

SUSTAINABLE FOOD SYSTEMS FOR FOOD SECURITY

Need for combination of local
and global approaches

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Chapter 2

Land management, value-chain governance and food security: examples in Senegal, Morocco and France

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Food security is commonly tackled as a problem of food availability, affected by climate and storage capacity limitations, or as a poverty-related problem of food access. A growing body of literature shows that public bodies can foster food security by acting on the essential levers of farm households' livelihoods, such as access to land and markets. In addition to public policies, the actions of private macro-stakeholders play a key role with regard to how land transactions are handled and the way agricultural products are traded. Finally, land governance is frequently associated with the governance of value chains. Private operators in Africa invest in agricultural production, processing and trade through contracts, which are often associated with land grabbing (Cotula et al., 2009).

Governance has become a major research agenda in many areas of social sciences, especially with regard to land management, territorial development and value chains. A key issue that arises is coordinating the decisions of stakeholders with connected but sometimes diverging interests (Chia, 2013). Governance is an intermediation process aimed at negotiating arrangements to reach compromises to address heterogeneous interests. The idea of land ownership constitutes 'all relations between individuals and the property (and the renewable natural resources that it supports' (Rochegude, 2005, p. 59) or 'the specific set of social relations based on the land or territorial space' (Le Bris et al., 1991, p. 13).

Governance of a value chain relates to the 'relations of authority and power that determine how financial, material and human resources are allocated and circulate within the chain' (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994, p. 97). Governance modes vary between the market – characterized by spot transactions coordinated by price with no commitment – and the hierarchy, where supply is controlled by administrative processes. Contracts are intermediate modes of governance with joint commitments related to conditions of production, delivery and purchase. They often come together

with upgrading, i.e., the process by which stakeholders acquire new capacities and reach new markets (Humphrey, 2004).

The territorial governance approach addresses the issues of stakeholder guidance and participation. Territorial governance is the ‘dynamic process of coordination between public and private operators with different identities and asymmetric resources around territorialised issues’ (Rey-Valette et al., 2011). The forms of coordination vary according to the level of participation of the different groups of stakeholders within the territory (Beuret, 2006), ranging from communication (stakeholders from outside the territory disseminate a message concerning a decision) to negotiation (joint construction of a decision). This framework is dynamic, because organizational and institutional innovations can alter this level of participation. Participation can take the form of cooperation among different groups of stakeholders or the form of conflicts, which represent a means for excluded parties to rejoin the negotiation process (Chia et al., 2008).

In this chapter, we examine the governance of land and food value chains and its impact on population livelihoods. The chapter covers work conducted in Senegal, Morocco and France. The research in Senegal combined territorial governance with value-chain governance through agribusinesses and observed their effects on agriculture sustainability and the inclusion of smallholders and food security. The work in Morocco focused on the development of an industrial zone, driven by public investors but with limited regulation by public authorities to the detriment of multifunctional nutritive agriculture. The research conducted in France focused on local levers used to regulate land use.

We assume that the evolution of value chains and access to land are linked together in various ways. First, in sub-Saharan Africa, the modernization of agriculture, which is driven by agribusinesses and characterized by vertical coordination, large-scale production and crop intensification, puts considerable strain on the land. The effects may be negative if this strain triggers a more intensive use of inputs, specialization of production and the exclusion of extensive land uses (e.g., pastoralism), and even more so when investors seek out countries with weak governance and land security (Arezki et al., 2011). Second, in peri-urban areas, land use for agricultural production is jeopardized by urban pressure due to industrial and housing projects. Such uses impede the capacity of cities to rely on short value-chain procurement or benefit from the multifunctionality of peri-urban agriculture (Duvernoy et al., 2005). These effects are mitigated by public action and territorial governance. The three case studies in this chapter (see Table 2.1 for an overview) illustrate some of the local levers that are used. The case studies explore the precise characterization and actual functioning of these levers, and provide a balanced view of their advantages and shortcomings.

Table 2.1. An overview of data.

