.
10 Despite strong criticism against land deals, other foreign investors from US, Portugal, Zimbabwe, Norway and South Africa faced no resistance. Soy production has received development co-operation support for more than ten years in the Nacala Corridor. Meanwhile, commercial and land conflicts have been identified in many regions of the Nacala Corridor, such as Rapale, Malema, Ribaue, Chimbukila e Ng’äuma which are related to other countries’ companies such as Lurio GreenResources, Matanuska and Chikweti. In the district of Gurue, a soya boom has been fostered by donor agencies and NGOs such as Clusa, TechnoServe, Gates Foundation, Norway, Switzeland, the US and the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), based on a support package of the Norwegian-funded business programme (Hanlon & Smart 2012). A set of other donor-driven initiatives such as the G8 Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), the Rural Markets Promotion Programme (PROMER), the USAID Mozambique Competitiveness and Agribusiness Program (AgriFUTURO) and the JICA Project for the Nacala Corridor Economic Development Strategies (PEDEC) are all of them concretely promoting agribusiness, market-oriented agriculture and cash crops, particularly soy, in the North of Mozambique. However most of them have not received public attention compared to ProSAVANA.
d. Weak Institutionalisation or Policy Clash? PAA Africa and PRONAE changing at the margin

Agricultural and food security strategies depend on strong institutionalisation processes and hinge on the fiscal capacity to pursue a trajectory that requires financial sustainability (Pierri 2013). Likewise, cash transfer programmes are perceived as costly and as demanding a complex delivery structure (Cabral et al. 2013). Even in Brazil, these kind of programmes face challenges incorporating the most vulnerable producers and addressing operational obstacles such as transportation, payment mechanisms and upscaling (Takagi 2011; Nehring & McKay 2013), apart from the risks of political misuse. PAA-Africa Programme comprises five small-scale projects in Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal. The projects combine emergency actions for agricultural recovery and food assistance with development strategies to link smallholder farmers with structured demand (PAA Africa 2013). The Programme is essentially a pilot initiative in Mozambique and its officers intend to promote dialogue with the Mozambican government and participate in the building of public policies for family farmers11.

PAA Africa has sought to support the national school feeding programme (PRONAE), also promoted by Brazilian actors, and to seize the opportunity to implement a model of local procurement that can provide lessons learned to the implementation nationwide. Both programmes have been subject to a process of institutionalisation. PRONAE was approved by Mozambique’s Council of Ministers in 2013 to promote school feeding policy based on fresh local products (formerly food aid programs were based on grains purchased in international markets). This program is implemented by Mozambique’s Ministry of Education (MINED) with support from Brazil’s National Fund for Education (FNDE) and WFP. PAA Africa is implemented by FAO and WFP, aimed at promoting purchase from local smallholders for school canteens, fostering family farming and local short circuits. On Brazil’s part, the Centre of Excellence against Hunger12 had an important role in providing information about the Brazilian experience.

However, a number of challenges have been identified during the pilot’s first phase. Productive zones in Tete province are localised and remote from the more food insecure districts (around 400 km). This implies high logistical costs to deliver maize to schools and raises the question of the capacity of local structures in continuing the initiative once the pilot project will be closed. Other institutional bottlenecks exist, particularly concerning the Mozambican framework of procurement. It demands a bureaucratic process for legalising, attributing fiscal register, and creating a bank account to farmers’ organisations which creates a stumbling block given the high rate of illiteracy and low resources condition among target farmers. Moreover, the required bidding process does not enable smallholder farmers’ participation and competition with medium/big farmers and local merchants. And the insufficient dialogue with other social policies highlights the challenge for implementing an intersectorial policy.