Location	Level of governance/ approach	Effects	Data source
Senegal River Valley, Dagana department ¹	Rice value chain (producer-processor relations) – global value chains framework Land (setting up of agribusinesses)	Access to land for agricultural producers Agricultural practices (use of chemical inputs)	Case studies on three agribusinesses: 154 semi- structured interviews with various actors in the value chains and from development and research organizations One workshop with producer and agribusiness representatives Survey of 470 farmers about their incomes and food insecurity
Morocco, region of Casablanca ²	Peri-urban land (establishment of an industrial zone)	Access to land for agricultural producers	In-depth interviews with 20 stakeholders in the land system (farmers, promoters, employees in the local communities)
Île-de- France ³	Peri-urban land (SAFER pre-emptions)	Access to land for agricultural producers	Analysis of 784 SAFER pre-emptions Interviews with 15 municipal employees and elected officials

1. Soullier et al. (2018).

2. Lenseigne and Bignebat (2019).

3. Belleil (2018).

► Limited counterbalancing governance facing agribusiness in Senegal

The administrative department of Dagana comprises three agroecological zones where small-scale producers carry out different activities (Figure 2.1). In Walo, located between the Senegal River and the main road, irrigated land is primarily used to grow rice, and to a lesser extent, for market gardening. Ferlo, a sandy and arid zone covered by shrub and wooded steppes, is located south of the main road. Pastoralism is the main activity in this area. In Diéri, which includes Lake Guier and surrounding farmland, agriculture is diversified. Agricultural activities are primarily carried out by family farmers, who mostly belong to the Wolof and Moorish ethnic groups, whereas the agro-pastoralists are mainly Fulani. The agricultural resources are governed by a combination of customary and legal institutions (Kamara 2014). The customary institution has for centuries been shaped by the practices of agro-pastoralists, for whom the territory is very valuable for their identity. This institution advocates collective ownership of agricultural resources, whereby descendants inherit the right of use. It endeavours to limit conflicts relating to the use of agricultural resources, such as by encouraging complementarity between crops and livestock. The municipal councils define the land-use plan and manage

allocations for housing, crops and livestock. The state manages land allocated for ecosystem protection. Territorial governance sometimes combines these customary and legal institutions. The local and state authorities have thus, in part, called on the customary institutions to allocated land linked to the expansion of irrigated areas. However, these institutions do not always agree, and they sometimes allocate conflicting functions to the same resource. For instance, the Ndial nature reserve has been used for pastoralism for centuries.

In the wake of the 2007 food crisis, the public authorities and international organizations strengthened their actions to develop the Senegalese agrifood sector. The main levers were focused on encouraging large-scale investments, intensifying agricultural practices, increasing land development, promoting contracting and developing infrastructure (Tyrou, Ribier and Soullier, 2019). These projects have helped transform the country's value chains through three agribusiness firms specialized in rice, tomato and agrofuel.

The investments made by the three agribusinesses have had different effects on territorial governance (Figure 2.1). The company Coumba Nor Thiam has local roots. It negotiates with rice farmers and takes customary rules into consideration. The company has gradually increased the capital it has invested in rice production and processing, and negotiations with producers enabled it to lease 1000 hectares in 2014 and conclude contracts with 660 producers. West African Farm, an English firm investing in the Diéri area since 2011, has also negotiated with local producers. Through its employees, it directly manages market gardening operations covering 200 hectares allocated to it by the municipality of Ngnith in exchange for a contribution to the municipal budget. The company does not source products from local producers but has constructed a canal to irrigate 200 hectares of land farmed by local producers. Meanwhile, Senhuile-Senethanol has relied on political support to impose its presence on agro-pastoralists in the areas. It is an Italian-Senegalese firm that has obtained access to 20,000 hectares located within the Ndial nature reserve to produce biofuel. Despite certain investments benefiting surrounding villages (schools, health centres, mosques), its activities block the rangelands and access to watering points (Papazian et al., 2016). The producers excluded from the negotiations have therefore reintegrated the territorial governance process by setting up an association in order to negotiate with public authorities and the company.

Small-scale producers are affected differently by the agribusiness investments. The Fulani agro-pastoralists have seen their access to land reduced because the investments lead to the extension of farmed areas and reduce grazing land. While the arrival of West African Farms has given various producers access to irrigated land, the investments made by Senhuile-Senethanol conflict with the activities of some 9,000 agro-pastoralists. A total of 16.16% of the agro-pastoralists surveyed declared that land grabbing is a reality on their land.

When an agribusiness firm concludes a contract or integrates rice farming into its operations, agricultural practices do not necessarily change (Soullier et al., 2018). Rice farming by small-scale producers, whether contracted or not, is still intensive because it relies on the use of chemical fertilizers and herbicides. Nevertheless, the agribusiness firms do produce more overall (1.95 crop rotations per year compared to 1.15 for smallholders). This reflects the companies' efficiency by having access to inputs and investments when they need them to ensure two consecutive rice farming

seasons. Furthermore, the agribusiness firms use slightly fewer inputs, most likely to limit the economic risks linked to soil fertility losses.




Figure 2.1. Holdings of the three agribusinesses in Senegal. Source: Adapted from Soullier et al., 2018.

The effects on the income of the different producers are limited. On one hand, 11% of the agro-pastoralists and 9% of the diversified producers who were interviewed are salaried employees, working for Senhuile-Senethanol and West African Farms, respectively. However, the income of some producers in the vicinity of agribusiness firms have fallen because of land grabbing (especially by Senhuile-Senethanol). On the other hand, previous research reveals that producers do not earn a higher income when contracting with a rice processor (Soullier and Moustier, 2018). Marketing contracts, which specify quality criteria, do not include any type of quality bonus, while production contracts, which include the provision of inputs and technical advice, are signed by rice farmers who are in debt to the national agricultural bank. This type of contract enables them to continue their activity but includes a significant insurance premium and high interest rates, reducing their profits by some 38.81%.

There is a wide range of effects on the food insecurity of producers. Producers working for agribusinesses can allocate their additional income to food, whereas those whose activities are restricted by agribusiness firms fall into severe food insecurity. Furthermore, industrial rice farmers who have signed a marketing contract can reduce their food insecurity, since this type of contract lowers farmgate price variability. Households can therefore more reliably predict the amount of the harvest to sell in order to repay their outstanding loan, and thus the amount they can keep for their own consumption (Soullier and Moustier, 2018).

► Casablanca, Morocco: an emerging system of governance, as illustrated by the Ouled Hadda industrial zone

The demographic context in Morocco is typified by strong pressure on urban zones due to demographic growth and rural exodus. A major part of the urban population lives in a handful of large towns (Schaffar and Nassori, 2016).

A quarter of Morocco's urban population lives in the Casablanca-Settat region, which covers 2.7% of the national territory (HCP, 2020, figures from 2014). While its agricultural potential is recognized (with around 15% of the national total cultivated area), the region also plays a decisive industrial role. It generates 74.5% of national industrial production in terms of value and attracted over 80% of industrial investments in the country in 2015.

The industrial zone of Ouled Hadda is the perfect illustration of this context. It is situated in the province of Mediouna (bordering Casablanca), around 15 kilometres south-east of the centre of Casablanca in the city's immediate outskirts. It was chosen for the case study because of its high agricultural potential and attractiveness to new business.

Data were collected through a long-term field study that was carried out from June to December 2018 in Casablanca and the surrounding area.¹

The Ouled Hadda industrial zone is part of the Sidi Hajjaj Oued Hassar Municipality, which had just over 20,000 inhabitants and covered around 10,000 ha of land as of 2014. At this same date, the industrial zone's potentially utilizable agricultural area was estimated at 68% of the total surface area, including 300 irrigated ha of privately-owned lots (known as *melk*) ranging from medium to large size (7.7 ha on average). Three quarters of these lots were occupied by the owners. The agricultural purpose of this land is, moreover, formally set out in a master urban planning document developed by the Ministry of Urban Planning and approved by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1984.

The zone attracted private industrial investments (mainly from the plastic and steel industries) as early as 2004 when land was acquired by private stakeholders with a view to building warehouses along the N9 highway. Official permission for construction rights was granted for a specific area, an industrial zone in Tit Mellil,

1. The results presented are based on around 20 interviews (Lenseigne and Bigneat, 2019) with Mediouna's Chamber of Agriculture, the urban agencies of the National Office of Agricultural Council and the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture and with a central property development agency, the Agricultural Development Agency, as well as with three farmers from the Mediouna province. Here, we mainly make use of two semi-structured interviews with: 1) Casablanca's Regional Investment Centre, which is in charge of allocating waivers (known as *dérogations* in French) concerning land use to enable construction of the biggest regional business projects, and 2) Casablanca's Wilaya, a regional body run by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The first-hand information obtained was then completed through the study of official websites and policy documents issued by Moroccan authorities: the Urban Agency, the Regional Investment Centre and the Ministry of Urban Planning. Furthermore, the most thorough attention possible was paid to articles in the Moroccan press. A geographic study of land use carried out via Google Earth Pro© software then rounded out our data.

on the eastern side of the municipality. In the pipeline since 2007, the Ouled Hadda industrial zone has been recognized by the authorities in charge of urban development (i.e., the Urban Agency, the Regional Investment Centre) mainly as a reaction to investors using derogations to set up new businesses. This way of overriding usual rules (by special dispensation) was authorized at a national level in 1999, in order to make obtaining construction permits easier for projects that did not fall within the scope of the regulatory conditions in force at the local level (Es-Sallak, 2018). Frequent recourse has been made to such methods in the zone under study (La Vie Eco, 2011). Following the development of a dense industrial network, the industrial purpose of the zone was officially acknowledged by Casablanca's master urban planning document in 2010. At that time, it was the largest industrial zone in Morocco, covering 840 ha of the municipality's land.