PAA Africa and PRONAE do not benefit from political and financial support similar to ProSAVANA and mining activities as they rely on dissimilar development perspectives (misfit). Commitment from government stakeholders is not comparable either. Food public procurement has been implemented as a pilot initiative; however with no major support to institutional changes and further allocation of resources, there are strong challenges to be faced if an expansion to national level policy is considered. Deeper institutional changes and allocation of resources would require adjustment of policymakers’ preferences. According to Sabatier, such adjustments depend on the shift of dominant coalition, that is to say, a restructuring of power relations at the national level. But drawing upon Risse and Tulmets’ arguments (Börzel & Risse 2002; Tulmets 2005), if political costs of adopting a

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11 In Mozambique, the pilot project targets three districts in Tete Province (Angonia, Cahora Bassa and Changara) and includes distribution of agricultural inputs and training on production systems and post-harvest handling.
12 Thematic UN centre dedicated to the implementation of south-south co-operation activities in partnership with key emerging countries. This particular centre has a hybrid structure with technical assistance from WFP and Brazil’s government funding.
foreign model are too high, the changes are effective and sustainable only through a deeper process of socialisation which alters belief systems of national actors.

Socialisation, as discussed above, includes institutionalisation, intercultural translation and knowledge exchange towards cognitive convergence. The inauguration of a dialogue space through the programme’s working group within the FAO, the organisation of international workshops for experience exchange by PAA Africa staff and recurrent missions to Brazil, as well as integration of Brazil and Mozambican civil society organisations may contribute to a further densification of this policy coalition and to a deeper socialisation of such policy beliefs. In Mozambique the project has counted on a participative process of inception and collaboration with civil society organisations and it maintains a policy dialogue with national institutions aiming at contributing to advance the food local procurement concept. This collaboration also stems from the relationship Mozambican organisations built with Brazilian organisations during the construction of PAA in Brazil. Their ability to influence policy change depends on the domestic coalition-building processes, but further dialogue and articulation mechanics may contribute to alter the effects of such foreign instruments.

VI. Conclusion

The article discussed the early process of internationalisation of Brazil’s policy instruments through the action of concurrent policy coalitions. Using an empirical basis, it sought to combine advocacy coalition and policy socialisation frameworks to analyse the south-south policy circulation. Brazil is becoming a prominent player in the development co-operation system and its governmental bodies have shown increasing interest in the dissemination of public solutions based on their own experience. The country’s agricultural model and food security system were particularly appealing during the international food and financial crisis; hence its diplomacy has inaugurated a new international position regarding rural development. We have highlighted the role of different policy coalitions and of political structures as national prisms of policy internationalisation and appropriation. Unlike domestic policy building and change, this international move involves additional intermediary actors, such as the FAO and other international institutions, as well as political arenas which contribute to alter power relations and the set of actors.

As previously detailed, Brazil has gone through a process of reprimarisation of its trade structure underlining the role of agricultural commodities and mineral goods in its economy. This process has also been accompanied by relevant state-led development of productive social protection programs. The coalitions involved in the promotion of these domestic policies have been in conflict for the past decades and these opposing relations have also been observed in the country’s international initiatives. What changed were the mechanisms allowing international action and national appropriation (or lack of it) of these reconfigured coalitions. In the relationships of emerging countries with Africa, coercion and technical policy learning may not represent the major aspects of policy change, given the experience sharing narrative, absence of political conditionality, low financial and implementation capacity as well as low political authority of these rising powers in comparison with other traditional partners.

Brazil’s extractive development model resonates with the priorities of Mozambique’s policymakers and politico-economic exchanges between both countries contribute to mainstream and consolidate this model. Incremental changes tend to predominate over policy reorientation, but domestic politics face some reconfiguration by the inclusion of new international actors and by deployment of political and material resources to civil society actors. The same reconfiguration has not accompanied traditional donors’ support to similar initiatives in Mozambique before. Moreover, the simple institutionalisation of specific policy instruments through PAA Africa and PRONAE may not assure effective and durable implementation. The initiatives lack of political and institutional weight to be consolidated in Mozambique. They have been placed as subject of assistentialist and costly public
policies. A potential policy change in this case would probably depend on a deeper process of socialisation which alters belief systems and preferences of policymakers. Recent efforts of intensification of exchanges and policy dialogue may contribute to this process, but it is not reliable to be attained on a short term basis. This south-south-triangular policy circulation axis has contributed to modify power relations and set of actors in the described sub-system and to internationalise policy instruments that were formerly limited to Brazil’s domestic level.

VII. References


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