Once Ouled Hadda had been declared an industrial zone, a public-private partnership was established in which the industrial partners largely funded the servicing of the site. Working together as an economic interest group, they were asked to pay for the site development as part of an agreement signed with the Regional Investment Centre. The Sidi Hajjaj Municipality does not appear to have been consulted at any point in the development process of this industrial zone, its financial means having been judged too limited to fund such a development.² Therefore, the municipality was not granted the right to be involved in the decisions in a national system where a decentralized decision-making process is at an early stage and where the private stakeholders have a large negotiation power and face legal flexibility (special dispensations).

In conclusion, this study has led us to ponder the implications of the decisions being taken on peri-urban areas where demographic pressure is strong and with the advent of bodies aiming to oversee current practices (North, 1990). The example chosen for this study demonstrates a tendency to regulate existing practices rather than to implement proactive policies defining a preferred strategy (Evans, 1999). This approach raises the concern that such practices may become increasingly common due to the likelihood of them being accepted in the future by the authorities in charge of local urban development (the Urban Agency, the Regional Investment Centre).

►► Purchasing land for agricultural projects in France's Île-de-France region

The aim of this study was to decide whether the use of pre-emptive agricultural rights by local authorities is likely to boost local agriculture in large metropolitan areas like the Île-de-France (the French region where Paris is located). We worked on a database of 784 pre-emptive decisions made by SAFER³ at the request of municipalities located in the Greater Paris area (2007–2017). With regards to the methods used, we analysed the SAFER data (factorial analysis, descriptive statistics)

2. Source: interview with the Regional Investment Centre, 2018.

3. SAFER: *Société d'aménagement foncier et d'établissement rural*, a French organization that supports projects in rural areas to serve the public interest.

and also examined qualitative data made up of in-depth interviews with a panel of 15 local authorities identified in our data as the most affected by pre-emptive choices.

The agricultural spaces in the Greater Paris area have become increasingly urbanized over the last few decades due to the need for housing, offices and the infrastructure necessary to support the development of the Parisian agglomeration. In the Île-de-France region, key players from a non-agricultural background are very active in the farmland real estate market. In fact, in 2011, some 3,260 farm properties (farmland, or mixed properties with land and farm buildings) were sold to non-agricultural buyers, while just 942 were sold to agricultural buyers (Charre et al., 2012). Since the year 2000, the market has been dominated by buyers and sellers who do not work in agriculture (incidentally, this market represents only 1% of the regional agricultural surface area; see Basciani-Funestre and Darley, 2013; Guelton, 2013). The land assets and the flow of agricultural land (the market) are therefore mainly controlled by individuals from outside the agricultural world. These individuals do not have the same aims in terms of land development as agricultural buyers or landowners. They are likely to prioritize generating a – preferably high – profit rather than maintaining and conserving agricultural practices.

In the early 1960s, France undertook a general reform of farmland policies to regulate the land market: a mechanism of authorization-to-farm was set up and local agencies (SAFERs) dedicated to farmland management and land-price monitoring were created (Boinon, 2011). Since the French rural law of 8 August 1962 was enacted, SAFERs have benefited from pre-emptive rights that allow them to intervene in property transactions and regulate the agricultural land market (Grimonprez, 2016). Pre-emptive rights can be defined as priority purchasing rights over assets intended for sale by their owner (Struillou and Hostiou, 2011). According to the French rural law, SAFERs can only exercise their pre-emptive rights when agricultural properties, the personal assets associated with them or vacant lots are transferred for valuable consideration. The role played by SAFERs is all the more important since local authorities have no pre-emptive rights over the agricultural land, countryside or woodlands under their jurisdiction the way they do over their urban spaces or future developable land (via urban pre-emptive rights).

To start with, we concentrated on the way pre-emptive decisions could be represented geographically by comparing them to data on real estate pressures. The municipalities that most often appeal to SAFERs, as part of their land monitoring and intervention agreement, are in the immediate vicinity of Paris (within a radius of 10 km to 30 km around the capital) and in sectors where the cost of agricultural land is considerably higher than average regional values (the green belt, the Yvelines region). The prices charged in these sectors are generally over 10 euros per square metre.

Given that the sale values of agricultural land are negotiated based on usual prices on the local market, they are particularly expensive, which seems to indicate a non-agricultural use (such as gardens or purchasing with a view to building) and illustrate the difficulties agricultural buyers (whether well-established or not) experience when they try to purchase land. This is, moreover, one of the first things we noticed when we analysed our data: from January 2010 to December 2017 in the Île-de-France region, 72% of the assets acquired due to pre-emptive decisions had their price revised. When revisions are granted (which systematically results

in a price reduction), they significantly reduce the sale price: in half of these cases, the modified prices were 75% less than the prices indicated in the declaration of intent to transfer; in 84% of the cases, the price reduction was more 50%, and in 98% of the cases more than 25%. These figures illustrate the continuing pressure on agricultural assets in Île-de-France, where they are sold at prices that are closer to those of building lots rather than those of land meant for agricultural use or as countryside. One of the reasons for this upward trend is the preponderance in this market of players from outside the realm of agriculture.

Secondly, we focused on the characteristics of the land acquired through pre-emptive decisions, looking at its zoning on local land-use plans, its outward appearance and finally its true nature. Concerning zoning regulations, over half the pre-emptive decisions were taken in non-agricultural zones (e.g., natural zones), where derogations exist for building extensions and speculation on farmland plots is therefore more likely. Among the 784 pre-emptive decisions made between 2010 and 2017 by SAFERs at the request of different municipalities, it appears that 59% of the lots acquired via pre-emptive decisions had a surface area of between 1000 square metres and one hectare and that 32% of the lots have a surface area of under 1000 square metres. The minor scale of these acquisitions leads us to believe that such decisions were motivated more by the desire to prevent real estate speculation rather than by any grand projects on the agricultural front.

Our field surveys allowed us to identify two major motivations for invoking pre-emptive rights:

1. The main reason that municipalities exercise pre-emptive rights is to prevent real estate speculation. These municipalities tend to ask for SAFERs' help in acquiring undeveloped or partially developed agricultural land in order to sell it on to non-agricultural buyers: people looking for a second home or a private garden, or the travelling community.
2. A second reason that municipalities invoke pre-emptive rights is to support local agricultural projects (e.g., local vegetable production), often in conjunction with other policy tools (e.g., protective planning regulations). While such examples are still in the minority, they have become more common over the last few years of the decade under study.

In conclusion, both our quantitative studies on the pre-emptive agricultural decisions taken at the request of towns and the semi-structured interviews we conducted allowed us to highlight some major land-use conflicts in the rural and peri-urban areas of the Greater Paris region.

The phenomenon of scattered urbanization described in our work had been identified by preliminary interviews, but our investigation brought it into sharper focus than expected. All things considered, scattered urbanization has turned out to be the main reason local authorities intervene in the management of their agricultural land. Although an oft-cited justification, protecting and conserving agricultural land is generally a secondary consideration. In some towns, the links between the different tools that give leverage over land assets help resolve issues of scattered urbanization and support agricultural activity as part of a consistent land management strategy. Forming a partnership with a SAFER is an option that towns can choose if they wish and if they allocate resources to it. This is less often the case in small rural

municipalities, which may thus find themselves powerless to deal with the issue of scattered urbanization on their agricultural land.

►► Conclusion

All the research presented in this chapter highlights a certain scope for action at regional level for public authorities, in order to protect farmers from the market rationales at play in terms of land use. The effects of public policies nevertheless remain limited; this is partly due to the coexistence of official institutions, customs and actual practices of private stakeholders.

In Senegal, the changes in territorial governance caused by agribusiness investments depend on the involvement of customary and legal institutions. There are numerous producers from different ethnic groups, located in a range of places and conducting various activities, and they are affected in diverse ways by these investments. Certain producers have seen their control over territorial agricultural resources diminish and have lost access to land, income and food security. Nevertheless, these same agribusinesses sometimes compensate for failing public policies by providing certain basic socioeconomic infrastructures that help increase acceptance among the population (Soullier et al., 2018). To avoid small-scale producers' loss of control of their territorial agricultural resources, agribusiness leaders and local authorities should respect customary rules, which govern the management of agricultural resources and identify mechanisms for controlling and enforcing the set of concluded agreements.

In the peri-urban area of Casablanca, the legal system allowing for the local urban schemes to be bypassed was conveniently overused by real estate promoters, in order to direct industrial development, presumably at the expense of agricultural land use. The acknowledgement of existing situations by public authorities may first lead to a lock-in effect, and later to repetitive practices by private stakeholders. A clear division of competences between the various national and subnational agencies could improve the promotion of a coherent general development design in conjunction with urban planning.

In île-de-France, various uses of the pre-emptive right are revealed. Municipalities first aim to freeze a situation, in order to avoid scattered urbanization, as a defensive strategy. Only then can local agricultural projects emerge as a result of proactive decisions.

In the context of rapid evolutions in terms of investments and use of private and public land, decisions lead to changes or adjustments of institutions and the results of some of them, like building in France and Morocco or the displacement of agro-pastoralists in Senegal, are difficult to reverse.

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